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Contributors

Marcin Bogucki – graduate of cultural studies, art history and musicology. PhD candidate in the Section for Theatre and Performance in the Institute of Polish Culture at the University of Warsaw. In 2012 he published a book about Peter Sellars's operatic work [Teatr operowy Petera Sellarsa]. Member of the Polish Society for Theatre Research, since 2016 – secretary of the Society, and member of the Organisation Générale des Amateurs de l'Eurovision.

Małgorzata Gamrat – (habilitation degree) works at The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin and at the Academy of Art in Szczecin. She obtained her PhD at the Jagiellonian University and at the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris (2012); habilitated doctor at the University of Warsaw (2017). She conducts research on the European culture of the eighteenth and twenty-first centuries, especially music and literature and their interactions. She also translates music texts from French, including Alexander Tansman and Vladimir Jankélévitch. Her academic interests include music semiotics, the methodology of interdisciplinary research, French song, the migration of 20th century composers and the history of music teaching. Author of several dozen articles and two monographs on Liszt's work: *Muzyka fortepianowa Franza Liszta z lat 1835–1855 w kontekście idei 'correspondance des arts' [Piano music by Franz Liszt from 1835-1855 in the context of the 'correspondance des arts' idea]* (2014 - Prize of the Polish Composers' Union Prize of Prof. H. Feicht 2015) and *Między słowem a dźwiękiem. Pieśni na głos i fortepian Franza Liszta [Between Word and Sound. Songs for voice and piano by Franz Liszt]* (2016 - Rector of the University of Warsaw Clio 3rd degree 2017 award).

Iłona Iwańska – In 2009 graduated with honours from the Academy of Music in Krakow, where she studied theory of music, spending one semester at Birmingham Conservatoire in the United Kingdom (2008). Also pursued comparative studies at the Faculty of Polish Studies, Jagiellonian University. Her academic interests focus on two areas: the rhetoric of major-minor tonality and the transformations of musical idiom in the first half of the 20th century; and the relationship between music and literature and the Word-Tone relationship. Iwańska has taken part in several Polish and international musicological conferences, and published over twenty articles, essays, interviews and concert programme notes in Polish and English. She works as an assistant at the Chair of Theory and Analysis of Musical Work, where she wrote her PhD dissertation in 2016. She is an editorial board member of academic journal *Teoria Muzyki. Studia. Interpretacje. Dokumentacje*. She is the recipient of several scientific scholarships.

Eliza Krupińska – PhD in philosophy (Jagiellonian University, 2016); MA in musicology (Jagiellonian University, 2009). She works at Intercollegiate Institute for Church Music – Pontifical University of John Paul II (from 2018), Institute of Pedagogy – Jagiellonian University (from 2016). She is the author of articles in *Res Facta Nova* and *Interdisciplinary Studies in Musicology*. Her research interests focus on semiotics, aesthetics and topics combining musicology and humanities.

Krzysztof Lipka – musicologist, philosopher and art historian, retired professor of The Chopin University of Music, a long-term editor of the Polish Radio (Polskie Radio Program II, Polish Radio Three, Polskie Radio BIS), writer and poet. His scientific interests focus on aesthetics philosophical, especially the ontology of a musical work, abstract art and the relationship between art and ethics. Author of over twenty books, including *Utopia realized. Metaphysical basis of the content of the work musical* (Warsaw 2009), *Landscape of Hope. The Historical Development of Music as a Process of Character teleologiczny* (Warsaw 2010), *Entropy of culture. Art in a postmodern trap*

(Warsaw 2013), *Abstraction and space. A Sketch on the Expansion of Thoughts and Art* (Warsaw 2017).

Elżbieta Nowicka – a professor of the Institute of Polish Philology at Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań. Her research focusses on Romantic literature, the history of drama and theatre, and the history and aesthetics of opera. From 2012 to 2018 she organised a series of academic conferences devoted to opera librettos and to cantata and oratorio. Recent book publications: *Oblicza wieku dziewiętnastego. Studia z historii literatury, teatru i opery* [Facets of the nineteenth century: studies from the history of literature, theatre and opera] (Poznań, 2017) (co-author: Alina Borkowska-Rychlewska) and *Opery Verdiego w polskich dziewiętnastowiecznych przekładach* [Operas by Verdi in nineteenth-century Polish translations] (Poznań, 2016) (co-author: Alina Borkowska-Rychlewska).

Iwona Sowińska-Fruhtrunk – PhD, conductor and music theorist. She studied at the Academy of Music in Kraków and the College of Musical Arts at the Bowling Green State University in Ohio (USA). In August 2004 she made her international opera debut at the Teatro Colón in Buenos Aires conducting *Ubu Rex* by Krzysztof Penderecki. She has prepared and conducted the premieres of *The Queen of Spades* by Pyotr Tchaikovsky at the Krakow Opera House (April 2008) and *L'elisir d'amore* by Gaetano Donizetti at the Bydgoszcz Opera House (April 2009). She has published several dozen of articles, essays and programme notes and participated in numerous international conferences in Poland and abroad. Her doctoral thesis was focused on the problematics of musical representation in Arnold Schoenberg's works. Currently she is a Research Assistant in the Department of Theory and Interpretation of Musical Work at the Academy of Music in Kraków and the Editorial Secretary of the scientific journal 'Theory of Music. Studies, Interpretations, Documentations'. She was the Principal Investigator (PRELUDIUM 11) and is one of the Main Investigators (DAINA 1) in the research projects financed by the National Science Centre.

Małgorzata A. Szyszkowska – works as an adjunct at the Fryderyk Chopin University of Music in Warsaw. She is an author of a monograph *Listening-in to Music. A Study in Phenomenology of Listening* (Warsaw 2017) and articles on aesthetics, phenomenological aesthetics and philosophy of music. From 2016 she was as a founder and now is a member of Research Center for Philosophy of Music affiliated with the Institute of Philosophy and the Foundation Form. From 2017 she is a director of a project *Philosophy of Music. Metaphysic, Phenomenological and Deconstructive Pathways to Researching Music, its Practice and Theory* no. 2016/23/B/HS1/02325 financed by the National Center for Science.

Anna Tenczyńska – researcher and lecturer at the Comparative Literature Department at the University of Warsaw. Research interests: intermedial studies, especially relationships between literature and music, historical poetics, especially modern Polish poetry, methodology of literary and comparative studies, translation. Member of the Intersemiotic and Intermedial Research Group at the Institute of Polish Literature (University of Warsaw), the Polish Comparative Literature Association, the Karol Szymanowski Music Society and the Polish Literary Translators Association. Author of several articles about relationships between literature and music; translator of numerous works devoted to literary theory, comparative literature, art theory and musicology, including Karol Berger's *A Theory of Art* (New York 2000), in Polish translation as *Potęga smaku. Teoria sztuki* (Gdańsk 2008).

From the editors

The volume is dedicated to the memory of Maciej Jabłoński (1962-2017), a musicologist from Poznań, long-time editor-in-chief of *Interdisciplinary Studies in Musicology* and one of the journal's initiators.

Maciej Jabłoński thought and acted in the field of broadly understood musicology, musical aesthetics and philosophy of music. He was the initiator of scholarly events, seminars and sessions; he supported and developed the academic community, initiated discussions on music as an artistic, cultural and philosophical phenomenon.

Some of the texts collected in the volume were originally delivered at the conference *Freedom of music - freedom in music*, which took place on September 14-16) 2018 to September at the Castle in Krokowa and was dedicated to the memory of Maciej Jabłoński. This event was held in cooperation with the Research Center for Philosophy of Music at the University of Warsaw, Department of Systematic Musicology of the Adam Mickiewicz University, and the Department of Aesthetics and Philosophy of Culture of the University of Gdańsk. The cooperation of these three centers is the result of Maciej Jabłoński's extensive academic contacts, as well as his interdisciplinary interests.

Many of the authors publishing in this volume also belonged to *Laboratorium Myśli Muzycznej* [Laboratory of Musical Thought], a nationwide project initiated at the end of 2009 and addressed to young musicologists, academics and humanists from other disciplines. The activity of the laboratory was originally based on the organization of interdisciplinary discussions on the problems presented in the subsequent issues of *Res Facta Nova* and *De Musica* and the topics proposed by individual centers, but the project quickly gained autonomy. The laboratory covered such centers as Gdańsk, Poznań, Kraków, Katowice and Wrocław (both music academies and universities) and resulted in numerous meetings, conferences (*Music and language* conference on June 1, 2010 in Kraków) and discussions at music festivals such as *Musica Polonica Nova* in Wrocław. On October 28-29, 2011, the Musical Thought Laboratory Festival was held in Jelenia Góra, with concerts at the Lower Silesian Philharmonic (including premieres) and discussions.

The result of this project was also five publications issued as part of the publishing series *Biblioteka Laboratorium Myśli Muzycznej* [the Musical Thought Laboratory Library] by the Poznań Society for the Advancement of the Arts and Sciences: *Marcin Bogucki, Teatr operowy Petera Sellarsa. Inscenizacje Händla i Mozarta z lat 80. XX wieku* [Peter Sellars' Opera Theater. Händel and Mozart productions from the 1980s] (2012); *Neuroestetyka muzyki* [The Neuroaesthetics of Music] (2013), edited by Marcin Bogucki, Adrian Foltyn, Piotr Podlipniak, Piotr Przybysz, and Hanna Winiszewska; Paweł Siechowicz, *Wyobrażenia muzyczna*

Mikalojusa Konstantinasa Čiurlionisa [The Musical Imagination of Mikalojus Konstantinas Čiurlionis] (2015); *Peter Kivy i jego filozofia muzyki* [Peter Kivy and his philosophy of music] (2015) edited by Anna Chęcka-Gotkowicz and Maciej Jabłoński and *Nowa muzykologia* [New Musicology] (2016), edited by Maciej Jabłoński and Małgorzata Gamrat.

The contacts initiated by the laboratory remain alive to this day, and the wide range of interests of its members is evidenced, for example, by the texts from the current volume.

Ewa Schreiber
Małgorzata Szyszkowska
Hanna Winiszewska

MARCIN BOGUCKI

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5349-1208>
Institute of Polish Culture, University of Warsaw

Chopin goes global. The cultural history of the 14th Chopin Competition¹

ABSTRACT: The article focuses on the cultural history of the 14th edition of the International Chopin Piano Competition held in Warsaw in 2000. The main aim is to analyze how the organizer, Fryderyk Chopin Society in Warsaw, tried to bring up to date the form of the competition in which the main prizes had not been awarded in the two previous editions (1990 and 1995). Changes were made in the regulations of the jury, the Warsaw Philharmonic hall was also refurbished and modern technology was used. However, the competition took place in the middle of an ongoing conflict between the Society and the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage over the organization of the competition and the Chopin heritage, and this resonated strongly with the event. The first prize was awarded that year to a Chinese pianist – Yundi Li. The verdict was widely approved but there were also some controversies over the jury's decisions. The press discourse on the competition is also analyzed, especially in the context of racial essentialism and the 'clash of civilizations' (term borrowed from Samuel Huntington).

KEYWORDS: Chopin, piano, competition, globalization, race, Edward W. Said, Samuel Huntington

'In the nearest future the Warsaw Okęcie airport will be named after Fryderyk Chopin. I strongly believe that his music, his mazurkas, polonaises, will be the best invitation to Poland. Chopin's Poland, Poland of strong tradition and universal values but also Poland of the 21st century – modern Poland hospitable for every guest'. In his speech during the concert of the winners of the 14th Chopin Competition held in Warsaw in 2000 Aleksander Kwaśniewski (2000), the president of the Republic of Poland, focused on the role of the composer in local and global context. He strongly emphasized the paradoxes of Chopin's music which is, at the same time, rooted in tradition and conveys a universal message, is marked by national identity but also belongs to the global heritage. This dualism was the main reason for choosing Chopin as the patron of the biggest airport in the country. The timing of revealing this information was not coincidental. Closing the competition, Kwaśniewski also marked the end of an extended

¹ This text is an abridged version of a chapter prepared for a forthcoming monograph about the Chopin Competition prepared in the research project Cultural History of the International Fryderyk Chopin Competition supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, under Grant number 2016/21/B/HS2/00684.

Chopin Year, recognized worldwide from the beginning of 1999 on the decision of UNESCO as the commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the composer's death.

Fryderyk Chopin Society in Warsaw (TiFC), organizer of the competition, was in a difficult situation after two editions without winners of the main prizes. Many talked about the crisis of the competition and the risk that it might lose its prestige. Andrzej Jasiński, a longtime member of the jury, was appointed as the head of the judges. The rules of the competition were changed radically (*Regulamin XIV Międzynarodowego Konkursu Pianistycznego im. Fryderyka Chopina*, 2000). Instead of the arithmetic mean, taken from the sum of points awarded by the jury, a new way of scoring was introduced. It combined two systems: each member of the jury expressed his or her opinion about the competitor by choosing between 'yes' and 'no', to indicate whether he or she wanted to hear that person in the next stage. However, the performance was still assessed with points (from 1 to 100). After the first, second and third stages, votes from the first system were counted and competitors qualified for the next stage. If two or more competitors received the same number of 'yes' votes, the second system was used. The average was calculated from the points but some corrections occurred in the scores very divergent from it. In the finals the jury members were using points from 1 to 12. A longer discussion was stipulated after the final session.

Modifications were introduced not only in the grading system. Rules of the competition also stated that the teachers of the competitors were not allowed to evaluate their students (in earlier editions this was not compulsory) and nominate them for special prizes. To reduce the danger of not awarding the main prize again, the best contestant did not have to obtain a certain minimum amount of points at every stage. This time it was the jury's decision to vote for the winner. Another important change was the reduced number of pianists who qualified (based on video recordings) for the first stage – down to 98 (from 140 in the previous edition). The organizers also withdrew the novelty from 1995 which obliged contestants to perform in the finals more than one of the piano concertos or another piece for piano and orchestra by Chopin (the cause was the time overload of the last stage).

The main goal of this alteration was, firstly, to secure high standard of pianism in the first, longest stage; secondly, to change the mechanism used in the previous editions while measuring the average (mean), thus promoting 'compromise' performances and eliminating controversial individualities; and, thirdly, to avoid the accusation that the verdict had been rigged (although the jury's marks were still classified as secret). In order to regain some of the undermined prestige of the competition, the organizers also invited a more international group of judges (with the ratio of 8 jury members from Poland out of the total of 23) and persuaded Martha Argerich to join the jury.² In 1980, the last time when Argerich took part in the jury panel, she left the competition in an atmosphere of

² The jury members: Andrzej Jasiński (chairman), Piotr Paleczny (vice-chairman), Bernard Ringeissen (vice-chairman), Martha Argerich, Edward Auer, Paul Badura-Skoda, Arnoldo Cohen, Sequeira Costa, Halina Czerny-Stefańska, Ikuko Endo, Kazimierz Gierzod, Lidia Grychtolówna, Adam Harasiewicz, Eugene Indjic, Ivan Klánský, Victor Merzhanov, Germaine Mounier, Hiroko Na-

scandal. She was supposed to arrive in Warsaw for the second stage and everyone was awaiting her impatiently.

The competition took place in the newly renovated hall of the Warsaw Philharmonic. Its previous season was shortened in order to secure enough time for the refurbishments – the last concert took place in April 2000 (MSP, 2000, 29 Sep.).³ Although at the beginning of October the work was still going on, the building was opened for the Chopin event. Shortly before the reopening one could see papers on the floor and smell the freshly painted walls. The main hall and foyer were refurbished, the organ, lighting and floors were brand new. Instead of the old, worn out and creaking seats, new ones were installed – more comfortable, quieter, in elegant claret colour. The number of places was not reduced but the seats were shortened in order to make it easier to pass between the rows. The air conditioning was still waiting to be installed. Everything was nearly ready for a ‘new beginning’ but the event itself had some ups and downs.

The competition took place in the middle of a war between the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage and the Fryderyk Chopin Society in Warsaw (TiFC) about the organization of the competition (Kamiński, 2000, 22 Aug.). Eventually TiFC decided to minimise the impact of the Ministry and organized the competition with the help of private sponsors (Marczyński, 2000, 21 Sept.). The ministry secured only the funding for the main awards from the budget of 4 million zloty estimated by TiFC.⁴

The argument between the two institutions reignited the question that had been asked a decade earlier: to whom belongs Chopin’s heritage? It is worth mentioning that the society of Chopin aficionados was established in 1945 to replace the prewar Chopin Institute. It organized the competition as a commission of the Ministry of Culture and Art. Until 1990 the Ministry had been in charge of appointing the directors and the jury of the competition. Before the 1995 edition the board of TiFC cancelled the prerogative of the Ministry to choose the jury. The Ministry, deprived of any influence, accused the society of its policies, also financial, not being transparent enough, and claimed that it was not worthy of being entrusted with managing the Polish cultural heritage. The society, it has to be stressed, also made controversial decisions, for example selling the copyright for Chopin’s image to a company that made a brand of vodka with his name. The proposal was to take the organization of such an important event away from

kamura, Sergio Perticaroli, Annerose Schmidt, Regina Smendzianka, Józef Stempel, Arie Vardi, Jan Ekier (honorary chairman).

³ The text is based on searches in the following newspapers, magazines and journals: *Angora*, *Antena*, *Dziennik Bałtycki*, *Dziennik Łódzki*, *Dziennik Polski*, *Dziennik Zachodni*, *Express Ilustrowany*, *Gazeta Krakowska*, *Gazeta Olsztyńska*, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Głos*, *Głos Koszaliński*, *Głos Pomorza*, *Głos Szczeciński*, *Głos Wielkopolski*, *Głos Wybrzeża*, *Ilustrowany Kurier Polski*, *Kaleidoscope*, *Kurier*, *Kurier Lubelski*, *Kurier Szczeciński*, *Łączność*, *Muzyka 21*, *Nasz Dziennik*, *Nie*, *Nowości*, *Pani*, *Plon*, *Polityka*, *Press*, *Przegląd*, *Puls Biznesu*, *Rocznik Chopinowski*, *Ruch Muzyczny*, *Rzeczpospolita*, *Super Express*, *Trybuna*, *Trybuna Śląska*, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Tygodnik Solidarność*, *Wprost*, *Wychowanie Muzyczne w Szkole*, *Wiadomości Dnia*, *Więź*, *Viva!*, *Życie*, *Życie Warszawy*.

⁴ 25 000 dollars for the first prize, 20 000, 15 000, 11 000, 8 000 and 6 000 respectively for the other prize winners.

the activists and hand it over to the professionals. The society's answer to those threats might be regarded as blackmail – if the society was deprived of the organization of the competition, then it would go to court and make it a registered trademark.

This turbulent quarrel was viewed with great distaste: TiFC appeared to be an institution focused on making money, while the Ministry seemed like a group of cruel bureaucrats destroying decades of work. The conflict was resolved only temporarily. In the parliament a proposed bill protecting the composer's heritage had already been under discussion and the idea of restoring the former Chopin Institute – a national institution that would break the monopoly of TiFC – was being considered.

Two weeks before the beginning of the competition it was announced that the 14th edition would be organized mostly from private fundings.⁵ However the overall budget of the event was not revealed. With the change of support an increase in ticket prices was observed – the most expensive ones cost more than 300 zł and for the first concert of prize winners one would have to pay even more – 450 zł (a loaf of bread cost around 1.5 zł).⁶ However, attendance was still relatively high. During the first stages the popularity of the competition was lower – as in every edition – but in the later stages it became more difficult to buy tickets. Despite the high cost of tickets, the organizers also reserved the possibility to buy last minute entrance ticket for 10 zł. During the finals the audience was not only standing by the walls but also sitting on the floor.

The competition began just after the closing ceremony of the Olympics in Sydney and during the last days of the presidential campaign in Poland.⁷ Those events – sport, political and musical rivalry – were on the covers of the newspapers at the beginning of October. Not only were the competitions taking place in the middle of big changes, the country was also searching for a new place for itself in the world order after 1989. In 1999, ten years after the political transformation, Poland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and it was also negotiating access to the European Union. A mixture of expectations and fears accompanied not only the competition but the whole political climate.

Eventually 94 pianists from 25 countries participated in the competition. In the corridors comments were heard that it is a 'Chinese' edition. In his popular history of the competition Janusz Ekiert (2002, p. 5) labelled it 'Asian'. The preceding chapters were titled after the surnames of the winners or abstract ideas (blossom, revival etc.), but the case of the 14th competition was different – geography came to the forefront. Although among the prize winners from previous editions one can easily name Asian pianists (e.g. Chinese Fou Ts'ong – third place in 1955, Li Ming-Qiang – fourth place in 1960, Vietnamese Dang Thai-Son laureate of the first prize in 1980 and a few Japanese pianists), the number of contestants from the Far East in 2000 was significant: 39 persons altogether

⁵ This edition took place between 4 and 22 October, the contest itself between 5 and 19 October.

⁶ The full-event ticket cost 4 000 zł, the most expensive single ticket for each stage: 75 zł (first stage, the whole stage – 750), 150 zł (second stage, the whole stage – more than 1000), 210 (third stage, the whole stage 630), 330 (finals, whole stage – 660).

⁷ The elections took place on October 8.

(including China, Japan, Taiwan, Republic of Korea and Hong Kong). Ekiert observed a trend of growing involvement from the 1980s of pianists not only from Japan (20–30 participants every edition) but also other countries of the Far East. However, he did not stop at the nationality, he also tried to trace ‘Asian’ faces and surnames (even when the contestants had passports or were born in one of the European countries or in the USA) (Ekiert, 2002, p. 154). This obsession was a result of racial essentialism that could also be observed among journalists commenting on the competition.

The Asian pianists were judged harshly. Ekiert accused the whole group of lack of originality – for him they were masters in copying interpretations but at the same their art of playing was highly impersonal. Only the more talented could – according to Ekiert – express something ‘from the inside’. However, at the same time, Ekiert accused the jury (without any proof) of being biased. In his opinion they could not overcome the prejudice against the Asian influx that supposedly was drowning the American and European music markets. The evidence of this fear was for Ekiert the process of eliminating a group of Japanese pianists. However, other journalists made comments about the level of artistry of the Asian pianists from a different perspective – they praised the preparation of the Chinese team, comparing them, favourably, to the Polish contestants. Among the newspaper titles one could easily observe some military metaphors. ‘Chinese attack’ was the most repeated phrase.

The response to this attack was the rhetoric of ‘besieged fortress’. Partially it was a way to defend the ‘Polish’ interpretation of Chopin – in 2000 not even one Pole qualified to the finals. In a text for the newspaper *Głos Franciszek S. Sikorski* expressed concern that the Chinese could – metaphorically – trample down the Poles and take away their identity by taking over their symbols. He made a joke depicting the situation: ‘I hope that the Chinese will never learn how to make *osycpki* [traditional smoked cheese from the Tatra Mountains]. It would be *finis Poloniae*’ (Sikorski, 2002, 4 Nov.). More sceptical voices about the interpretations from the Far East could be heard. Jerzy Salwarowski, the artistic director of Chamber Orchestra of Toruń, in an interview for the newspaper *Nowości* stressed the difference between the European and the Asian culture: ‘It would not be good, if the leaders in the interpretation of the European music, Chopin included, so different in expressing the feelings, would become those pianists [from the Far East]. They are great in copying but there is lack of heart’ (Schulz, 2000, 21 Oct.).

Ewa Mazgal from the local newspaper *Gazeta Olsztyńska* pointed out that the Poles wanted to have Chopin only for themselves. To prove the thesis she used two anecdotes. One of the radio reporters asked the Chinese pianist Jin Ju if it was required to know the history of Poland to understand Chopin’s music. She agreed. The journalist however dug deeper and kept asking what she knew about it. Confused, the pianist had to admit that not much but she would definitely educate herself further. Another Chinese competitor answering a question about the Polishness of the composer, replied irritated: ‘Chopin’s music is Polish? But it is my music!’ (Mazgal, 2000, 13–15 Oct.). The question of nationality was an issue not only in the overviews of the competition, but also in announcing

the competitors. As well as their name, surname and registration number, information about the represented country was also announced. Paradoxically, nationality was as often underlined as downplayed, especially in the context of the 'national piano schools'. In the age of globalization, with possibilities to study in different countries, this term was seen as outdated (Marczyński, 2000, 10 Oct.).

In the previous editions the flags of the countries of competitors were displayed on the stage of the Warsaw Philharmonic; sometimes they were so big that they even partially covered the organ at the back. This time the scenery was organized differently. There was no central picture of the composer and no flowers. On the right side stood a simple backdrop with illuminated profile of the composer shaped so that it could also be seen as lightning on a blue sky. On the left side there was a smaller backdrop with a patchwork made up of flags. Blue colour dominated the stage – in the set design and the lighting. The scenery reminded one a little of a TV studio – it was simple and clean (Kędzierska, Niewiarowska, 2001). The originality of the aesthetics was praised in the newspapers.

Very often the commentators underlined the modern character of the 14th edition. For the first time the event not only had an official media partner (newspaper *Rzeczpospolita*) but also had the media patronage on the 'world wide web' (i.e. *Wirtualna Polska*). TiFC also launched a website to spread the news about the competition and to promote the composer (*chopin.pl*). It contained not only basic information about the contestants and the jury, the schedule of the competition and the extra events but also special commentaries and interviews and mp3 files from different stages (however, not updated on a regular basis). The concert of the prize winners (Friday, October 20) was also broadcast live on the website of the competition and by *Wirtualna Polska*. In the foyer of the Warsaw Philharmonic, an Internet café was built that was frequently used by the pianists as well as the audiences of the competition. Large screens were provided, so those who did not get tickets for the competition could watch the live broadcast in the chamber hall.

In 2000 the era of mobile phones began. Phones were often ringing during the recitals of the contestants: 'In the first stage only a few pianists were able to play the whole programme without the accompaniment of mobiles' – wrote ironically Grzegorz Michalski (2000) (see also: Tumiłowicz, 2000, 21–22 Oct.). A phone ringing was the first sound of the competition – it was heard just after the announcement with the request to switch off mobile phones. It was not an isolated incident – it happened many times afterwards, despite the announcements. The most spectacular one was the sonic intervention of a phone in Ning An's mazurkas op. 30 in the third stage (Jurczak, 2000, 17 Oct.).

The competition was obviously present in radio and TV. The exclusive rights to cover the event were bought, it was said for 15 000 dollars, by Polish and Japanese broadcasters (the latter even brought two filming crews) (Ginał, 2000, 27 Oct.). The cameras were present everywhere, also on the stage. The competition was still a huge media event (Barbara Niewiarowska (2001) counted 269 journalists from 15 countries accredited by the competition); however, it was praised more on the radio than television. In the main news programmes information about the competition was presented at the tail end. The broadcast

about the event was aired at the worst time (TVP 2 at 7:30 pm, simultaneously with *Wiadomości*, the main news programme on the first channel of the national broadcaster). Many complained about the standard of the TV materials – short with quite incompetent commentaries (Dybowski, 2000). The first concert of the prize winners was broadcast live on TV but everybody joked that its programme was so short because of another ‘national celebration’ later that night – a boxing fight between Andrzej Gołota and Mike Tyson (Ginał, 2000, 21–22 Oct.).

Tomasz Domalewski (2000, 27 Oct.) in the newspaper *Dziennik Polski* pointed out that this *désintéressement* of the mainstream media was a more general trend – they were focused foremost on the economy, art was only a minor topic: ‘International Chopin Competition flew through TV like an artist through a salon crowded with the first generation of businessmen. Somebody spotted something, this one and that one gave a slight cough but really nobody was impressed by the event because everybody was busy talking about credits and debtors, and names of Tchaikovsky and Bartók did not mean a thing to them’ (Domalewski, 2000, 27 Oct.). Domalewski recalled with sensitivity the times when the competition was a prominent event in the main news programmes. Nowadays – primetime is reserved for events like beauty pageants, he added. Domalewski was right in his opinion; however, it has to be emphasized that Warsaw itself was celebrating Chopin, with performances by the competitors organized in the Chopin Club in Mały Theatre, Paderewski Museum and the Cellar on Wójtowska Street.

The main hall of the Warsaw Philharmonic was shining with the new lacquered seats and painted walls, the programmes printed, the selling stands prepared, as well as the stage and places for the jury in the central area of the balcony. The stakes were high and everybody awaited a star to shine and to snatch the first prize. However the concern was getting more complex. The dramaturgy of this editions was often presented this way: the gasp of amazement at the standard of pianism in the first stage, critique of the jury’s decision after the second stage, anger aroused by the results after the third stage and eventually the acceptance of the final verdict – if not with applause, then with satisfaction that the first prize has been awarded.

The lack of one front runner caused additional excitement, especially when so many young pianists participated in this edition: more than one-quarter of the enrolled competitors, were less than 20 years old. The situation was unpredictable. The jury also recognized the potential of the candidates. They promoted 38 people to the second stage – two more than defined by the rules of the competition. Thanks to the interviews with Jasiński and to Niewiarowska’s report we could dig deeper into the work of the jury (Niewiarowska, 2001). In the ‘yes/no’ voting 35 automatically got promoted to the second stage. Additional voting was allowed for the competitors who received 9 ‘yes’ votes. Sixteen jury members were in favour of the promotion and five were against it. This decision was praised by the critics.

For the second stage Martha Argerich arrived and she was applauded by the audience ([Anon], 2000, 12 Oct.). However, the enthusiasm of some of the critics was somewhat tempered. They pointed out that some promising young pianists were missing from the list of pianists who qualified to the third stage: Tan

Xiaotang and Ju Jin from China, Yurie Miura from Japan, Giuseppe Albanese from Italy (the list was different according to each journalist). Also the blind competitor Takeshi Kakehashi from Japan, praised in both stages, did not get into the third stage. However the real outrage was provoked by the verdict after the third stage. The critics stated that many pianists who deserved to be in the finals were rejected: Ning An from the United States, considered as one of the front runners, or Mihaela Ursuleasa from Romania – so called ‘darling of the audience’ (during her performance of the B-minor Sonata two jury members, by implication from the conservative section of the jury, ostentatiously closed the scores and put them away; Bukowski, 2005). Other pianists were also treated as victims of the jury: Etsuko Hirose from France and the competitors whose interpretations were judged – like Ursuleasa’s – as controversial: Valentina Igoshina from Russia or Nicolas Stavy from France.

Some of the jurors expressed loudly their dissatisfaction with the results, despite the rules forbidding them to do so. Edward Auer said that three of his favourites were excluded from the finals (Malatyńska-Stankiewicz, 2000, 17 Oct.). Argerich, normally avoiding journalists, approached the press and – as it was described – with tears in her eyes was asking: where is Ursuleasa? (Ginał, 2000, 17 Oct.).

The final results were announced quite late – 30 minutes after midnight, one and a half hours later than expected. The winner of the competition was Yundi Li from China, the next places were given to Ingrid Fliter from Argentina, Alexander Kobrin from Russia, Sa Chen from China, Alberto Nosè from Italy and Mika Satō from Japan.⁸ Despite the earlier dispute the verdict was regarded as fair; however, the feeling of distaste remained because of the rejection of highly regarded pianists in the preceding stages. The announcement of the first prize was welcomed with a sigh of relief (no booing occurred, unlike in the last two editions). Ekiert (2002) suggested that the organizers had been influencing the jury but one could only treat it as an innuendo. We only know that the final discussion itself was pretty short – it lasted 1.5 hours (previously it could last even 5 hours). From the interviews with Jasiński we learnt that the question of awarding the first prize was vigorously discussed, as was the issue how to award the other prizes – from I do VI or ex aequo (Ginał, 2000, 21–22 Oct.). The final decision was not unanimous but had been accepted with the majority of votes (leaked information suggested that Victor Merzhanov was the most radical in his opinions and proposed not to award the three main prizes! (Dybowski, 2000).

Yundi was raised above the crowd. A comparison with Zimerman could have surely taken place; however, the Pole had been carried away by the whole gathering, this time it was the idea and execution of another competitor – Alexander Kobrin. Praise for the winner was not as huge as in 1975, but comparison with Zimerman did appear (Ginał, 2000, 21–22 Oct.; Tumiłowicz, 2000, 23 Oct.; Malatyńska-Stankiewicz, 2000, 20 Oct.). Also, Yundi himself admitted that Zimerman was one of his idols.

⁸ Honorable mentions received: Ning An, Etsuko Hirose, Valentina Igoshina, Radosław Sobczak, Nicolas Stavy and Mihaela Ursuleasa.

The 14th edition was successful only partially. The first prize was awarded, the special prize for the performance of the polonaise as well (two Chinese pianists – Yundi and Sa Chen) but in the eyes (and ears) of the jury nobody was worthy of getting a prize for the mazurkas or the concerto. The number of extra prizes grew – it turned out that Radosław Sobczak, the only Pole who qualified for the third stage, received nearly the same amount of money as the winner of the competition. Journalists expressed their dissatisfaction by giving their prize to the rejected Ursuleasa, who also received the audience award.

Eventually, the excitement was mixed with disappointment. The absence of Argerich, Ursuleasa and Igoshina during the concert of the prize winners was interpreted as a symbolic gesture. The changes in the rules of the competition did not eliminate controversies. Many commentators proposed therapies to cure the problem. They talked about changes in the number of judges and rules, including publicly announcing the scoring. Krystian Zimerman himself was expressing his hesitation about the idea of the competition and consequently rejected invitations to become a judge (Ginał, 2000, 21–22 Oct.). He felt that he was not able to select the candidates in this way. Zimerman has been actively supporting talented youth but in alternative ways, not as risky and questionable as the competition.

Some journalists announced that ‘Chopin defended himself’ (Weryński, 2000, 19 Oct.), others compared the competition to a folk museum (Sulek, 2000, 21–22 Oct.). Despite the attempt to modernize, for some of the critics in its essence it was highly conservative. Its main purpose was only to defend the non-existent standard of playing Chopin’s music. Much was said about the standard of the Polish pianists and many diagnosed a crisis of musical education in general. On October 17th, 13 minutes past midnight, the press office received an email: ‘heartfelt condolences on the day of the funeral of Polish pianism!’ (Dybowski, 2000). Emotional discussions lasted longer in the newspapers.

This edition was rather calm. Nobody had a nervous breakdown, only at the beginning some of the competitors reported flu-like symptoms (Piwowar, 2000, 20 Oct.). From time to time there were overloaded muscles, hands and tendons (in two cases the pain made it impossible to play). Towards the end of the competition more accidents occurred. One of the jury members tripped down the stairs and her condition was so severe that she stayed in hospital for medical observation. She was not the first victim of the shiny new floor of the Warsaw Philharmonic. At the entrance during the first days the organizers put up appropriate signs which stated: CAUTION, SLIPPERY FLOOR. One can sum up jokingly that this image was the best summary of the 14th edition (Tumiłowicz, 2000, 21–22 Oct.).

In 2000 the competition was presented as a modern institution: up to date, represented by youngsters. Although it was not the most diverse edition compared, for example, to 1980, when 149 pianists from 37 countries competed, thanks to the development of the Internet and stable political situation in Poland the competition achieved global outreach.

The situation was, however, not optimistic, even looked at from the perspective of funding. Jasiński also commented on the underfunding of musical

education (as one of the reasons for the crisis of Polish pianism), although he justified it by the claim that Poland was still a developing country: 'I think that the society, with the improvement of its financial state, will also understand how important spiritual culture is. I can only express my hope that it won't be too late' (Jasiński, 2000, 21–22 Oct.).

Despite the superficial, 'Olympic' openness, the commentators still used a very narrow definition of nationality. However, it has to be stressed that some other voices were heard as well. For example Jacek Kurczewski (2000) wrote: 'Globalization means that the idea of national identity of music gets more and more anachronic. Meanwhile, the Warsaw competition continues as a fortress in a red desert besieged by Asians, defending its holy mission about which everybody has already forgotten. The new century will be a period of connection between China and the West, to which Chopin belongs and to which we also want to reach out here in Warsaw. [...] Chopin is dead, all hail Cho-Pen!'

Yundi cocked a snook at the local journalists. He was not a pianist trained in Europe but grew up under the mentorship of Dan Zhaoyi, a Chinese teacher. He was the opposite of the so-called Asian copyist that the critics saw in pianists from the Far East. The whole Chinese team was prepared perfectly (part of this success was connected to the economic growth of the country). In 2015 Mariusz Herma wrote about how this trend to play the piano began and how Yundi's victory caused a boom in China where around 40–60 million children (approximate number) were learning to play the piano and three of four pianos that were sold worldwide went to Chinese households (Herma, 2015, 22 Sept.).

The Chopin Competition launched world careers of many pianists; however, Yundi was the first one to meet the aim of its special version – he became a pop star: '18 million – this is the number of fans that Yundi Li has on the social media platform Weibo [...]. It ranks him among the top ten of the local Internet celebrities. On Twitter it equals the popularity of Eminem, Mariah Carey or Christina Aguilera – and also FC Barcelona and CNN' (Herma, 2015, 22 Sept.). The contract with Deutsche Grammophon and touring in the most renowned venues were only part of his activities. Others were connected with TV concerts and advertisements for big companies. 'Why can't classical musicians be on television, or play in different kinds of concerts? That will bring a bigger audience to the music' – said Yundi in an interview, commenting on his classical concerts with pop grandeur for thousands of people, with visual effects and pyrotechnics (Eatock, 2008, 13 Feb.).

To sum up the 14th edition of the Chopin Competition from 2000 in a more lighthearted way, one could say that the event shifted from the era of Fukuyama to the era of Huntington. During the 12th and 13th editions the main prize was not awarded and many talked about the end of the competition. However, another aspect to discussions about the piano contest and its controversies was discovered – the clash of civilizations as understood in the famous book by Samuel Huntington (1997). The West presented itself as a besieged fortress, into which alien forces wanted to enter. In this case it was the attack on one of the prominent cultural achievements – Chopin. However, it is important to mention here the critique of Huntington by Edward W. Said (Said, 2001, 22 Sept.). He pointed

out that Huntington's theory is a caricatural simplification and his definition of identity and civilization – awry. In spite of appearances, they are not stable categories, permanent and static, but are a matter of negotiation, influence and diffusion. History is not only about the war of religions and conquests but also of mutual exchange. Huntington provided simple instruments to describe the world, using war rhetoric. Said compares *The Clash of Civilizations* to *The War of the Worlds* by Orson Welles – the radio drama from 1938 that broadcast the allegedly live alien invasion, causing real panic among the listening audience. Huntington was doing the same thing – under the guise of academic argument, he told the story about the war of the worlds. This type of simplified narration definitely dominated the language in which the competition was described and it would be present in the editions which followed.

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ILONA IWAŃSKA

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9787-721X>

Music Theory and Interpretation Department, Composition, Interpretation and Musical Education Faculty,
The Academy of Music in Cracow

Major-minor polarity and its expressive-semantic faces. Songs by Karłowicz, Mahler and Berg

ABSTRACT: The connection between the idea of major and minor modes and the connotations of sorrow and joy – understood as general and primal categories, some of the several basic emotions defined by psychology – is very strong. It seems that this immanent affective content of the modes manifests itself in three ways – in three basic forms: *in crudo*, *deformed* and *reversed*. The last two play a particularly important role in works marked with pessimism and neuroticism, including those by Gustav Mahler, Mieczysław Karłowicz and Alban Berg. This unnatural ‘behaviour’ of modes can be observed most easily if we study their works with text.

In the *in crudo* form, the connotations of both modes raise no doubts, and result directly from the archetypal opposition of joy and sorrow. The *deformed* form comes to the fore whenever the modes alternate in full tension, or when they merge. Both phenomena – which in fact often occur together – result in a tonal and expressive *ambivalence*, more or less distinctive. A *reversed* (negative) form concerns mainly the *major mode*, which can be explained by the fact that the minor mode is by its nature marked as ‘the Other, the deviant’, to use Adorno’s words. This form reveals itself in psychologically complicated conditions, in two manifestations of different semantic intensity: as *falsehood* or *paradox*.

A separate group of phenomena are the different variants of *picardy strategy*: (1) *extended picardy third*; (2) *false picardy effect*; (3) *denial of positive ending*; (4) *dismissal of positive ending*.

KEYWORDS: major-minor polarity, major and minor as joy and sorrow, picardy strategy

1. Major and minor as ‘twin poles of expression’

Interpreting the relationship between modes¹ in dualistic categories, which, according to Siegmund Levarie, is the ‘musical manifestation of the general principle of polarity’ (Levarie, 1992, p. 29), is the expression of a timeless and universal trend, seen by Johann Wolfgang Goethe himself as one of two ‘great driving wheels of all nature’ (Goethe, 1955, p. 547, as cited in Levarie, 1992, p. 29). Obviously, this antithetical quality is not limited to the level of musical structure: to use Deryck Cooke’s words, major and minor modes are at the same

¹ The term ‘mode’ refers here to one of the two structural types, major (due to major third) and minor (due to minor third), into which all construction composed in major-minor harmonic system can be classified. At the same time, it applies to two characters represented by these two structural types (Chodkowski, 1995, p. 207).

time the ‘twin poles of expression’ (Cooke, 1959, p. 50); they remain inextricable from some affective surplus, since the times of Gioseffo Zarlino interpreted as the opposition of happiness and sadness.

One could make a long list of examples of significant statements that confirm the permanent presence of these connotations in contemporary consciousness. What is important – as proved by Candace Brower – these associations or even attributions are not ‘merely the product of enculturation’, but they have a ‘bodily explanation’ (Brower, 2008, p. 98)². This is connected first and foremost with lesser stability of the minor chord, which departs from the harmonic series due to its minor third. But not only: Rudolf Arnheim argues that the association of the major mode with happiness, bliss and ‘vigour’, and the minor mode with sadness, stems from the fact that the first seems to be naturally predestined to an ascending melos, and the latter – at least in its harmonic and natural variation – to a descending melos (Arnheim, 1984)³. This ‘primal’ thread also emerges in the statements of other researchers. Leonard B. Meyer, referring to the correlation between the minor mode and ‘affectivity’ (in particular expressing feelings i.e. ‘sadness, suffering, and anguish’), as well as a chromatic and unstable character, sees this relationship as ‘not only a logical one but [...] a genetic one as well’ (Meyer, 1956, p. 227). In turn, Deryck Cooke, who interprets antithesis of modes in a psychoanalytical way – referring to Freudian *Lustprinzip* – puts the equal sign between the major and minor modes and two ‘basic categories of human emotions’: pleasure and pain (Cooke, 1959, p. 51).

2. Expressive-semantic faces of modes

The connection between the idea of major and minor modes and the connotations of ‘happiness’ and ‘sadness’ – understood as general and primal categories, some of the several basic emotions defined by psychology⁴ – is then very strong. The clearest and most tangible proof of it is the fact that through the use of antithesis of modes (which is one of the key rhetorical strategies of a tonal language) it is possible to evoke such complex and sublime semantic categories as *falsehood* and *paradox*. At the same time, it seems that this immanent affective content of the modes manifests itself in three ways – in three basic forms: *in crudo*, *deformed* and *reversed*. The last two play a particularly important role in works marked with pessimism and neuroticism, including those by Gustav Mahler, Mieczysław Karłowicz and Alban Berg. The unnatural ‘behaviour’ of modes can be observed most easily if we study their works with text, such as, for example, all the surviving songs (in the case of Karłowicz), *Kindertotenlieder* (in

² The author cites research which proves that such associations are made even by very small children and adults who suffered from brain damage.

³ As the author recalls, according to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, the ‘happy is up’ and ‘sad is down’ metaphors are ubiquitous in many cultures, which indicates their ‘embodied’ and universal character (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980); compare with: Brower (2000, p. 374).

⁴ According to Paul Ekman: ‘anger, fear, sadness, enjoyment, disgust and surprise’ (Ekman, 1992, as cited in Zbikowski, 2010, p. 40).

the case of Mahler) and *Sieben frühe Lieder* (in the case of Berg). It is noteworthy that the mentioned works are clearly marked with personal and spiritual experiences of their authors.

In the *in crudo* form, the connotations of both modes raise no doubts, and result directly from the archetypal opposition of joy and sorrow. Here we have:

1. Karłowicz's minor mode, Chopinian in its provenance, used to express sorrow (Anders, 1955, p. 342 and other) or fear caused by the bitter awareness of the passage of time;
2. And Mahler's minor mode, semantically specified as a symbol of mourning, etc.

The *deformed* form comes to the fore whenever the modes alternate in full tension, or when they merge. Both phenomena – which in fact often occur together – result in a tonal and expressive *ambivalence*, more or less distinctive. Typical examples are provided here by Mahler's oeuvre, where, as Theodor W. Adorno puts it, 'love and grief are always apt to go hand in hand', and the modality 'is left open, as if coming from a primeval world in which antithetical principles have not yet hardened to logical opposites'. Such 'an attitude toward reality', which the author of *Philosophy Of New Music* compares to 'gallows humour' (Adorno, 1992, p. 23) is manifested in such strategies of expression as:

1. *Bitter major*, which receives its tinge due to chromatic oscillations around the elements of the chord, or an enharmonic play on the verge of the minor mode (like in *In diesem Wetter*, ex. 1);

The image displays a musical score for G. Mahler's *Kindertotenlieder*, 5. *In diesem Wetter, in diesem Braus*. The score is in D major and 3/4 time. It begins with a piano introduction marked *pp* and *ritard.*. The vocal line starts at measure 99 with the lyrics: "In die - sem Wet - ter, in die - sem Saus, in die - sem Braus, sie". The piano accompaniment is marked *con Pedale* and *sempre pp al Fine*. The score includes a small detail of the piano introduction above the main score.

Example 1. G. Mahler, *Kindertotenlieder*. 5. *In diesem Wetter, in diesem Braus*, mm. 98–106: bitter D major

As we can see, the *F sharp* note is delayed here directly by *E sharp* ($\cong F$), and the *A* note – by *G sharp*; additionally *A sharp* ($\cong B$ flat) is put instead of *A*, *C sharp* alternates with *C*, and *B* – with *B flat*. This hesitation (possibly: arguing with God and oneself) accompanies the last repetition of the anaphora: ‘In this weather, in this windy storm’.

2. *Sorrowful major* – a kind of laughter through tears, with minor mode influences, bridled and blunted by omitting or delaying the major third (like in *Nun will die Sonn*’, ex. 2); but also – this time in Karłowicz’s works – forced between minor phrases radiating from both sides (ex. 3);

The musical score is for G. Mahler's 'Nun will die Sonn' so hell aufgehn!'. It is in D major and consists of four systems of music. The first system shows the vocal line and piano accompaniment starting at measure 10. The second system starts at measure 12 and includes the lyrics 'Un-glück, kein Un-glück die Nacht ge-schehn!'. The third system starts at measure 16. The fourth system starts at measure 20 and includes the marking 'm.s.' and 'pp'. The score features various dynamics such as 'pp mit verhaltener Stimme', 'pp', and 'espr.'.

Example 2. G. Mahler, *Kindertotenlieder*. 1. *Nun will die Sonn' so hell aufgehn!*, mm. 10–20: sorrowful D major

Here this ‘laughter through tears’ can be interpreted as the paradox of happiness that seems to pervade the external world, despite the unhappiness and emptiness experienced at the same moment by the lyrical I.

Moderato *p* op.3 nr7

Nie płacz na - de mną, kró - le - wno ma zło - ta,

cho - ciał me pier - si przy - gnia - ta tę - skno - ta; cho - ciał w mej du - szy i

smu - tno, i cie - mno, nie płacz na - de mną!

Example 3. M. Karłowicz, *Nie płacz nade mną/Weep not over me*, mm. 1–11: sorrowful E major

3. And finally minor *memento* in major, understood as consistently repeated signals of the minor mode's presence (like a persistently returning thought about a painful experience), e.g. the lowered sixth degree of the scale, direct alternations of major and minor tonic, and minor endings of tonally ambivalent phrases (like in *Nun will die Sonn*).

A *reversed* (negative) form concerns mainly the major mode, which can be explained by the fact that the minor mode is by its nature marked as 'the Other, the deviant', to use Adorno's words (Adorno, 1992, p. 26). This form reveals itself in psychologically complicated conditions, in two manifestations of a different semantic intensity: as *falsehood* or *paradox*. *False major* constitutes a kind of a mask for real emotions and as such might mean – according to a very evocative formula by James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy:

the posture of sheer bluff or cruel deception; the pitiable embracing of an illusion or emotional mirage; the projection of something intensely desired but no longer available; the deep sigh of 'if only' amidst a situation of profound loss (Hepokoski & Darcy, 2006, p. 308).

The expressive situations mentioned above, as the quoted researchers put it, 'denaturalise' the major mode, and make it an ironic phenomenon – as if 'from outside', that cannot be explained on the basis of the nearest musical and aesthetical context (Hepokoski & Darcy, 2006, p. 308). Symptoms of this kind can be found:

1. In Karłowicz's music – when the major mode manifests itself as a vehicle for oneiric escapism – an intention to escape: either to the lost paradise of childhood, or into reminiscence of lost love, or into meditation, or finally, to a different world that allows one to observe reality from a distance;

Moderato ♩ = 76 *mf* op. 1 nr 4

Wy-ko-ty-sa-łem

f *dim.* *p*

f *dim.*

cresc. *mf* *dim.*

più piano *mf*

pp *p*

più mosso *cresc.*

mf *animato* *cresc.* *f*

Wy-ko-ty-sa-łem
 cię wśród fal mych snów jak lim-bę gdzieś nad-wo-dną, śni-łem cię ci-chą i po-go-dną,
 ach, jak mi żal, jak żal... Na zie-lo-noś-ci sen-nych hal, gdzie wiatr błękit-ne mgły roz-pi-na,
 by-łaś mi dziew-czę, tak je-dy-na, ach, jak mi żal, jak żal...

Example. 4. M. Karłowicz, *Zawód/Disillusion*, mm. 1–20: the false A major as a vehicle for oneiric escapism

2. In Mahler's – when the major mode expresses itself as illusory happiness (*Nun seh' ich wohl*);

11
Au - gen! O Au - gen!

15 *p zart*
Gleich - - sam, um voll in ei - nem Blick - ke zu

18
drän - gen eu - re gan - ze Macht zu - sam - men. Dort

Example 5. G. Mahler, *Kindertotenlieder*. 2. *Nun seh' ich wohl, warum so dunkle Flammen*, mm. 11–21: the false C major as an expression of illusory happiness (bars 15–19)

3. And in Berg's – when it has a note of longing, with no hope of it being soothed (*Schilflied, Die Nachtigall* and *Im Zimmer*).

Meanwhile, we can speak about paradox when a mode that we hear is in clear contradiction to the content of a poetic text, suggesting that its sense might be different: deeper than what appears on the surface. Such cases can be found, e.g. with Karłowicz, when the major mode reveals itself as an expression of nirvana and accompanies, for example, the words about a prayer at a coffin (*Mów do mnie jeszcze/ Speak to me Still*), and also with Berg, where for example in the context of fulfilled love (*Liebesode*) or delight with God's work of creation (*Sommertage*) it is the minor mode this time that is incomprehensible and paradoxical.

Form	Major mode	Minor mode
the <i>in crudo</i> form	happiness hope excitement etc.	pain anxiety fear loneliness mourning etc.
the <i>deformed</i> form	bitter major sorrowful major (laughter through tears)	minor memento
the <i>reversed</i> form	false major (escapism, illusion) paradoxical major	paradoxical minor

Figure 1. Expressive-semantic faces of modes

A separate group of phenomena are the different variants of *picardy strategy*. This practice, known from the times of the Renaissance, which, according to Brower, constitutes ‘a reflection of the psychological desire for maximum stability at points of musical repose’ (Brower, 2000, p. 349), is universally interpreted as a ‘happy ending’ (Cooke, 1959, p. 57; Kivy, 1999, p. 289) or transportation into the ‘sphere of hope’ (Tomaszewski, 2005, p. 250). Robert Hatten sees in it a ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ and at the same time notes that the strong conventionalisation of the discussed effect has with time led to a situation where this unfulfilled expectation related to a major ending took on the dimension of a ‘denial of positive ending’ (1994, pp. 39–40). However, this strive to resolve a minor piece with the major mode does not always take the form of a *picardy third sensu stricto* – a phenomenon, which towards the end of the baroque period gradually started to fade away. Very often the change of the mode takes place much earlier and is kept until the last chord. Peter Kivy proposes that such cases – and also the cases when the major mode is introduced only by the final movement of a cyclic piece – are called ‘extended *picardy third*’ (1999, p. 289 and other).

If we take the above-mentioned arguments as a starting point, the following phenomena can be distinguished in the discussed scores:

1. *Extended picardy third* as a symbol of overcoming mourning, metaphysical hope and consolation (Mahler’s *Kindertotenlieder*);
2. *False picardy effect* as an element of the false major strategy (Berg’s *Schilflied*);
3. *Denial of positive ending*, i.e. a minor ending of a piece despite the context that builds up an expectation of a major mode fulfilment (Mahler’s *Nun will die Sonn’* and Berg’s *Liebesode* – in the context of the endings of the rest of the minor songs in the cycle);

Klang, und im Wei - - her un - - ter ge - - hen
 tain, and the wat - - er, scarce - - ly flow - - ing,

dei - nen lieb - - li - - chen Ge - -
 brings your song - - to me a - -

sang.
 gain.

mp dolce

dim.

Example 6. A. Berg, *Sieben frühe Lieder. 2. Schilflied*, mm. 23–29: false picardy effect

4. *Dismissal of positive ending*, i.e. a sudden change of modality, from major to minor, right before the final cadence (Berg's *Sommertage*, ex. 7).

poco accel. - - - - -
cresc. - - - - -

Brust, nun schweigt das Wort, wo Bild um Bild
steal, and comes in si - lence with um the Bild
view

cresc.

allargando - - - - - *ff* - - - - - *a tempo*

zu dir zieht und dich ganz er füllt.
of *ev - en - tide,* and fill - *eth* you.

(cresc.) - *p* - *ff* *marcatiss.*

Horn

f *subito mf* *p* *r. H.*

Example 7. A. Berg, *Sieben frühe Lieder*. 7. *Sommertage*, mm. 31–39: dismissal of positive ending

3. Karłowicz, Mahler and Berg, or hyperbolic, melancholic and ambivalent nature

According to the considerations above, all the three examined composers show a strong inclination to mediate the supersonic message of their statements through the major-minor opposition, and also to draw from this opposition the most extreme consequences. What is also characteristic of them is the peculiar appreciation of the minor sphere, both in terms of quantity and quality, corresponding with a psychologically profound and pessimistic tinge of their oeuvre. It is worth emphasising that inclinations of this kind – to some degree characteristic of the entire romantic music – were shown also earlier, and to a greater extent, by others, including Schubert⁵, Chopin⁶, Brahms⁷, and Grieg⁸.

Mieczysław Karłowicz finds in the minor mode a space for his melancholic personality, which is confirmed by Leszek Polony's observation that the minor keys most frequently chosen by the composer have consolidated in culture their association with 'sorrow, suffering, depression, melancholy, complaint, tragedy' (2002, p. 100). In such a context, the major mode gains a new, specified expressive-semantic quality: it becomes the expression of longing for what has been irretrievably lost or is unattainable.

Gustav Mahler exploits the dichotomy of the modes to the limit, turning it into possibly the most important channel of his expressive-semantic message. One could risk saying that in his oeuvre both tonal elements assume a hyperbolic dimension: according to Adorno's diagnosis, the minor mode functions as a 'symbol of mourning' (Adorno, 1992, p. 26), while the pure major mode, presented in *crudo* and without overtones, by and large becomes a taboo. It is also significant that the composer plays a dynamic major-minor game: he highlights the parallel relationship where the discussed contrast assumes the most extreme form⁹, leads to severe clashes and confrontations, and also to a meaningful modal mixture, and finally, uses the picardy device. As a result, in *Kindertotenlieder* alone one can observe such refined expressive and semantic phenomena – communicated through modes – as: minor *memento*, cautious and bitter major, laughter through tears, illusion of happiness, and denial of a positive ending. The pinnacle of mastery is the last section of the cycle, with a unique and extremely tense process of a gradual transformation of the minor element into the major one, symbolising a transition from the phase of despair to the phase of acceptance. Its 'happy' ending brings fulfilment of the total tonal plan, based on extended picardy third.

⁵ Compare with the interpretation of major-minor opposition in his works by Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht (1970, p. 96 and other).

⁶ The 'particular fondness of minor keys', as a phenomenon typical of Polish but also Norwegian folk music, becomes, according to Ekkehard Kreft, 'the basic principle of Chopinian aesthetic' (Kreft, 1999, pp. 459–461).

⁷ August Sturke described him even as a 'minor composer' (1932, p. 55).

⁸ About the domination of the minor mode in Grieg's music writes Kreft (1999, pp. 461–463).

⁹ This results from the fact that, as noted by Brower, with the preservation of structural fifths of the key, the perceptual awareness of the lowered thirds heightens (Brower, 2000, p. 348).

In *Sieben frühe Lieder* the fundamental tonal-expressive tensions also go along the major-minor line; however, very rarely are modes treated here literally. Their actual overtone and meaning are often the reverse of what appears at the first glance. Therefore, as regards Berg, one can speak of full-blown ambivalence; however, not of Mahler's kind (where major and minor argue with each other), but of the kind where one does not know whether the seemingly innocent major mode really 'means' major. It is worth emphasising that this phenomenon is not a sign of instability or irrelevance of affective qualities associated with modes. On the contrary, it proves their strong foundations, since a paradoxical meaning can be expressed only there, where there is no doubt about the primary meaning.

In the case of the author of *Traumgekrönt*, tonal-harmonic ambivalence stems from mental ambivalence: from a simultaneous feeling of love and longing (Floros, 1992, pp. 144–146 and pp. 150–152); from a desperate desire for happiness and a simultaneous bitter awareness of its utopian character (Adorno, 1991);¹⁰ and finally, from a paradoxical longing for death from love.¹¹ The traces of these contradictory emotional states can be easily found in the *Sieben frühe Lieder* in such moments as: the unconvincing picardy ending (*Schilflied*), the apparent major mode tinged with falsehood (*Die Nachtigall, Im Zimmer*) or the minor mode 'incompatible' with the content (*Liebesode, Sommertage*). However, among the phenomena of this category, the most striking is the very finale of the cycle, which inscribes itself in the strategy of a sudden resignation from a major resolution, despite clear signals that it should take place. This device evokes the feeling of disillusion and an overwhelming association with the expressive character of 'waiting in vain' that Adorno attributed to Berg (Adorno, 1991, p. 17).

Translated by Xymena Plater-Zyberk

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¹⁰ Adorno sees in Berg – his teacher – signs of 'a deep longing for happiness, one that perhaps knows itself to be always in vain yet remains entirely undeflected' (Adorno, 1991, p. 17); similarly, Andrzej Chłopecki notices in his early works the signs of 'longing for happiness, in the fulfilment of which he does not believe' (Chłopecki, 2013, p. 75).

¹¹ As the composer confessed to his future wife in a letter from 30 June 1909: 'Oh, Helene, sometimes, for example at this moment, I am overwhelmed by a very strong desire to have you at my side for at least a second, and, while loving you, die next to you, die from love' (as cited in Floros, 1992, p. 148).

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IWONA SOWIŃSKA-FRUHTRUNK

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7053-6607>

Music Theory and Interpretation Department, Composition, Interpretation and Musical Education Faculty,
The Academy of Music in Cracow

Neo-Mythologism and musical representation in Arnold Schoenberg's Verklärte Nacht op. 4¹

ABSTRACT: Arnold Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4 represents a special type of music in terms of the word-tone relationship, being on the borderline between programme music and musical representation (or even *ekphrasis*, as Siglind Bruhn suggests). It shows a very close relation to the poem by Richard Dehmel, by which it was inspired (although the text is absent from the work), and uses a tight web of leitmotifs of a Wagnerian type. After analysing the work in the context of three different levels of representation: mimetic, metaphoric and symbolic, *Verklärte Nacht* will be shown in this paper in the combined context of Eleazar Meletinsky's axiology of space in myth and Victoria Adamenko's concept of neo-mythologism in 20th-century music. Since Adamenko is drawing her theory from Meletinsky's *The Poetics of Myth*, observations of both authors are being presented.

KEYWORDS: musical representation, Arnold Schoenberg, Eleazar Meletinsky, Victoria Adamenko

To memory of Professor Mieczysław Tomaszewski

1. The conditions of musical representation

The life and work of Arnold Schoenberg is an inexhaustible source of interpretation and comparison. However, it seems that there is the need for introducing new contexts and using new methods regarding the composer's output. The category of representation may be another key to interpret Schoenberg's works. Nevertheless, in order to accomplish such a result certain issues should be resolved. The multiplicity of concepts of representation, or even the discrepancies between them, result firstly from the lack of unambiguous definitions of this category, and secondly from the multitude of aesthetic-philosophical theo-

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ries, which sometimes had a significant and sometimes an inconsiderable influence on musicological theories.

One of the most convincing and universal concepts of musical representation seems to be the newest theory created by Mieczysław Tomaszewski, including both the internal and external representation (as extramusical categories), so therefore the widest scope of this problematic category (Tomaszewski, 2017). Internal representation, according to Tomaszewski, means the tripartite presence of the composer in the work (of an autobiographical, autoexpressive and autoreflexive character). External representation is possible due to the context of the work. The author proposes four basic types of it: representation through imitation, transformation, parallel and opposition. Relating to this concept, it is possible to define the scope of terms that are necessary to consider the category of representation in the research. I suggest the following factors should be regarded as the necessary conditions of musical representation:²

- the intention of the composer to make the work representative (attached as a programme, note or known by any written or oral sources. There exist also so-called 'hidden programmes' and while the intention would be then rather to hide than to reveal, it is still present);
- the presence of the external inspiration, originating from an external source (that which can decide the type of representation: literal or mimetic, metaphorical or symbolical);
- the similarity of the representation to the represented object (not necessarily visual or even aural similarity; frequently, it is the similarity consisting of only one, not always obvious feature of a given object);
- the recognisability of an object of representation (because of the used text, programme, title, marks in the score, knowledge of the autobiographical background);
- the role – not to substitute, but to reinterpret the original object, with totally independent features and its own ontological status.

All the factors mentioned above refer more or less to the dimensions of representation, which (understood in this way) is present in the musical work not only at the level of interpretation, but is situated somehow between the analytical and interpretive levels, being the pre-requisite of the second level. Therefore, the level of interpretation refers mainly to the epistemological dimension of the representative work, namely the perception of the representation, interpretation of the sensory factors, the recognition of the reaction to the external stimuli through the imagination and the knowledge of the context.

² The necessary presence of similar factors (however, in the case of pictorial depiction) is partly indicated by Stephen Davies (1994, pp. 53–79). On the other hand, the necessity of presence of the author's intention is postulated by, among others, Kendall L. Walton (1990).



2. The levels of the musical representation

Having the knowledge of the conditions of the representation, I propose three basic levels³ of this category in a musical work:

- the level of representation that has the literal, mimetic, realistic (usually iconic) character, which consists of the categories of direct mimetism and refers to the existing reality, both external and internal. This level refers in an obvious way to all works in which this type of representation has been discovered through analysis or the existing comment of the composer. The mimetic level is the starting point for the next analytical steps;
- the level of representation that has the metaphorical character, in which there is the relation of perceived similarity between the object of representation and (seemingly different) used metaphorical means. As Ewa Schreiber writes, even at the time of Aristotle 'creating successful metaphors was the proof for the philosophical cleverness of the mind, and the imaging power of the figure was strictly connected with the theory of poetical *mimesis*'.⁴ Despite the fact that the term 'metaphor' is used here mainly in the classical and interactive meaning, being the 'change of meanings from one sphere to another', as Ewa Schreiber observes, elaborating on Paul Ricoeur's thought (Schreiber, 2012, p. 147), it is also close to the cognitive definition of Michael Spitzer, originating from the cognitive projection theory by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson and referring to the relation between the physical aspect that is close and known, and the abstractive, which is distant and foreign (Spitzer, 2004). Mieczysław Tomaszewski gives the metaphoric relation the name of parallel, where the similarity to the model refers only to 'the abstractive structure' of the phenomenon (Tomaszewski, 2016, p. 495);
- the level of representation of the symbolic character, in which the relation between the object and the symbol is predetermined, without assuming similarity. It includes also the mythological and spiritual references. The term 'symbol' is understood here in the same sense as when used by Leszek Polony, who sees this term as making present 'some field of existential experience; it becomes the representation of a literary person, presents experiences which are difficult to verbalise or even philosophical ideas'⁵ and Paul Ricoeur, who, according to Polony, sees the symbol as 'the form of expression which shares the meaning'.⁶ What is close to such an approach are

³The proposed levels are somehow similar to the semiotic division: icon, index, symbol. However due to the mediums of language and music being different, the semiotic triad seems to be not sufficient for particular musical purposes. Additionally, icon, index and symbol do not share the range of meaning, while the proposed three levels often interfere with each other.

⁴Orig. 'tworzenie udanych metafor świadczyło o filozoficznej bystrości umysłu, a obrazowa siła tej figury wiązała się ściśle z teorią poetyckiej *mimesis*' (Schreiber, 2012, p. 5).

⁵Orig. 'jakaś dziedzinę doświadczenia egzystencjalnego, staje się reprezentacją postaci literackiej, przedstawia trudne do zwerbalizowania przeżycia czy nawet idee filozoficzne' (Polony, 2011, pp. 271–272).

⁶Orig. 'formę wyrazu udostępniającego sens' (Polony, 2011, p. 51).

Ricoeur's two stages of understanding the symbol: phenomenological-philosophical as well as sociological and anthropological-cultural, connected with the three-stage structure of *mimesis* (Ricoeur, 1984, pp. 52–87).

All the three levels can refer to the following spheres: the external world (existing in reality), fictional (imagined) world and the internal experiences. What is important is that these levels do not exclude one another and can coexist or dominate in the specific musical works; it is also possible that one of the levels does not appear.

As the 'innocent ear', to paraphrase Ernst Gombrich, does not exist, our perception and understanding of musical representation are strongly determined by associations (both internal and external) with what the particular musical elements can represent. Because of this, it is difficult to mark the borders of a really 'original' (understood paradoxically, as does Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe)⁷ musical representation. Fixed conventional representations with the meanings of e.g. rhetorical figures (historically) or leitmotifs (locally) make it easier to recognise representation, but make it more difficult when the author uses a set of means that is not known by the recipients. Then, in the case of the mimetic level the issue of recognition is difficult because recognition of the mimetic relation in music requires the connection and the establishment of an association between the represented objects and the means used that is happening over a certain duration.

3. Arnold Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4 – the genesis of the work

The sextet *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4 was written in the autumn of 1899. The score was finished on the 1st of December, but the moment of writing is difficult to establish definitely as the drafts were not dated. Schoenberg claimed that the piece was composed over a period of three weeks – as Egon Wellesz says, probably in September (Frisch, 1997, p. 110). Schoenberg was then on holiday in Payerbach with Alexander von Zemlinsky and his sister Mathilde, whom he married in 1901. The inspiration and simultaneously the programme of the work was Richard Dehmel's poem of the same title from the cycle *Weib und Welt* (1896). Although the earlier Schoenberg's compositions (from the years 1893–1897) remain under the clear influence of Johannes Brahms' work, in *Verklärte Nacht* inspiration by Richard Wagner's music, especially *Tristan and Isolde*, is also apparent. Dehmel himself was flattering about *Verklärte Nacht* in his first letter to Schoenberg from 12 December 1912: 'Last night I heard *Verklärte Nacht*, and I should feel it to be a sin of omission if I did not send you a word of thanks for your wonderful sextet' (Stein, 1987, p. 35).

⁷The paradoxical element of Lacoue-Labarthe's thought is the statement that there exist no fully original model; everything is already a mimesis of something previously existing or the true original is hidden from sight. Therefore, mimesis is the only original thing (Lacoue-Labarthe, 1991, p. 20).

The premiere of *Verklärte Nacht*, which took place as late as the 18th of March 1902 in Vienna, was controversial not only because of the non-existent 'forbidden chord',⁸ but because of the presence of programme music in chamber music. As noted by Ethan Haimo, chamber music around 1900 was still a strong, last bastion of the so-called absolute music⁹ (Haimo, 2006, p. 24).

4. Poem *Verklärte Nacht* by Richard Dehmel and autobiographical motives

Richard Fedor Leopold Dehmel (1863–1920) was a German author writing at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Remaining under the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy, Charles Baudelaire's poetry and the sensuality of the Secession style (*Jugendstil*), the artist made love and sexuality central themes of his work, going beyond the artificial frames of convention. *Verklärte Nacht* was published first in 1896 as part of the collection *Weib und Welt*, which got the author into trouble – he was accused of obscenity and blasphemy (Swift 1977, p. 6). The collection was inspired by the person of Ida Auerbach, whom the poet met in the autumn of 1895. Dehmel divorced his first wife for her and married her in 1901. *Verklärte Nacht* was supposed to be created the day after the first meeting of the lovers. In a letter to Ida dated 30th November 1895 the poet mentions the moonlight of that night and the particular 'shine' ('Glanz'), which surrounded everything. In 1901 the poem was incorporated in the verse novel *Zwei Menschen. Roman in Romanzen*, adopting this title from the first words of the poem. The text of Dehmel's poem is absent from Schoenberg's manuscript; it appears only on the opening page of the first edition of the score from 1905, and that was at the publisher's request. From the review of the premiere of the piece it is also known that the audience did not have the text of the poem during the concert (Bailey, 1984, p. 28).

Dehmel's poem belongs to the type of indirect situational poetry (Kulawik, 1997) – the speaker appears as a hidden Narrator, and there are also two nameless characters: the Woman and the Man. Hidden characters are present as well, namely other persons: an unborn child and a strange man, the father of the child. There is the so-called double exposition (of the Woman and the Man) and two perspectives: the subjective (in certain aspects) observation of the narrator and two monologues of the characters – a sincere, agitated and dramatic confession of the Woman and a calm answer full of love given by the Man. Characters' statements, although divided by the narrator's words, are in the relation of a dialogue. The motif of the 'transition' of the characters (the moon also 'runs') through the night brings associations with the motif of a journey, deeply rooted

⁸ This refers to A flat major dominant ninth chord (in the third inversion). The name 'forbidden chord' is connected with the ban on performing the work by Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Vienna due to the fact that the chord is 'non-existent' in the harmony course books. Schoenberg commented on this fact ironically, which was characteristic for him: 'Of course, something that does not exist cannot be performed'.

⁹ The first person to observe this fact was Anton Webern in 1912 (Bailey, 1984, p. 35).

in Romanticism, and the related term of transformation. On the contrary, the night – according to Mieczysław Tomaszewski, the key term for early Romantics – is a moment that favours reflection and examination of conscience (Tomaszewski, 1997, p. 196).

The Woman speaks in the second strophe, and the fourth strophe is intended for the Man. The Narrator describes nature in the first strophe, characterises the Woman's clothes in the third strophe and the elation of love experienced by both of them is in the last, fifth strophe. It is a subjective-like description owing to the adjectives used: 'kahlen, kalten Hain' ('bare, cold grove'), 'mit ungelenkem Schritt' ('with awkward step'), 'Ihr dunkler Blick' ('her dark sight'), 'die starken Hüften' ('the strong hips'), 'hohe, helle Nacht' ('high, bright night'). The repetitions present in the Narrator's strophes: 'zwei Menschen gehn...' ('two people walk...'), 'der Mond läuft mit' ('the moon runs with them'), 'die Stimme eines Weibes/Mannes spricht' ('the Woman's/Man's voice speaks') create the impression of monotony. The 12-verse Woman's strophe is divided into two internal 6-verse strophes, at the intersection of which there is an enjambment (and the absence of tetrameter), after which the rhymes of the woman are stumbled, shaken, atypical and extraordinary in comparison with the rest of the work. It is the first moment of the culmination of the poem – the confession and self-condemnation of the Woman as well as her uncertainty about the reaction of the Man.

In the Woman's strophe as many as four verses begin with the word 'Them' – this rhetorical figure used as anaphora does not serve – according to Siglind Bruhn – to underline the egoistic and selfish 'I' of the woman, but rather it expresses her uncertainty and anxiety in this way (Bruhn, 2000, pp. 153–154). In the second part of the strophe the rhymes are 'stumbled', and the Narrator comments on this in the following strophe: 'Sie geht mit ungelenkem Schritt' ('she goes awkwardly'). An anaphora appears also in the strophe of the Man (verses 31–33), but with a totally different aim – as a confirmation of love and devotion. The first and last verses of the poem are an example of using alliteration: 'kahlen, kalten' ('naked, cold') and 'hohe, helle' ('tall, bright'), characteristic, as Bruhn states, of the medieval German poetry (e.g. epos *Helian*, *Hildebrandslied*), and later also of the lyrics of Richard Wagner's musical dramas.

Verklärte Nacht was, at the time of its publication, a scandalous work to say the least, and it certainly broke a cultural taboo. Despite the fact that Dehmel was inspired by his own experiences, the motif of a child was 'created' by him, doubtless with the aim to create the dramatic situation in the poem.

5. Musical means of representation

Verklärte Nacht as a programme work is a clear example of musical representation. However, its internal structure is complex. The representation refers both to the fictional, outer world, presented in the poem, and to the music itself, being a kind of author's 'comment' in the context of Schoenberg's life situation. It is worth remembering that Richard Dehmel's poem was written under the influence of the poet's experiences and contains autobiographical elements,

which seem to be close to Schoenberg as well. The time of creating *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4 coincided with the bloom of the love for his future wife, Mathilde Zemlinsky. Such an order of the inspirations' sequence is, according to Siglind Bruhn, the basis of musical *ekphrasis*, the author of which, however, underlines the aspect of re-representation, the re-appearance in another artistic medium. This aspect, called transmedialisation by Bruhn (2000), was widely discussed in the work *Musical Ekphrasis: Composers Responding to Poetry and Painting*. In this article attention is paid to the attempt to indicate the presence of the elements of both representation, referring to the literary work itself but perceived in the light of poet, and those that refer to the non-musical reality, perceived in the light of the composer's view. The result of it is the necessity to discuss the issue of representation (in the case of *Verklärte Nacht*) according to the particular levels. What is proposed is – significant for defining these levels and investigating the phenomenon of dissection of representation – a hierarchy of its elements, containing several stages: from the level of representation of a mimetic character, containing the phenomena of imitation, tone painting, to the level of representation of a metaphoric and symbolic character, referring to, among others, relations word-sound, the presence of rhetoric and leitmotifs.

6. The form of music and the text of a programme

Verklärte Nacht is a programme chamber work, composed for string sextet. It has the structure of one part (characteristic for tone poems) of an internal structure A/Introduction B A' C A'' /Coda, equal with 5 strophes of Dehmel's poem. Analogies appear between the length of the poem's strophes and the duration of particular musical fragments. The microform is shaped mainly through two composers' favourite techniques: Brahms' technique of 'developing variation' and Wagner's sequential technique.¹⁰ Schoenberg thought that the technique of 'developing variation', besides influencing the shape of the form, also has a higher aesthetic function than the Wagnerian unchanged sequence (Schoenberg, 2010, p. 78). Asymmetric phrases are characteristic for *Verklärte Nacht* as well as the traditional participation of motivic technique and tonal-harmonic structures in the whole form.

¹⁰ Compositional technique of 'developing variation' was mentioned by Schoenberg for the first time around 1917. It was influenced by the works of Brahms and meant introducing gradually changes to a musical theme, which leads in a more or less direct way to the emergence of new musical ideas. Wagnerian sequential technique refers to repeating unchanged (or almost unchanged) melodic, harmonic and rhythmic pattern on another scale degree (without modulation).

7. Leitmotifs

Schoenberg wrote respectfully about Wagner's technique of leitmotifs. In one of his essays he indicates their role in the organisation of the whole work, in the unification of the thematic material, as well as paying attention to their harmonic construction, in which there is the impulse to modulate even at the level of the motif (Schoenberg, 2010, pp. 244 and 405). The web of returning motifs in *Verklärte Nacht* is dense and can be recognised as one of the most important features of the work. In the composition, the group of leitmotifs of the Woman and the Man may be distinguished. The Woman's motifs are chromatic and characterised by the intervallic structure, in which the basic role is given to the intervals of a second (usually minor second downward at the beginning of the motif), tritone and minor sixth; they are chromatic. Additionally, the huge variety of time signatures in the fragment corresponding to the Woman's strophe intensifies the anxiety, the uncertainty, and underlines some of the chaos of her story. On the contrary, the Man's motifs are characterised by thirds and the characteristic interval of a perfect fourth; they are usually diatonic. In the literature also appears the term 'source', proposed by Richard Swift (1977), and 'source phrase', proposed by Siglind Bruhn (2000). They refer to the phrase with so-called 'forbidden chord'¹¹, which is part of the frame of part B (similarly to the first and last verse of the poem) and which is the source of the Woman's motifs (ex. 1).



Example 1. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4: 'source' phrase, bb. 41–45. All examples published with the permission from the Universal Edition in Vienna

It seems justifiable to accept Schoenberg's term for leitmotif, because the way they are used and the density of their use in the work indicates clearly their Wagnerian origin. The dense use of leitmotifs in the work causes the rest of the themes to be perceived only as bridges. Leitmotifs return in a slightly changed

¹¹See fn 8.

shape (the technique of 'developing variation'), modified but still recognisable. In the composition the web becomes denser and denser due to the appearance of new motifs. Frequently, they create a polyphonic structure, as in the complicated though close relation between the protagonists. However, even then they do not appear simultaneously, but close to one another, somehow recreating a conversation. The exception to this are the moments of 'transfiguration' and an 'embrace' in a coda, when the motifs appear simultaneously. Leitmotifs return also as reminiscences of earlier psychological states and emotions (e.g. motif of introduction, motif of 'wish for motherhood'); then, they shed some light upon the present dramatic-lyrical situation. Owing to the leitmotifs the aspect of dialogue appears as the clearest way of reconciling the opposites.

8. The levels of musical representation

The key element in establishing the three levels of the representation, of a mimetic, metaphorical and symbolic character, is to decide which means of representation and stylistic means are usual for the poet and the composer, and which are the musical 'interpretation' by Schoenberg. The most important examples of the author's own interpretation are the three perspectives (of the Woman, Man and the composer) instead of two, which causes the hidden narrator to become the present one, and his comments have a subjective character; including the comments of the Woman and her dialogue with the Man in his strophe.

8.1. The level of representation of a mimetic character

For the level of representation of a mimetic character, it is important to investigate musical references to the particular moments at the programme level of the work.

- a. elements of direct mimetism (tone painting of a mimetic character, musical illustration of the onomatopoeic character)

The most characteristic example of direct mimetism is musical mirroring of the words of the poem: 'doch eine eigne Wärme flimmert von Dir in mich, von mir in Dich' ('However, the particular warmth is flickering, from You in me, from me in You'). Rhythm (groups of sixteenth note sextuples and syncopated *pizzicato* eight notes) shows the 'flickering' present in this statement. The key of F sharp major with the symbolic significance that remained in the musical tradition (as 'warm'¹² or symbolising overcoming the difficulties¹³), *pp* dynamics, the string harmonics and using the mute create an atmosphere of calm and silence after earlier violent emotions (ex. 2).

¹² According to the characteristic created by Paul Ertel in 1896 (Golianek, 1998, p. 127).

¹³ According to Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart (Golianek, 1998, p. 127).

This system of musical notation includes a piano part (top staff) and a harp part (bottom two staves). The piano part begins with a *rit.* (ritardando) marking. The harp part features complex textures with *pp* (pianissimo) dynamics and includes specific performance instructions: *mit Dämpfer* (with damper), *Flag. (d) (d)*, and *Flag. (e) (e)*. The harp part also contains *pp* markings and numerical figures (7, 2, 7) indicating fingerings or patterns.

This system continues the musical score. The piano part (top staff) maintains a *pp* dynamic. The harp part (bottom two staves) includes *pp* dynamics, *pizz.* (pizzicato) markings, and the instruction *weich und lang* (soft and long). The harp part also features *Flag. a* markings and a *pizz.* marking at the end of the system.

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Example 2. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, bb. 248–254

b. mimetic relations of word and sound

The error of the Woman, her 'slip', is pictured in Dehmel's poem through using enjambment, which causes an interruption in the rhythm of the poem. Schoenberg proposed mimetically presenting this 'slip' in the part of viola. Sixteenth note sextuplets and the dotted rhythm within the triplet *pizzicato* present the character of 'losing' the rhythm, a 'slip' indeed. Perceived mainly as a motif consisting of rhythmic-timbre effect, it is simultaneously the musical answer and complementation of the analogical melodic-rhythmic motif in the first violin part (ex. 3), characterised by the composer by the terms: *wild, leidenschaftlich* ('wildly, with pain').

The image displays a page of musical notation for Arnold Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, specifically pages 135-140. The score is arranged in five systems, each with five staves representing different instruments: Violin I, Violin II, Viola, Violoncello, and Kontrabaß. The key signature is one flat (F major/C minor) and the time signature is 3/4. The score includes various performance instructions and dynamic markings. In the second system, the Viola part is circled in red, and the instruction *wild, leidenschaftlich* is written below it. In the third system, another instance of the circled motif is shown, with the instruction *pizz.* above it. The score concludes with a *rit.* marking.

Example 3. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, the 'slip' of the Woman, bb. 135–140

Another example can be found in references to particular words or verses in the poem: here, the anaphora ‘Them’. The repetition of the word ‘Them’ in every one of the four verses of the strophe of the poem is almost cited by the composer, as the three-time beginning of the bar with the same melodic-rhythmic figure played by the cello, and in the next bars also by the first violin. The remaining parts of the sextet are also repeated in the identical way (ex. 4).

Example 4. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, the example of musical representation of anaphora (‘Them’), bb. 46–57

What is interesting is the link between the level of a mimetic character and the level of a metaphorical character, e.g. in the fragment of the work that pictures the dialogue of the Woman and the Man (as an example of Schoenberg’s interpretation of the poem). The composer uses the simple technique of imitation here, becoming a type of canon in the distance in term of the timbre, but at the same time with close registers: the high register of the first violin (assigned

to the Woman) and the high register of the first cello (assigned to the Man). Interpenetration of the two levels of representation is achieved by using simple imitation as characteristic of mimetism and by bringing closer the registers of the instruments that are basically different in term of the timbre, (remaining in dialogue) as a kind of a metaphor of pursuance of closeness. To link the levels of representation, the paraphrase of the term created by Paul Ricoeur could be used – ‘polyfigurative’, meaning that ‘several levels of meaning are held together in a single expression’ (Ricoeur, 1998, p. 172).

8.2. The level of representation of the metaphorical character

Due to the type of reaction of one (human) subject to another, postulated by Mieczysław Tomaszewski, there are several aspects that are significant for the representation of the metaphorical character (Tomaszewski, 2003, p. 133). Among them are:

- a. the way of expressing emotional states

Increasing indignation and despair of the Woman is presented in the music through reaching higher and higher register in all the instruments, *tremolo* of the chords changing in the pulse of fourths, strong accentuation of every chord, *fff* dynamics, meaningful rest after an interrupted passage of triplets and slowing down the tempo (*Sehr langsam*) (ex. 5).

The image shows a musical score for Arnold Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, measures 34-40. The score is in G major and 3/4 time. It features a complex texture with multiple staves for strings and woodwinds. The music is characterized by high registers, tremolos, and strong accents. The tempo is marked 'rit.' (ritardando) and 'tempo'.

Example 5. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, indignation and despair of the Woman, bb. 34–40

b. a way of expressing the hidden meanings (Schoenberg's interpretation of Dehmel's poem)

An example of interpretation by the composer is the reminiscence of the beginning motif in the strophe of the Man, and simultaneously the return of the original, suddenly changing mood of the Woman (in the key of E flat minor, according to Schubart symbolising fear and doubt). The mood is increased by the *ppp* dynamics and articulation *legato sul tasto*. There is no such situation in the text, so this is the musical interpretation by Schoenberg, having the features of reading 'between the lines' (ex. 6).

Etwas gedehnt. *8va ad lib.*

* am Griffbrett. *ppp*

* am Griffbrett. *ppp*

* am Griffbrett. *ppp*

* am Griffbrett. *ppp*

* am Griffbrett. *ppp*

* am Griffbrett. *ppp*

ppp

ppp

pp

pp

pp

pp

pp

* Von hier an die nächsten vier Takte sind „am Griffbrett“ zu spielen (alle 6 Instrumente) der 5. Takt wieder gewöhnlich.

Example 6. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, reminiscence of resignation and the gloomy mood of the Woman in the Man's 'strophe', bb. 265–268

c. rhetoric of the metaphorical character¹⁴

A rhetorical figure, apart from the mimetic and onomatopoeic, may have metaphorical character (when referring to certain similarity or analogy with the described content, visually, aurally or imaginarily) or symbolic character (when the relation is forced).¹⁵ Among rhetorical figures of the first type the following ones appear most frequently in the work: *ascensus* or *anabasis*, belonging to the characteristics of the Man's motifs and *descensus* or *katabasis*, showing resignation and the gloomy mood of the Woman at the beginning of the poem. The descending melodic line characteristic of this figure in the first viola and first cello accompanies the monotonous, even rhythm in the remaining instruments (ex. 7).

Sehr langsam.

Example 7. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, *descensus*, or *katabasis*, bb. 1–4

References to *exclamatio* and *suspiratio* also appear in the work. The figure of *suspiratio* is shown characteristically in one of the musically crucial moments of the composition, containing the 'forbidden ninth chord' in the third inversion. Motifs of minor seconds in the first violin part are divided by rests, characteristic for this rhetorical figure (ex. 8).

¹⁴ Mieczysław Tomaszewski in the text *Utwór muzyczny jako refleks, odbłask, relik i echo rzeczywistości poza-dziелowej. Rekonesans* (2016, p. 493) proposes including rhetoric in the so-called indirect mimetism, which, according to the author of this paper, is not always justified because not all rhetorical figures are conditioned mimetically, or even metaphorically, e.g. *pathopoeia*, *saltus duriusculus*, *multiplicatio* etc. Considering also the historical distance between the epochs of Baroque and the avant-garde of the beginning of the 20th century, the author thinks that the rhetorical figures present in numerous Schoenberg's works have metaphorical and symbolical, but not mimetic meaning.

¹⁵ The author of this article refers only to the conventional understanding of metaphor (not musical metaphor), where the correlation is recognisable by a certain analogy. Therefore, diverse positions taken by researchers such as Robert Hatten, Lawrence Zbikowski or Eero Tarasti were not taken into account.



Example 8. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, *suspiratio*, bb. 41–45

- d. the character of leitmotifs (corresponding metaphorically with the features of the characters)

Leitmotifs can be considered at the level of metaphorical representation, when their character corresponds metaphorically with the features of the character. High mobility and the rhythmic variety of the motif (in the first violin and first viola), the presence of tritone and the variability of the melodic contour of the motif describe the Woman as easily changing the mood and characterised by a rather variable character. The motif of the Man is characterised by the simple structure of thirds, diatonicism and homophonic structure that are supposed to indicate the good nature of the character and his ability to forgive.

8.3. The level of representation of the symbolic character

- a. symbolism of the key

Hartmut Krones pays attention to Schoenberg's particular inclination to the traditional *ethos* of the keys: he respected 'every "old" tradition, which reached from the Baroque through the Viennese Classics, Johannes Brahms and Anton Brucker to Alexander von Zemlinsky' (Krones, 2005, p. 165). Krones claims that despite the fact that the composer probably did not read the classification of keys written by Schubart, he nevertheless had to have some observations on this topic when studying the works of the older masters. The main key of *Verklärte Nacht* was D minor, traditionally associated with the symbolism of death, but Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart describes it as 'gloomy femininity', and Ferdinand Hand as expressing 'complaint, strong pain' (Golianek, 1998, p. 128). The work ends in the key of D major, understood by Schubart as a 'triumph, alleluia [...] the joy of win', and described by Paul Ertel as bright and cheerful (Golianek, 1998, p. 127). Showing parallel keys was also characteristic of the work of Gustav Mahler (e.g. cycle *Kindertotenlieder*). Ilona Iwańska pays attention to the consolidating-mystical meaning of Mahler's D major (Iwańska, 2019, p. 299). For

Schoenberg, D major at the end of *Verklärte Nacht* appears *in crudo* (if we use Iwańska's typology), but the aspect of triumph has strong mystic connotations.

b. symbolic representation of feelings and states

The wish for motherhood felt by the Woman is the state which musical means cannot picture without referring to symbolic associations. In this case, the change of time signature from duple to triple metre, lower tempo, *pp* dynamics, *legato* articulation and no-moving bass resemble the character of a lullaby. However, without the sign from the composer it would be impossible to interpret this fragment as indeed being the 'wish for motherhood' (ex. 9).

The image shows a musical score for Arnold Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht*, Op. 4, specifically the section titled 'wish for motherhood' (bb. 105-116). The score is written for a string quartet and is in D major. It consists of three systems of staves. The first system is marked 'Etwas ruhiger.' and 'pp'. The second system is marked 'rit.', 'dolce', and 'p'. The third system is marked 'rit.', 'tremolando', and 'F'. The score shows a change in time signature from 2/4 to 3/4 and features a variety of dynamics and articulations.

Example 9. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, 'wish for motherhood', bb. 105–116

c. the musical space

The musical space is understood here both metaphorically and symbolically. Interpreted in the traditional way, the example shows the opposition of the

sound space through low and high registers. The dark night and the cold copse from the beginning of the poem are presented through the rhetorical figure *descend* or *katabasis* and are characterised by the analogical dark timbre of the violas and cello, *pp* dynamics with the annotation *immer leise* and articulation *legato* (compare ex. 7).

On the other hand, the high, bright, transformed night at the end of the work is pictured through the high register of the violins and violas, figurations and *tremolando* of thirty-second notes in thirds, string harmonics in all the parts and dynamics oscillating between *pp* and *pppp* (ex. 10).

The image displays a musical score for Example 10, consisting of three systems of staves. The top system shows a violin part with a melodic line and a cello/bass part with a harmonic accompaniment. The middle system features a violin part with a tremolando of thirty-second notes in thirds, a cello/bass part with a harmonic accompaniment, and a double bass part with a harmonic accompaniment. The bottom system shows a violin part with a tremolando of thirty-second notes in thirds, a cello/bass part with a harmonic accompaniment, and a double bass part with a harmonic accompaniment. The score includes various dynamic markings such as *pp*, *pppp*, and *ppppp*, and annotations like *Flage*, *Klang*, and *Flage D Saiten*.

Example 10. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, high bright night (high register, string harmonics), bb. 412–418

d. mystical-spiritual references

The state of spiritual communion between the Woman and the Man, which is hidden in Dehmel's poem 'between the lines', is presented by the composer through the simple method of simultaneously showing the motifs of both characters. What is interesting is that the motif of the Man (here as the motif of 'transfiguration') is present in the high register (first violin), and the motif of the Woman in the part of first cello, what can indicate the symbolic 'speaking' the language of the other character, confirming their spiritual unity. This type of representation is a clear change compared to the previous situations (ex. 11).

The image shows a musical score for Example 11, which is a section from Arnold Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4. The score is in B-flat major and 3/4 time, marked 'R Etwas bewegt.' It features a first violin part in the high register and a first cello part in the low register, both playing the same melodic motif. The score is divided into three systems, with dynamics ranging from *pp* to *p* and markings like 'dolce' and 'steigernd'. The first system starts with 'pp *sare*' and 'pp *sare*'. The second system has 'pp' and 'p'. The third system has 'p' and 'steigernd' repeated multiple times.

Example 11. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, 'communion' of the motifs of the Woman and the Man – the motif of transfiguration, bb. 320-325

What is also transfigured is the night: from dark and chill, shown at the beginning of the work through low register, the modest musical material (melodic line against the background of repetition of quarter notes) and low dynamics, to bright, shining, full of flickering light. The high register of four of the six instruments, string harmonics and thirty-second notes figurations, as well as syncopes, represent the shining, referring also to the mimetic way of presenting the 'flickering light'.

References to transfiguration are present in literature and music of the beginning of the 20th century (it is enough to mention the tone poem *Tod und Verklärung* written by Richard Strauss). In the case of Schoenberg, it is difficult to talk about references of a religious nature: there are, rather, the mystic-spiritual references, inspired by the thought of Emanuel Swedenborg (it is worth mentioning that the way of presenting the musical space is also a direct result of this source of inspiration).

Hans-Georg Gadamer in the work *The Relevance of the Beautiful. Art as Play, Symbol, and Festival* says:

The symbolic representation accomplished in art does not have to depend directly on what is already given. On the contrary, it is characteristic of art that what is represented, whether it is rich or poor in connotations or has none whatsoever, calls us to dwell upon it and give our assent in an act of recognition (Gadamer, 1986, p. 36).

In *Verklärte Nacht*, in many cases the distinction between representation of metaphorical and symbolic character becomes difficult (and unnecessary) to make, because the multitude of meanings of music allows various interpretations to exist. The specific musical fragment can be a metaphorical representation of the emotional state of the narrator, and simultaneously a symbolical representation of another, wider aspect, resulting from the content of the literary text.

9. Neo-mythologism and binary oppositions as aspects of musical representation

Showing *Verklärte Nacht* in the context of the theory of axiologisation of space in myths, created by Yeleazar Meletinsky, and the concept of neo-mythologism in the musical avant-garde of the beginning of the 20th century, created by Victoria Adamenko, allows us to underline these aspects of the work (remaining strictly connected to the discussed levels of representation) which usually remain hidden. The theory of binary opposition discussed by Adamenko in the context of neo-mythologism as the main characteristic of mythical thinking has its sources in the thought of Claude Lévi-Strauss (Meletinsky, 2000, pp. 155–156). In the book titled *The Poetics of Myth* Yeleazar Meletinsky postulates three levels of spatial relations in myths, arguing that such relations are the foundations of the mythological system of symbolical classification.¹⁶ He writes:

The fundamental building blocks of mythological system of symbolic classification are not motifs but relationships in the sense of elementary semantic oppositions. The most important correspond to man's sensory and spatial orientations: above/below, left/right, far/near, internal/external, big/small, hot/cold, [...] bright/dark, and various colors arranged into sets of binary oppositions. These are later reified and supplemented by correlations of motifs in the cosmic space-time continuum (sky/earth, [...] day/night, winter/summer, and sun/moon); correlations in the social dimension (self/other, male/female, [...]); contrasts at the margins of social solidarity, universal order, and of nature and culture (water/fire, [...] home/forest, village/desert); in

¹⁶It is worth mentioning, that Meletinsky's concept originates not only from Claude Lévi-Strauss, but also from Jungian psychoanalysis and 20th-century literature (James Joyce, Thomas Mann, Franz Kafka, among others).

numerical oppositions [...]; in basic antinomies (life/death, happiness/unhappiness); and, finally, in the most important mythological opposition, the opposition between sacred and profane (Meletinsky, 2000, p. 208).

According to the author, in the myth the opposition of a general nature, e.g. closer/further, becomes concrete through the contrast between the higher and lower, body and soul, or upper or lower, social/family hierarchy; in most cases 'high' is also associated with the sacral dimension (Meletinsky, 2000, p. 156). Meletinsky notes that making these poles positive (*sacrum*) or negative (*profanum*) brings a certain stability (Meletinsky, 2000, p. 156). Moreover, high, right, male, near, self, bright, and sun are usually associated with the positive pole, while low, left, female, far, other, dark, forest, and moon are almost always negative. It is worth remembering that Meletinsky's work refers mainly to the poetry of myth, not its structure.

According to Victoria Adamenko, the term 'neo-mythologism' is used to distinguish the newly constructed myths, desired and significant (and thus culturally inspiring) and the ones that must be 'demystified' (Adamenko, 2007, p. 2). The term 'neo-mythologism' was created by Meletinsky, who understood it as the way to interpret the epic through the juxtaposition of the ideas of Carl Gustav Jung and ritualism with the important role of psychoanalysis and the common subconscious (which becomes a synonym of the myth itself) in its literary and cultural appearances (Adamenko, 2007, pp. 177 and 246). Referring to the literature of the 20th century (among others James Joyce, Thomas Mann, Franz Kafka), Meletinsky uses the terms 'mythologism', 'mythologisation' and 're-mythologisation' (reappearance of the myth) (Meletinsky, 2000, p. *xxi*). The author also claims that it is crucial to distinguish between the 'authentic' myth and its contemporary artistic 'reincarnation' (Adamenko, 2007, p. 4). Meletinsky defines the avant-garde literature from the beginning of the 20th century as 'pan-mythological' (Adamenko, 2007, p. 177). Adamenko sees neo-mythologism as a diachronic paradigm of the trend rather than an artistic movement such as symbolism or expressionism; this means that it refers to the culture as a whole (Adamenko, 2007, p. 3). The author writes:

[...] neo-mythology is not really "new", but stands in contrast to the collective mythology of the period in which art embodied rather than expressed mythology. [...] However, the special role of myth in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries resulted in new and unique combinations of mythic-artistic ways of thinking, and it is precisely this pluralistic worldview that makes neo-mythologism special (Adamenko, 2007, p. 11).

Meletinsky claims that re-mythologisation of culture revived the issue of the myth. Contemporary 'mystification' can be understood as a phenomenon of the 20th century and therefore it should be distinguished from the archaic mythology.

10. Schoenberg and neo-mythologism

In the interpretation of *Verklärte Nacht*, we can find a number of significant features of the myth given by Adamenko. There are the significance of

binary opposition, the mobility (variety), the presence of leitmotifs and the mythology of the cycle. The author states: 'In archaic myths, the figure of a circle has served as the model of circularly unfolding time and space. [...] Some medieval traditions attributed a circular shape to the Garden of Eden, which served as an allegorical model for a city plan' (Adamenko 2007, p. 207). Adamenko thinks that 'such post-Wagnerian composers as Scriabin, Schoenberg, and Stockhausen express mythologism through religious or theosophical precepts' (Adamenko, 2007, p. 16). Numerology also plays a crucial role in mythological thinking, which has its significance in the case of Schoenberg. Characterising the composer as the 'mediator of the opposition', Adamenko writes: 'Dualism is a prominent feature in his thought, as several scholars noted' (Adamenko, 2007, p. 31). The pair of oppositions seems to be especially important: the old art *versus* new art, and the 'new art' is identified with dodecaphony. Robert Fleisher, mentioned by Adamenko, the author of *Dualism in the Music of Arnold Schoenberg*, sees Schoenberg's 'predilection for contrastive and oppositional musical design' and 'the polarization of materials' as ideas that are generally typical for the composer (Adamenko, 2007, p. 31). Fleisher also links the dualisms that are characteristic for Schoenberg with 'the traditional symbols of Jewish mysticism' (Adamenko, 2007, p. 33).

11. Binary oppositions in Dehmel's poem

In Richard Dehmel's poem *Verklärte Nacht* the features of myth are present, especially those described in Meletinsky's concept. This text shows the features that are close to 20th-century neo-mythologism and contains – although in a way that was not foreseen by the author – the traditional mythical pattern. What is particular is the *quasi*-dramatic character of the work (conflict and solution) and the fact that between the narrator and the two protagonists there is the relation of dialogue. The protagonists are nameless (it is also a feature of many of Schoenberg's works), which can indicate a generalisation as well as an attempt to show the opposition woman/man. From the reader's point of view, the content of the second strophe is a surprise because the first strophe does not suggest any relation between the characters. The Woman and the Man are described in the poem simply as 'two people' being/going separately, who then remain in the situation 'next to each other' (second and third strophe), to finally become a unity through transformation (fifth strophe). Various categories of the opposition of metaphoric space appear between the characters: 'woman/man', 'foreign/own' ('foreign as the father of the child, but also "not own" child'), 'being separately/being together'. Being separately has different associations: private, social, conventional, spiritual. Other binary oppositions are also present: 'cold' and 'foreign' appearing in the first and second strophes gain oppositional status to 'warm' and 'own' in the fourth strophe, assigned to the Man (only there the oppositions appear next to each other). The light of the moon and the dark sight of the Woman are placed in opposition to the high (implicitly bright) night. The category of height, way upwards appears in the juxtaposition with the 'low' deed

of the Woman. All the opposing pairs have the axiological assumption, which becomes apparent at the end of the poem (as the act of transformation), that refers to the most important – according to Meletinsky – mythical opposition of ‘*sacrum/profanum*’. ‘High’ is again associated with the spiritual, sacral dimension: ‘high night’ is the ‘transformed night’. The remaining pairs of opposition that are present in the text are: ‘forest (copse)/home’ (forest as the place of the resolution of the conflict), in opposition to Kafka’s chaotic peripheries (traditional mythical archetype) and in agreement with the chaotic centre of Dostoyevsky, as noted by Meletinsky (2000, p. 115).

Wandering through the forest also has analogies with the ritual initiation before the transformation or the ritual of ‘transition’. Such a type of ritual, typical of myth, usually takes place far away from home and during the night. The strophes of the Woman and the Man contain also one more type of the mythical opposition: ‘internal/external’. The internal one is the Woman’s confession, the external one – the description of Nature made by the Man. What is worth underlining in the content of Dehmel’s poem is the example of significant breaking with Wagner’s idea of unity of love and death.

12. Binary oppositions in Schoenberg’s work

Almost all the binary oppositions present in Dehmel’s work appear also in Schoenberg’s composition. It is striking that the composer used traditional, almost conventional musical means to show the differences between the pairs of oppositions: chromaticism/diatonicism, minor/major, dynamic, register and timbre differences. More complicated oppositions appear through transformations of leitmotifs. Ethan Haimo notes that:

Schoenberg exploited the distinctions between tonal stability and instability, and between diatonicism and chromaticism, as metaphors that parallel the distinctions between stability and instability, between happiness and despair, between conflict and resolution, in the relationship of the couple as described in Dehmel’s poem (Haimo, 2009, pp. 37–38).

Analogical aspects indicate the tendency mentioned by Małgorzata Janicka-Słysz:

Some rhetorical strategies of expression are rooted in the consciousness of European artists; it is enough to mention the antithesis *chiaro-oscuro*, meaning the basic oppositions bright-dark; up-down; day-night; happiness-sorrow [...], which has been present since the late Renaissance aesthetics and compositional practice. This opposition is linked to the polarity of the keys: major – and positive emotions, identified with the idea of *maggiore*, as well as movement ‘upwards’ related to it, ascending, transcendental; and minor – and the negative emotions identified with the idea of *minore*, as well as the related movement ‘downwards’, descending.¹⁷

¹⁷Orig. ‘W świadomości twórców europejskich na trwale zapisały się niektóre retoryczne strategie wyrazowe, wystarczy wskazać na utrwaloną już od czasów późnorennesansowej estetyki i praktyki kompozytorskiej antytezę: *chiaro-oscuro*, oznaczającą podstawowe opozycje: jasno – ciemno; góra – dół; dzień – noc; radość – smutek; [...]. Z opozycją tą złączono także biegunowość trybów: dur – i tożsame z ideą *maggiore* emocje pozytywne, a także związany z nimi ruch „ku górze”, ascendentny, transcendentny; oraz moll – i tożsame z ideą *minore* emocje negatywne i związany z nimi ruch „w dół”, descendentny’ (Janicka-Słysz, 2013, pp. 246–247).

The comparison between the described binary oppositions, present both in Dehmel's poem and Schoenberg's work are presented in table 1.

Binary oppositions in <i>Verklärte Nacht</i> op. 4	
Binary oppositions in the text of Dehmel's poem	Musical means representing the oppositions resulting from the text
Man/Woman	Diatonicism/chromaticism
Separately/together	Particular motifs/polyphonic web of leitmotifs
Foreign/own	Chromaticism, tonal instability, complex rhythm/diatonicism, "wish for motherhood" motif, tonal stability
Sorrow/happiness	Pianto, chromaticism/perfect fourth, diatonicism
Agitation/calm	Chromaticism, ninth chords, rhythm/diatonicism, cadences
Cold/warm	Minor, playing on the neck/major, play on G and D string
Dark/bright High/low	Low register, legato, playing on the neck/high register, pizzicato, string harmonics, tremolo
Forest/home	Minor, dark timbre/major
Internal/external	Chromaticism/diatonicism
Sacrum/profanum	Diatonicism, high register, dynamics pp, string harmonics/chromaticism, low register, dynamics ff, accents

Table 1. Binary oppositions in A. Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4

The following examples illustrate two of the mentioned binary oppositions in the work: cold/warm and forest/home (ex. 12 and 13).

Example 12. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, cold/warm opposition, bb. 266 and 399–402



Example 13. A. Schoenberg, *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4, forest/home opposition, bb. 5-9 and 370-371

The conclusion is that the category of *sacrum* is musically identified with the bright and high aspect (through register, timbre, articulation) and diatonicism. The remaining binary oppositions are the next example of the musical interpretation of the poem by the composer, of its stylistics and character (table 2).

Remaining binary oppositions in the musical layer of <i>Verklärte Nacht</i>
<p><u>Stylistically:</u> Traditional/innovatory</p>
<p><u>Harmonically:</u> Diatonic/chromatic Cadences/ninth chords without resolution Major/minor</p>
<p><u>Textual:</u> Polyphony/homophony Delicate, transparent/dense Vertically/horizontally</p>

Table 2. Remaining binary oppositions in A. Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht* Op. 4

13. Conclusion

The life and work of Arnold Schoenberg provide a never-ending source of interpretations and comparisons. It seems, though, that there is a great need of introducing new contexts and using new methodologies when analysing

his musical works. The category of representation (which is not new, just read anew) may be such a new key to interpreting Schoenberg's music. Is it also closely linked to the composer's need of defining the concept of 'musical idea' as something ethereal, but still present and expressed in the work, responsible for its final shape. Finally, I suggest that Schoenberg's music requires a fully humanistic approach.

Reading the composer's works through the lens of musical representation leads to underlining the duality of traditional and innovative features of his works, as well as the ways by which the tension created between these two poles is realised. It seems that although there exists research about musical symbolism and rhetoric in Schoenberg's works,¹⁸ there are still some uncovered aspects of his music. They may come to light while using the category of musical representation. Formulating the three levels of representation allows one to establish the way in which the composer treats the extramusical, external reality (in this case not only the literary poem, but also the events from his own life).

Introducing the category of neo-mythologism makes it clear that a traditional (or even archetypal) way of thinking was at that time typical for the composer (interestingly, it is also present in later works). Nevertheless, Schoenberg's interpretation of the poem goes much further than would be indicated by the presence of aspects of neo-mythologism. Treating the programme almost like a text which accompanies music, the composer proposes a new type of programme music. At the same time, he shows extraordinarily personal interpretation of the feelings and emotions of the protagonists, adding his own musical 'comments'. In the poem these issues are absent or left to the suppositions of the readers. It does not mean that Schoenberg makes Dehmel's poem more direct and obvious, but, on the contrary, he makes a particular transfiguration of the poem's content, giving it his own, new and humanistic meaning. This is what a true 'mediator of the oppositions' does.

Translated by Jolanta Bujas

¹⁸ Among others: Krones, H. (2005). *Arnold Schönberg*. Wien: Edition Steinbauer; Krones, H. (1992). 'Wiener' Symbolik? Zu musiksemantischen Traditionen in den beiden Wiener Schulen. In O. Kolleritsch (Ed.) *Beethoven und die Zweite Wiener Schule*. Wien: Universal Edition; Bruhn, S. (2000). *Musical Ekphrasis: Composers Responding to Poetry and Painting*. Hillsdale: Pendragon; Boss, J. (2014). *Schoenberg's Twelve-Tone Music. Symmetry and the Musical Idea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Włodarski, A.L. (2015). *Musical Witness and Holocaust Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Cherlin, M. (1998). Memory and Rhetorical Trope in Schoenberg's String Trio, *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 51(3); Cherlin, M. (1986). Schoenberg's Representation of the Divine in Moses und Aron. *Journal of the Arnold Schoenberg Institute*, 9; Brown, J. (1995). *Schoenberg's Musical Prose as Allegory*. *Music Analysis*, 14(2-3); Trzęsiok, M. (2012). Narodziny dodekafonii z ducha teozofii? Schönberg, Swedenborg i metempsychoza. In E. Kowalska-Zajac & M. Szoka (Eds.). *Kompozytor i jego świat. Bronisław Kazimierz Przybylski in memoriam*. Łódź: Akademia Muzyczna w Łodzi.

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MAŁGORZATA GAMRAT

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6588-7533>
Academy of Art in Szczecin

Jankélévitch: freedom, music and unfinished project¹

ABSTRACT: The text deals with the philosophy of Vladimir Jankélévitch, shown synthetically with emphasis on his deliberations on the subject of freedom and music. Music in the approach of this French philosopher is seen from the perspective of the most important categories used to describe it (e.g., ineffable) and the composers whose works he discussed in his texts on the art of sound. It is supplemented by information about the project aimed at familiarising Polish readers with Jankélévitch's ideas and the relations between that philosopher and the composer Aleksander Tansman.

KEYWORDS: Vladimir Jankélévitch, philosophy of music, freedom, ineffable, Aleksander Tansman

*Ma liberté
C'est toi qui m'a aidé
A larguer les amarres
Pour aller n'importe où
Pour aller jusqu'au bout
Des chemins de fortune
Pour cueillir en rêvant
Une rose des vents
Sur un rayon de lune*

Georges Moustaki, *Ma liberté* (1970)

Vladimir Jankélévitch (1903–1985) is an exceptional figure among the luminaries of the humanities: philosopher (doctorate defended successfully in 1933) and literary scholar (Russian philology degree obtained in 1925) by education, musicologist and pianist by choice and interest, a man of great culture and erudition, open to the world and eager to know it. He was educated at the prestigious École normale supérieure (1922–1926), taught in Prague (1927–1932), Besançon, Lyon, Lille and Toulouse, and finally became professor of moral philosophy (*philosophie morale*) at the Sorbonne University in Paris in 1951, where his lectures were extremely popular and had great influence on the students. One might describe him as a self-taught erudite in the area of the art of sound, who

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combined a passion for music with philosophy and was thus able to create his own original conceptions.

He left behind numerous texts: articles, interviews, papers as well as books, the latter quickly disappearing from bookshops and requiring frequent reprints. He pursued his passion for sharing the knowledge of his own particular interests through journalistic activity; through radio broadcasts in Toulouse, and concert programme notes and reviews, which he began to write in early youth.² In spite of his extensive knowledge, his ability to produce original ideas, and the respect accorded to him as a philosopher and connoisseur of music, he always described himself in very modest terms, as merely a teacher, and not a creator: 'I am not a creator but a consumer, a never satisfied passionate amateur. [...] I am only a philosophy professor'³ (Jankélévitch, 2010d, p. 391). And when he was asked what a contemporary philosopher was, he gave this significant answer: 'above all it is someone who does what he says he does. It is someone truly committed. Not only in words and declarations, but someone who through his daily activities may avert some dangers'⁴ (Schwab, 2010a, p. 21).

He expected philosophy to undertake difficult tasks: it should deal not only with the most painful and uncomfortable contemporary subjects, but it should also strike out into areas where thinking breaks down and cannot reach. He spoke about it quite succinctly, as if it was something as simple and obvious to everyone as it was to him:

what I do has nothing systematic about it because I forbade myself to engage in such an undertaking. I have a tendency to always place myself on the edge of things at the moment when thinking about them becomes impossible, yet it is still possible to do it; a millimetre further and nothing more can be said about them. Time is one of these things that are at a time within me and beyond me. [...] My philosophical project is the manner of philosophising. That is, to try and think of matters difficult to capture, such as time, death, love until the moment when thinking explodes⁵ (Jankélévitch, 2010a, p. 25).

His attitude to academic (creative) work is also of interest. In his opinion it required precision and constant development of one's ideas, explaining them, arguing 'for and against' one's own theses. And while he did not see himself as a creative artist, he regarded writing, or rather thinking, as a work of art, the

² Many previously unpublished concert programmes written for, among others, the orchestra in Toulouse, and reviews of concerts in Prague, were published in 2017 by Françoise Schwab (cf. unspoken Jankélévitch, 2017). Selected interviews and papers not published previously appeared in a book following a conference held in 2005 in Paris, titled *Présence de Vladimir Jankélévitch. Le charme et l'occasion* (2010).

³ 'Je ne suis pas créateur mais consommateur, amateur passionné jamais rassasié [...] je ne suis qu'un professeur de philosophie.'

⁴ 'c'est d'abord quelqu'un qui fait comme il dit. C'est quelqu'un qui s'engage mais réellement. Pas seulement en paroles et dans des discours, mais c'est celui qui par son action quotidienne peut quand même courir certains périls.'

⁵ 'ce que je fait n'a rien de systématique puisque je me suis interdit pareille entreprise. J'ai tendance toujours à me placer sur le bord des choses au moment où elles cessent d'être pensables mais quand elles le sont encore: un millimètre de plus et vous ne pouvez plus rien en dire. Le temps est un de ses objets qui est à la fois en moi et devant moi. [...] Mon projet philosophique est une manière de philosopher. C'est-à-dire d'essayer de penser jusqu'au moment où la pensée se brise, des choses difficiles à saisir comme le temps, la mort, l'amour.'

creation of which was also aimed at producing moral benefits. He wrote about this in a letter to Louis Beauduc: 'You cannot imagine the moral good you will derive from such necessity of *thinking about one idea* over 30 or 40 pages, and making a work of art, a complete and organic whole, out of it. Nothing can compare to this'⁶ (Jankélévitch, 1995, p. 149).

He always followed his own path, did not worship contemporary apostles of philosophy but would rather refer to Plotinus, Francis de Sales, Baltasar Gracián, François Fénelon, Shestov or his incomparable master Bergson (see Schwab, 2010a, p. 18). He would often 'swim against the tide', since what was most important to him was to remain himself. When the humanities triumphantly took to imitating natural sciences with their objectivity (and, in a sense, dehumanisation), Jankélévitch opted for subjective interpretation, and for a quest for the ineffable, the unspeakable and the inexpressible in human creation. One might describe him as a Bergsonist by choice and by conviction (he stayed in contact with the latter philosopher from 1923), for whom freedom constituted the highest value.

In his thinking he used categories taken from Bergson and combined them with his own, such as: the creative principle (*élan vital*), or creative force which powers human activity, inner experience, becoming, intuition, temporality (particularly important in the context of music), potentiality, hope or transcendence of everyday life. In his writings much space is also devoted to morality, intention and will. He assumed that intention as such acquires value only when it is translated into action, carried out through compromises between it (the intention) and its realisation. This involves a paradox – moral duty at the beginning of an action is certain and infinite, but its realisation is only possible by using means which are finite and ambiguous, as he claimed in *Le paradoxe de la morale* (Jankélévitch, 1981). In turn, he had this to say on the subject of paradox, and in principle the impossibility of reconciling existence and love:

The more existence, the less love. The less existence, the more love. One compensates for the other. The devilish problem of the whole moral life, similar to the feat achieved almost without thinking when one loves: it means, let us repeat, to maintain maximum of love in minimum of existence'⁷ (Jankélévitch, 1981, p. 194).

He also combined these categories with metaphysics, expressing this approach most forcefully in his book *Philosophie première. Introduction à une philosophie du presque*, fundamental to his thinking on moral philosophy:

moral experience suggests a concept that is both universal and rational, of a birthright, speaking generally, to human dignity and [...] privileging an urgent and hyperbolic right which is always pushing us beyond what is due from us [...] Also morality, when it stops being a pure cognitive

⁶ 'Tu n'imagines pas le bienfait moral que t'apportera cette obligation de *penser une idée* en 30 ou 40 pages, d'en faire une œuvre d'art, un tout complet et organique. Rien n'est comparable à cela.'

⁷ 'Plus il y a d'être, moins il y a d'amour. Moins il y a d'être, plus il y a de l'amour. L'un compense l'autre. Le problème scabreux de la vie morale ressemble à un tour de force, mais on réussit ce tour de force presque sans y penser quand on aime: c'est, répétons-le, de faire tenir le maximum d'amour dans le minimum d'être.'

deduction, a synonym of obligations, is no longer different from metaphysics⁸ (Jankélévitch, 1986, p. 54).

When talking about metaphysics in the thinking of Vladimir Jankélévitch, we need to bear in mind the other categories which are fundamental to it: the ‘something I know not what’ (*le je-ne-sais-quoi*) and ‘the almost-nothing’ (*le presque-rien*) borrowed from Saint John of the Cross. They may be linked to an attempt to capture and experience (or taste the infinite beauty of God and his creation if you read the poem by Saint John of the Cross) that which is elusive and at the same time pointing to this elusiveness (see Jankélévitch, 1980).

He was not afraid of touching on difficult subjects; he wrote and talked about death, love, transience and ephemerality of human existence, both in his texts and lectures (see Schwab, Bouratsis, Brohm, 2010, pp. 11–12). He wrote about death in an extraordinary way, both very profound and accessible to the ‘common man’. He tried to understand dying, suffering, fear of death, but also whether it was possible to find consolation in religion. He also pondered the rightness of death sentence and euthanasia, which would allow death with dignity and a conscious final choice for the individual. He tried to approach these matters both rationally and with a great deal of empathy (see Jankélévitch, 1966).

His comments on extermination were very poignant; he fought for the preservation of the remembrance of those murdered, and against forgiveness for those guilty of the Holocaust. It is worth noting that during the Second World War he was involved in real fighting, as a member of the French resistance. In his texts he tried to bring back the memory, or to immortalise the heroes, often his friends, who lost their lives in battle or just because of being Jewish (see Jankélévitch, 2015). Until the end of his life he could not come to terms with the fact that so many people lost their lives because of an absurd ideology; it was also a burden to him to have survived while others perished, hence the importance for him of preserving their memory. He fought against anti-Semitism and racism which began to rise 20 years after the war, when the limitation period on Nazi crimes was gradually expiring. He could not reconcile himself to this, and thought that genocide and creation of an ideological justification for it could never be accepted and, even less, forgiven (see Jankélévitch, 1967). However, after the war he supported and became involved in all the student revolts and rebellions, every struggle aimed at increasing individual freedoms.

Freedom

The category of freedom may be regarded as one of the most important in the thought and life of Vladimir Jankélévitch. In his deliberations on freedom he starts with Plato and arrives at two aspects of freedom: inner and outer

⁸ ‘L’expérience morale enfin suppose à la fois la notion universelle et rationnelle d’une loi inhérente à la dignité de l’humain en général et, [...], une expérience privilégiée, urgente, hyperbolique qui nous pousse toujours au-delà de notre devoir [...] Aussi la morale, dès qu’elle cesse d’être une pure déduction cognitive et synonymique des devoirs, ne se distingue-t-elle plus de la métaphysique.’

(political). Examining it from this perspective, he applies three criteria: (1) the feeling of the obviousness of freedom, which is within us; (2) criticism of freedom from the perspective of determinism and fear of the latter – this refers to Bergson and his idea of human struggle against fate; it is also a struggle aimed at going beyond the boundaries imposed on us by external factors and the urge to freedom; (3) a reversal of Pascal's Wager 'for and against' (see Jankélévitch, 2010b, pp. 377–382).

Jankélévitch presupposes that freedom begins through itself (*par elle-même*); it must be within us to be real, it is a necessary inner condition, the power source of humanity which 'allows one to act without cause, without an etiological, physical or biological causality in such a way that the action results from one's will'⁹ (Jankélévitch, 2010b, p. 380). We need to remember that the achievement of this inner freedom also means inner struggles with superstitions and *clichés* which we absorb from our culture and circumstances. In the words of Michèle Le Dœuff, 'for Jankélévitch, finding in oneself the power of freedom allows one to overcome a nightmare or to break a spell, [...] in order to act independently and act in the cause of freedom the smokescreen needs to be overcome'¹⁰ (Le Dœuff, 2010, p. 269). His numerous declarations claim that thought and action should go hand in hand and result from conscious choice, while everyone should have the right to freedom and self-determination (see LeDœuff, 2010, p. 264). As an aside let us add that in his approach to philosophy (and humanities or human activity in general) he already tried to be free of all the 'isms' and fashions of his time (see Schwab, 2010a, p. 14).

It is important to bear in mind that, for Jankélévitch, 'freedom is the response to the passing of time'¹¹ (Jankélévitch, 2010b, p. 383), which undergoes continuous change. That change depends on the inner predisposition of the individual and external factors, hence the philosopher's conception of freedom is also linked to the premiss that freedom is not static (as a state of consciousness), but keeps changing, is dynamic (always trying to go beyond the boundaries of consciousness, to expand them). As he wrote in the third volume of *Le je-ne-sais-quoi et le presque-rien*: 'freedom means to remain faithful to consciousness in itself, which is not an indicator, nor a cryptogram, but is dynamism and mobility'¹² (Jankélévitch, 1981, p. 24). He emphasised that freedom is a sufficiently abstract concept to be successfully examined in opposition to, for example, captivity (Jankélévitch, 2010b, p. 375), allowing one to imagine it quickly (and quite easily). He spoke about freedom during his guest lecture at the philosophy department of the Université Paris Sud in Villebon-sur-Yvette, a suburb of Paris, in 1971:

⁹ 'permet d'agir sans raison entraînant, sans causalité étiologique, physique, biologique, de telle manière que cette action vienne bien de sa volonté'.

¹⁰ 'pour Jankélévitch, trouver en soi le ressort de la liberté revient à vaincre un fantôme ou se délivrer d'un sortilège [...] pour agir librement, et agir pour la liberté, un écran de fumée est à franchir.'

¹¹ 'la liberté est la réponse à un moment du temps'.

¹² 'la liberté c'est de rester fidèle à la prise de conscience elle-même, laquelle n'est pas un exposant, ni un cryptogramme, mais un dynamisme et une mobilité'.

Freedom is comprehensible only in an ambiguous mode; it is linked to determinism; freedom in itself creates destiny. In the moment when I make a choice I am free but once I have made a choice, I have killed all the possibilities apart from one, and created an accomplished fact (*fait accompli*). It is precisely there that human scleroticism lies, the possibilities become increasingly fewer. Freedom, being accomplished through this, destroys itself; man is free but not free of his freedom, because my freedom ends at the moment of becoming my destiny. The one who would succeed in freeing himself from his freedom would be God. Man is free in his choice (Plotinus) but is not free of the chosen thing which burdens his shoulders: this is why he is afraid of choices. Freedom is not palpable, it is only a possibility; when we press it, it disappears. It is not freedom which is great, but liberation¹³ (Jankélévitch, 2010b, pp. 383–384).

When we talk about freedom in Jankélévitch's reflections, it is worth drawing attention to a category directly linked to it, to liberation (*libération*), which comes at the end of the quotation given above. The philosopher seems to see these two categories in a close relationship: liberation is a consequence of freedom, as if its next stage, its crowning glory. Françoise Schwab explains this issue as follows:

His voice elucidates spiritual rebirth, joy, active courage and freedom. The metaphysics of becoming and creating, which bestows the right to the ethics of presence and freedom. 'Freedom gives happiness, but liberation gives joy' and if it is necessary to have the second to experience the first, one needs a whole life to derive benefit from it¹⁴ (Schwab, 2010a, p. 19).

At the same time freedom is a category which Jankélévitch links to music (and any human creative activity). One may regard it here as a bridge to the next issue of the greatest importance in this study – music, which in turn is irrevocably linked to the category of the ineffable, so emblematic of this thinker. Music is a form of ineffable experience, but also an art form which extends beyond it.

Music

Vladimir Jankélévitch's legacy includes dozens of books, published mainly during his life (a few appeared posthumously) and several hundred articles. This extensive collection includes as many as 17 books devoted to music (although one should note that some of them are new editions, often significantly revised, of earlier works). His first text on music was published in 1929, under

¹³ 'La liberté n'est intelligible qu'à l'état ambigu, elle est liée au déterminisme, la liberté elle-même fabrique le destin. Au moment où je choisis, je suis libre mais une fois que j'ai choisi j'ai tué tous les possibles sauf un et créé un fait accompli. C'est en cela que réside la sclérose de l'homme, les possibles sont de moins en moins nombreux. La liberté en s'exerçant se détruit elle-même, l'homme est libre mais il n'est pas libre de sa liberté puisque ma liberté finit par être mon destin. Quelqu'un qui serait libre de sa liberté, ce serait Dieu. L'homme est libre de choisir (Plotin), mais il n'est pas libre de la chose choisie qui s'alourdit sur ses épaules: c'est pourquoi il a peur de choisir. La liberté est impalpable, ce n'est qu'un pouvoir, dès qu'on insiste sur elle, elle disparaît. Ce n'est pas la liberté qui est grande, c'est la libération.'

¹⁴ 'Sa voix exprime la résurgence du spirituel, de la joie, du courage agissant et de la liberté. Une métaphysique du devenir et de la création qui fait droit à une éthique de présence et de liberté. "La liberté fait le bonheur mais la libération fait la joie" et s'il fait une seconde pour l'éprouver, il faut la vie entière pour en tirer profit.'

the title *Franz Liszt et les étapes de la musique contemporaine*.¹⁵ His first book on music was *Gabriel Fauré et ses mélodies* published in 1938, while the last one (and one of the last published during his life) was *La présence lointaine: Albeniz, Séverac, Mompou*, 1983.¹⁶

One of the basic assumptions made by the French philosopher in relation to talking as well as thinking about music was that ‘it concerns explaining in words something which rebels against discourse and language, using all the resources of language as such, metaphors if necessary, with the risk of falling into banality’¹⁷ (Jankélévitch, 2010c, p. 385). He often emphasised that talking about music is a question of metaphors, since it is impossible otherwise to encompass that art within words; those who comment on Jankélévitch’s writings also draw attention to this aspect (see Bartoli, 2010, p. 74; Poniatowska, 1999, pp. 55–62). In spite of the elusiveness of music and the difficulty of describing it, the philosopher does not doubt its power and ability to influence people (Jankélévitch, 2010e, p. 396).

Jankélévitch considered music in many of its aspects: its temporality, the meanings it carried (or not), the ability to exist between sound and silence, to go beyond time, to experience and enter the realm of the ineffable. This is a consequence of the diversity of his interests and his openness. Irena Poniatowska remarks that ‘He placed the issue of the ontology and specificity of music on a broad philosophical, psychophysical, aesthetic and theoretical plane – in the context of art generally’¹⁸ (Poniatowska, 1999, p. 55).

For Jankélévitch, temporality (*temporalité*) is one of the most important and the most obvious determinants of music even in its most original essence: ‘Music, in its original function, constitutes an irreversible temporal continuum’¹⁹ (Jankélévitch, 2010d, p. 392). This is an art which does not exist without time, but which also passes in it, as does human life. Hence he notes the closeness of human existence and music, which consists precisely in that transience and ephemerality (see Schwab, 2010b, p. 69).

He was quite unambiguous on the subject of meaning in music, or its ability to transmit ideas or content: if it does contain any meanings, they are only metaphorical. In his view, music is not a language, and thus cannot carry content. He expressed these views strongly in his *La musique et l’ineffable*: ‘In comparison to forms of intentional signification, music operates according to a completely

¹⁵It seems that from his earliest youth Jankélévitch had the highest regard for the works of Liszt. This composer returns as the subject of nearly every larger text relating to music in different contexts as a precursor of 20th century music, a genius of improvisation, master of nuance, a man of great generosity, kindness and empathy etc. (one of Jankélévitch’s favourite compositions was the transcendental etude *La Ricordanza*). One might note here that his experiences relating to the Second World War left such a deep mark on the philosopher that he would never again use the German version of Liszt’s first name (Schwab, 2010b, p. 57).

¹⁶Complete list (as of 2010) of Jankélévitch’s publications is to be found at the end of *Présence de Vladimir Jankélévitch. Le charme et l’occasion* on pages 445–461.

¹⁷‘il s’agit d’exprimer par des mots quelque chose qui est rebelle au discours et au langage, en usant de toutes les ressources du langage lui-même, de la métaphore s’il le faut, au risque de tomber dans la carte postale.’

¹⁸‘Zagadnienie ontologii i specyfiki muzyki stawiał na szerokiej płaszczyźnie filozoficznej, psychofizycznej, estetycznej i teoretycznej – w kontekście sztuki w ogóle.’

¹⁹‘La musique, dans sa fonction primitive, est une continuité temporelle irréversible’.

different plan' (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 17); also, 'Music signifies something in general without ever wanting to say anything in particular' (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 57). Irena Poniatowska comments about his deliberations: 'Music [...] does not mean anything [...]. Music does not express any meaning which communicates something, it is a meaning in itself'²⁰ (Poniatowska, 1999, p. 57). As an aside one may add that France has a very long tradition of polemic and comparisons concerning the relationship between music and language (see Gamrat, 2010; Gamrat, 2014, pp. 56–76), to which Jankélévitch does not refer. It seems that he also did not take note of musical semiotics or narratology which began to gain popularity in the first half of the 1980s.

We thus reach the key concept in Jankélévitch's reflection on the art of sound, that of *ineffable*, alongside which appear the additional category of *indicible* (unspeakable), *inexprimable* (inexpressible). These terms, as was noted by Jan Czarnecki (2015, p. 54), constitute the emblem of this thinker's philosophy, a fundamental 'triad of closely related adjectives with neo-Platonic provenance'²¹. It should be emphasised that the category of *ineffable* appears in the deliberations of a number of twentieth-century philosophers, not only Jankélévitch, but in his thinking 'it found a particular reflection [...], constituting at the same time one of the cornerstones of all his philosophy'²² (Czarnecki, 2015, p. 53), where music is perceived as 'a form of experience of the ineffable'²³ (Schwab, 2010a, p. 22).

Jan Czarnecki emphasises that the term *inexprimable* contains in it the two other categories, that which is ineffable and unspoken. It is also the strongest of these terms, but it is *ineffable* that became the emblem of Vladimir Jankélévitch's philosophy of music, since his book from 1961 which contains this category in its title – *La musique et l'ineffable* – became a classic among philosophical-aesthetic deliberations about music.

The differences between *ineffable*, *indicible* and *inexprimable* are very subtle, and disappear during attempts at translation, since dictionaries give them as synonyms, while the French dictionary *Le petit Robert* also provides identical definitions of these words: impossible to express in words, indescribable. It is particularly difficult to differentiate between *ineffable* (dictionary: incapable of being expressed in words, unspeakable) and *indicible* (dictionary: unspeakable/incapable of being expressed in words), and there do not seem to be generally adopted translations of these categories. Only the explanations given by individual researchers of Jankélévitch's writings allow one to arrive at more precise interpretations of these terms. According to Anna Chęćka-Gotkiewicz, *indicible* 'has a negative character, reveals creative impotence' – the impotence of words faced with something beyond them, their limits. On the other hand, *ineffable* stands at the other extreme: it is positive, because it goes beyond the limitation of words, touches that which 'reaches not only a bodily gesture, but also a spiritual

²⁰ 'Muzyka [...] nie oznacza niczego [...]. Muzyka nie wyraża żadnego sensu, który coś komunikuje, sama jest sensem.'

²¹ 'triadę blisko spokrewnionych ze sobą przymiotników o proveniencji neoplatonickiej'.

²² 'znalazła szczególne odbicie [...], stanowiąc zarazem jeden ze zworników całości jego filozofii'.

²³ 'une forme de l'expérience de l'ineffable'.

movement'²⁴ (Chęćka-Gotkiewicz, 2011, p. 45). These categories clearly reveal Jankélévitch's tendency to use paradoxes, aptly described by Anna Chęćka-Gotkiewicz: 'This paradoxical ability to reach the essence of meaning, while at the same time opening up music semantically, means that Jankélévitch describes it as *espressivo inexpressif*. [...] Jankélévitch defines inexpressive expressiveness more precisely by another paradox – affected indifference'²⁵ (Chęćka-Gotkiewicz, 2011, p. 45).

It should be stressed that, when writing about *inexprimable/inexpressif* (or *exprimable/expressif*), Jankélévitch is concerned with linguistic and philosophical issues, without touching the subject of musical expression, which for many composers is the essence of music. It is precisely expression, or giving expression to feelings, which was the aim for generations of composers. On the other hand, Jankélévitch in reality is always concerned with the issue of whether music can convey / express specific meanings. Hence he wrote about the non-expressiveness of music in the sense of its inability to convey specific meanings (e.g. landscape), and this non-expressiveness opens infinite possibilities of various interpretations from which we can make our choices (see Chęćka-Gotkiewicz, 2011, p. 45). And thus here also we find the issue of freedom and possibility of choice, which had such great significance for this thinker.

Regardless of the doubts and problems concerning the interpretation of the subtle differences between the categories used by Jankélévitch, it would be difficult not to agree with Anna Chęćka-Gotkiewicz when she says:

He created original music metaphysics which is capable of drawing on musicological analysis of a work but never loses contact with the living experience. [...] The author does not avoid musical notation examples illustrating a specific sound phenomenon, but the main aim of the argument is to reach the essence of the music being discussed and the experience evoked by it. For Jankélévitch music provides an opportunity to write about existential issues, his reflections at times take on a confessional tone, but they are grounded in the experience of a specific composition²⁶ (Chęćka-Gotkiewicz, 2011, p. 41).

It is interesting that Jankélévitch's beloved composer, Franz Liszt, wrote, as did many after him, about music's capacity to transmit meanings; also many before him considered the possibility of content being conveyed by music and whether it was a language; above all discussions involved its expressive potential (including the capacity to depict and evoke feelings). We already find elements of these reflections in antiquity, in Plato, and later they intensify in the eighteenth

²⁴ 'ma charakter negatywny, ujawnia twórczą niemoc [...] sięga nie tylko do cielesnego gestu, ale też do duchowego poruszenia'.

²⁵ 'Ta paradoksalna zdolność dotarcia do jądra sensu – przy jednoczesnym otwarciu semantycznym muzyki – sprawia, że Jankélévitch określa ją jako *espressivo inexpressif*. [...] Nieekspresyjna ekspresyjność zostaje przez Jankélévitcha dookreślona przez kolejny paradoks – afektowaną obojętność.'

²⁶ 'Stworzył on oryginalną metafizykę muzyczną, która potrafi czerpać z muzykologicznej analizy dzieła, lecz nigdy nie traci kontaktu z żywym doznaniem. [...] Autor nie unika przykładów nutowych, które ilustrują konkretne zjawisko dźwiękowe, jednak zasadniczym celem wywodu jest dotarcie do istoty omawianej muzyki i wywoływanego przez nią doznania. Muzyka jest dla Jankélévitcha okazją do pisania o kwestiach egzystencjalnych, jego refleksje niekiedy osiągają ton konfesyjny, jednak są ugruntowane w doświadczeniu konkretnego utworu.'

century and continue throughout the nineteenth century. On the other hand, in the twentieth century they become the subject of research in such areas as the psychology of music and musical semiotics derived from philosophy.

Let us now look at the composers most highly regarded by Jankélévitch, who were at the centre of his deliberations. The very titles of his books direct us to the most important people and issues with which he was concerned in his thinking.

1938: *Gabriel Fauré et ses mélodies*

1939: *Maurice Ravel*

1942: *Le Nocturne*

1949: *Debussy et le mystère*

1951: *Gabriel Fauré, ses mélodies, son esthétique*

1955: *La Rhapsodie. Verve et improvisation musicale*

1957: *Le nocturne: Fauré. Chopin et la nuit. Satie et le matin*

1961: *La Musique et l'ineffable*

1968: *La Vie et la mort dans la musique de Debussy*

1974: *De la musique au silence* vol. 1: *Fauré et l'inexprimable*

1976: *De la musique au silence*, vol. 2: *Debussy et le mystère de l'instant*

1979: *De la musique au silence*, vol. 3: *Liszt et la Rhapsodie: essai sur la virtuosité*

1983: *La Présence lointaine, Isaac Albéniz, Déodat de Séverac, Federico Mompou*

1988: *La Musique et les heures* (ed. F. Schwab)

1998: *Liszt, rhapsodie et improvisation* (ed. F. Schwab)

2017: *L'Enchantement musical: écrits 1929–1983* (ed. F. Schwab)

It is easy to list the composers who were most important for this philosopher, starting with those members of the musical pantheon whose names appear in book titles: Gabriel Fauré, Maurice Ravel, Claude Debussy, Franz Liszt, Fryderyk Chopin, Isaac Albéniz, as well as those often referred to in the texts: Modest Mussorgsky, Nikolai Rimski-Korsakov, Igor Stravinsky, Aleksander Tansman and Alexander Scriabin. To this list we also need to add the so-called 'maîtres mineurs' (minor masters), whose music was close to Jankélévitch: Déodat de Séverac, Eric Satie, Federico Mompou, Mily Balakirev, Andre Caplet and Charles Koechlin.

At this point a question arises regarding the criteria for choosing these composers and not others. Undoubtedly the philosopher's attitude to music and its mysteries – that which is inexpressible, indescribable and unspoken – had significance for his decisions about repertoire. Jean-Pierre Bartoli put it concisely: 'Jankélévitch values all composers who turn their work into a manifesto of irrationality and freedom and are restrained in their utterances'²⁷ (Bartoli,

²⁷ 'Jankélévitch apprécie par-dessus tout les compositeurs qui font de leur art un manifeste en faveur de l'irrationalité et de la liberté et restent économes dans leurs propos'.

2010, p. 78). Bernard Sève approached the issue in a more systematic manner, distinguishing five criteria of repertoire selection which, in his opinion, guided Jankélévitch's decisions. They seem to convey perfectly that which we find in the philosopher's thinking, let us therefore quote them here: (1) historical period – from 1825 to 1937; (2) nationality – the philosopher avoids music by German, English, Italian and Austrian composers; (3) piano – composers who either were pianists themselves or wrote much for that instrument; (4) preference for the magic of timbre (*magie sonore*); (5) nuances, i.e., dynamics and performance symbols (*notion de nuance*) (cf. Sève, 2010, p. 88).

Knowing the significance of timbre magic for the philosopher makes his choice of composers quite clear. He used the term 'magic' to describe music's capacity for affecting people (i.e., according to the terminology used by musicians – expression and affectivity), something given an excellent description by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the entry for *Musique* in his encyclopaedia. In Jankélévitch's words, 'Music acts upon human beings, on their nervous systems and their vital processes' (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 1). According to Sève, this magic involves sophisticated timbre, colouring of the instrumentation, the composer's sensitivity to nuance and his attitude to the instrument as a tool of sound colouring. He also emphasises the link between 'timbre magic' and 'nuances' which together contribute to the uniqueness of a composition, its power and its effect on a (sensitive) listener (Sève, 2010, p. 89).

As a bard of freedom, Jankélévitch rejects petrified forms inherited from previous generations, particularly those which might be described as strict, with an *a priori* given construction, such as the sonata. On the other hand, he has high regard for improvisation and free forms (Sève, 2010, p. 94), regarding rhapsody as the most perfect among them. He sees in it the form (he does not distinguish between form and genre) which is *par excellence* romantic and linked to the historical changes which took place during the nineteenth century – the rise of national identity and national music (with references to popular and folk music). For him it is also the ideal realisation of the idea of freedom in music through freedom of construction and elements of improvisation. (He tends to forget that improvisation is also a structured activity and very free only in appearance; it was also a subject of musical studies in the nineteenth century). He contrasts rhapsody with all constructions based on the sonata form, attempting to make these oppositions more apparent by reference to the romantic literature (Jankélévitch, 1998, p. 26). He also contrasts the character of rhapsody with that of symphony: 'Symphonies are heroic or pastoral, while rhapsodies are Slavonic, Basque, Norwegian, Ukrainian or Spanish – the adjective does not connote subjective mood or pathos but geographical provenance'²⁸ (Jankélévitch, 1998, p. 29).

Let us examine a short fragment of the description of Debussy's *Nuages* from *Trois Nocturnes pour orchestre* written for the concert programme of orchestra from Toulouse in 1944, to find out more about the philosopher's approach to music.

²⁸ 'Les symphonies sont héroïques ou pastorales: mais les rhapsodies sont slaves, basques, norvégiennes, ukrainiennes ou espagnoles, l'adjectif désignant ici non point un humeur subjective ou un pathos, mais une provenance géographique.'

We might describe it as a poem of elements: air (*Nuages*), fire (*Fêtes*), water (*Sirènes*). Debussy is not interested in heavy matter and massive objects, but in things that are light, winged and delightful: meteors, quivering satin like Mallarmé's *Éventail*, sails on the water, fairies of vapour and mist like the 'exquisite dancers' from the fourth *Preludium* from the second *Book*, capricious and impalpable gnomes from St John's Eve, like Shakespeare's Puck. This parade of altered fifths and thirds, which had already been used by Mussorgsky in the third song from the *Without sun* collection tells us of the peace and white procession moving along the sky. The clouds combine and separate like thoughts – not like the heavy cumulus clouds of Chateaubriand, more like billowy and fluffy floss that Baudelaire talks about in his *Prose poems*, which floats dreamily across the azure. Debussy did not see massive sculptures or brilliant reliefs, but massless bodies, such as wind across a plain²⁹ (Jankélévitch, 2017, pp. 90–91).

The above fragment conveys well the author's approach to a specific composition: referring to the larger whole (where justified), comparison to the composer's other works and to the works of other composers, indicating the elements important for the given artist (including the writer's own preferences), comparison to literary works, metaphorical illustrations and a few elements of the composer's craft characteristic of the given piece (or those which the philosopher found particularly affective). Undoubtedly this is a somewhat individualistic approach, where technical elements are woven into a quite metaphorical discourse encompassing the music of various composers and comparison with literature. Jan Czarnecki, however, emphasises the fact that 'The philosopher warns against the error of hypostasising metaphors which leads to "fictionalised metamusic", his ironic description of the consequences of interpreting musical metaphors, analogies and comparisons as literally understood content of music, or a key to its supposed esoteric meaning'³⁰ (Czarnecki, 2015, p. 56).

Vladimir Jankélévitch's book publications were not part of mainstream musicological thinking, but his input was valued. He wrote, in a sense, in opposition to the scientific objectivism of natural sciences adapted by musicology, he was 'against academic musicology using analytical tools in order to systematically classify musical forms and explain their origin and development in a historical description'³¹ (Czarnecki, 2015, p. 56). In his works he showed that within the same structures one could discover 'a basis for developing various hermeneutics within the context of the philosophy and culture of a given period which could

²⁹ 'On dirait le poème des éléments: l'air (*Nuages*), le feu (*Fêtes*), l'eau (*Sirènes*). Car Debussy s'intéresse non pas à la lourde matière et aux corps massifs, mais aux choses légères, ailées et ravissantes: météores, satin frissonnant comme l'*Éventail* de Mallarmé, voiles sur l'eau, fées de vapeur et de brouillard comme les „exquises danseuses” du 4^e *Prélude* du Livre II, gnomes impondérables et impalpables d'une nuit de la Saint-Jean, comme le Puck de Shakespeare. Ce défilé de quintes et de tierces alternantes dont Moussorgski s'était déjà servi dans le troisième poème du recueil *Sans Soleil* nous raconte la calme et blanche procession qui glisse dans le ciel. Les nuages se nouent et se dénouent comme des pensées – et non pas les lourds cumulus de Chateaubriand, mais plutôt l'ouate floconneuse et duveteée dont parle Baudelaire dans ses *Poèmes en prose* et qui flotte rêveusement dans l'azur. Debussy n'a pas vu des épaisseurs profondément sculptée ni d'éblouissants reliefs mais des corps sans masse aussi légers que le vent dans la plaine.'

³⁰ 'Filozof przestrzega przed błędem hipostazowania metafor rodzącego "sfabularyzowaną muzykę", jak z przekąsem określa skutki brania muzycznych metafor, analogii i porównań za literalnie rozumianą treść muzyki, czy klucz do jej domniemanego ezoterycznego sensu.'

³¹ 'przeciw akademickiej muzykologii posługującej się narzędziami analitycznymi w celu systematycznego sklasyfikowania form muzycznych i wyjaśnienia ich genezy oraz rozwoju w opisie historycznym'.

not be captured by structuralist analysis. Particularly now, in a period when culture is understood as symbolic, we do not limit ourselves to what is known as the internal code, but we also take into consideration various external codes³² (Poniatowska, 1999, pp. 56–57; cf. Bartoli, 2010, p. 79).

He always remained ‘faithful to his intellectual independence and his sovereign contempt for fashions and coteries’³³ (Bartoli, 2010, p. 73). It is only now, when fashions in science change as in a kaleidoscope, when the humanities are also more open to various different perspectives and ‘followers’ of one particular research method are becoming rare, when ‘talking of spontaneity and expression in music is no longer perceived as absurd, can one assume renewed interest in the writings of Jankélévitch’³⁴ (Bartoli, 2010, p. 74). From the perspective of more than 30 years which have passed since his death one can see more clearly the value of his reflections on music; in Bartoli’s words:

Jankélévitch’s musicological works today hold unexpected riches. In many of their aspects they should be taken as a model. Above all as a model because of the durability of his reflections on the poetics of musicians, of which he was a fiery defender. The time has come to situate his musicological reflections in the right context, to take them out of the polemics of his time and to recognise him as one of the most important interpreters of the aesthetics of the first half of the twentieth century.³⁵ (Bartoli, 2010, p. 84)

Unfinished project

When, towards the end of September 2015, we were discussing with Maciej Jabłoński the final details of a book titled *Nowa Muzykologia* [*New Musicology*] (Jabłoński, Gamrat, 2016), we were already planning our next project. Maciej thought that it would be worthwhile to make Vladimir Jankélévitch’s thinking about music known in Poland. This philosopher’s writings about the art of sound are not available in Polish (only his book on Ravel was translated in 1977), nor have they been the subject of thorough analysis by researchers. We only have single texts by Irena Poniatowska and Jan Czarnecki, and the works of Anna Chęćka-Gotkowicz, who might be described as the philosopher’s spokesperson in Poland (see, e.g., Chęćka-Gotkowicz, 2011; Chęćka-Gotkowicz, 2012). The aim of the project was to make Jankélévitch’s music philosophy better known in a systematic manner, presenting not only his texts but also contem-

³² ‘nieuchwytnie dla strukturalistycznej analizy podstawy do rozwijania różnych hermeneutyk w kontekście filozofii i kultury danego czasu. Zwłaszcza obecnie w epoce rozumienia kultury jako kultury symbolicznej nie ograniczmy się do tzw. kodu wewnętrznego, ale uwzględniamy również różne kody zewnętrzne.’

³³ ‘fidele à son indépendance d’esprit et à son mépris souverain des modes et coteries’.

³⁴ ‘il n’est plus incongru de parler de spontanéité et d’expression en musique, on peut faire le pari d’un retour d’intérêt pour écrits de Jankélévitch’.

³⁵ ‘L’œuvre musicologique de Jankélévitch contient des ressources aujourd’hui insoupçonnées. En beaucoup de ses aspects, elle doit être prise comme un modèle. Un modèle d’abord par la pertinence de ses propos sur la poétique de musiciens dont il s’est fait ardent défenseur. Il est temps de situer dans son contexte son œuvre musicologique, de s’évader de polémiques de son époque et de reconnaître en lui l’un de plus importants interprètes de l’esthétique de la première moitié du XX^e siècle.’

porary commentary on them, something necessary in view of the time elapsed (as commented on by Bartoli in the quotation above). We were planning to present these writings in the appropriate perspective and context, to acquaint Polish readers with a particular model of approach to music, most probably in a manner analogous to the publication devoted to the philosophy of music of Peter Kivy (see Chęćka-Gotkiewicz, Jabłoński, 2015).



Fig. 1. Vladimir Jankélévitch at Aleksander Tansman's ca. 1961/62 (Florence Blumenthal 3, Paris). Jankélévitch first on the left, Tansman next to Claire Motte. Photograph from Les Amis d'Alexandre Tansman collection kindly provided by Mireille Tansman

With this new project in mind, we took certain preparatory steps: exploring the full extent of Jankélévitch's legacy, producing a Polish bibliography of his works relating to the philosophy of music, and we also planned as an introduction (or one of the introductions) a mini-interview with Mireille Tansman,³⁶ who wrote a doctoral thesis under the supervision of Jankélévitch³⁷ and whose father, the outstanding composer Alexander Tansman, was a friend of the philosopher. In this introductory interview we wanted to present Jankélévitch as a man, a family friend, an aficionado of and a commentator on music. There was also to be a chapter devoted to the friendship between the composer and the philosopher which lasted nearly 30 years and is testified to by letters, dedications, photographs (see Fig. 1) and reminiscences such as the one from the musician's older daughter:

They became close friends in the 1950s, after the death of my mother. They were so close my father used to say that they did not need to speak to understand each other! They saw each other

³⁶ We exchanged a number of emails with Mireille on this subject at the beginning of October 2015, and in one of them she suggested putting me in touch with Françoise Schwab, who has been researching the legacy of Vladimir Jankélévitch (Email 6 October 2015, 10:45).

³⁷ Mireille Tansman, *La philosophie de la mort chez Léon Tolstoï*, Ph.D. thesis successfully defended on 3 December 1983 at Université Paris IV (Sorbonne University).

regularly, at Jankélévitch's (1 quai aux Fleurs, 75004 Paris), close to Notre Dame. Moreover, Jankélévitch organised musical evenings at his place. He was always present at the concerts where Tansman's music was performed³⁸ (Email dated 17 December 2018 11:39).

Let us pause for a moment longer looking at the relationship between Jankélévitch and Tansman. In a text published in the periodical *L'Arc*, issue 75 of which was wholly devoted to Jankélévitch, Tansman described it as a 'deep brotherly friendship' (Tansman, 1979, p. 55). As an aside we might mention that this was the only text by this musician in this issue of the periodical. Writing about Jankélévitch, Tansman said that he was:

one of the most complex, most fascinating people I have had occasion to meet in all of my long life. He collects hobbies none of which are one, since all the disciplines he touches and his poetic and oneiric vision are combined with deep professionalism and awareness of things in themselves in a form unique only to him. [...] He can make philosophy musical and music philosophical³⁹ (Tansman, 1979, p. 55).

Tansman tries to present concisely Jankélévitch's most important ideas on music and the manner in which music functions. He notes that, according to the philosopher's premiss, music needs three elements in order to 'fulfil its aesthetic aim: creation, performance and perception. These postulates are based on intuition, interpretation and the ability to receive (or reject)'⁴⁰ (Tansman, 1979, p. 57). At the end of the article we find the following comment, very important from the point of view of the reception of Jankélévitch's thinking: 'Becoming acquainted with the texts of Vladimir Jankélévitch, as well as our personal relationship, not only confirmed my aesthetic views on the art I serve; they also enriched my vision of that ineffable art and opened up new horizons'⁴¹ (Tansman, 1979, p. 58).

The surviving correspondence between the two men gives us an even clearer picture of their discussions about music and the development of their friendship. A valuable aspect of this was the fact that they would exchange their works and comment on them. In a letter dated 2 July 1957 Tansman thanks Jankélévitch for sending him a copy of the book *Le nocturne: Fauré. Chopin et la nuit. Satie et le matin* (1957) (Tansman, 2005, p. 436), and on 5 December of that year he comments on the book:

³⁸ 'Les deux étaient devenus des amis intimes depuis les années 50, après la mort de ma mère. Tellement proches que mon père disait qu'ils n'avaient pas besoin de se parler pour se comprendre! Ils se voyaient régulièrement, chez Jankélévitch, 1 quai aux Fleurs, 75004 Paris, près de Notre Dame. Jankélévitch organisait en outre des soirées musicales chez lui. Il assistait toujours aux concerts où figurait une œuvre de Tansman.'

³⁹ 'une des figures les plus complexes, les plus fascinantes qu'il m'ait été donné de rencontrer tout au long de ma vie. Il accumule les „Violons d'Ingres" dont aucun n'en est un, car dans toutes les disciplines qu'il touche, une vision poétique et onirique est liée à un profond professionnalisme, à une connaissance des choses en elles-mêmes dans une projection très personnelle qui n'est qu'à lui. [...] il sait rendre la philosophie musicale et la musique philosophique.'

⁴⁰ 'pour accomplir son but esthétique: la création, l'exécution et la perception. Ces postulats sont basés sur l'intuition, l'interprétation et la faculté de recevoir (ou de rejeter).'

⁴¹ 'La fréquentation des textes de Vladimir Jankélévitch, ainsi que nos rapports personnels n'ont pas uniquement confirmé mes vues esthétiques sur l'art que je sers; ils ont enrichi ma vision de cet art ineffable et ouvert des horizons nouveaux.'

I am deeply under the spell of your perspicacity, poetic and sensitive at the same time, and intelligence, which retains all of the necessary clarity that you apply in your 'approach' to a musical composition. This is something increasingly rare today when most often we assist in analyses which are either superficial or super-technically dry, thus in fact destroying all of truly creative quality⁴² (Tansman, 2005, p. 436; see also Fig. 2).

3, rue Florence Jacquesson
Paris 16^e
5/12-57.

Cher Monsieur Jankélévitch,

Il y a longtemps que je voulais
vous écrire pour vous dire toute mon
admiration, en tant que musicien et
arbitre, pour votre "Nocturne".

Je n'aurais pas à trouver votre
adresse et, par quelque miracle, en
ce moment, en rentrant de Rome,
et en redonnant votre livre sans le train,
je viens de mettre la main dessus!

J'ai été profondément frappé par
la pénétration, en même temps poétique
et sensible, et où l'intelligence garde
toute sa lucidité indispensable, que
vous possédez dans votre "approche" à
l'œuvre de musique. C'est une chose
de plus en plus rare à notre époque
où, pour la plupart, on assiste
à des analyses, soit superficielles, soit
d'une sécheresse super-technique qui
enlèvent toute qualité vraiment créatrice.

J'aurais été très heureux si vous
veniez. Si vous avez quelque jour

Fig. 2. Fragment of a letter from Aleksander Tansman to Vladimir Jankélévitch dated 5 December 1957. Document from Les Amis d'Alexandre Tansman collection kindly provided by Mireille Tansman

Tansman responded by sending Jankélévitch his *Intermezzi* (four books of works composed during the years 1939–1940). The philosopher started playing

⁴² 'J'ai été profondément frappé par la pénétration, en même temps poétique et sensible, et où l'intelligence garde toute sa lucidité indispensable, que vous possédez dans votre "approche" de l'œuvre de musique. C'est une chose de plus en plus rare à notre époque où, pour la plupart, on assiste à des analyses, soit superficielles, soit d'une sécheresse super-technique qui enlèvent toute qualité vraiment créatrice.'

these works with great joy and enthusiasm, as he reported to the composer on 27 December 1957, with the following comments on the music he was playing:

What you do, even in the most swirly counterpoints, always has a clear face, a melodic meaning; in short, it is always the music of an artist. When you Schoenbergize it you are better than Schoenberg: poetry, mystery, the dreamy recitative of the fourth Interlude have no equivalent among his works. I could not tell you what I love the most: what I love most is always that which I am playing at the time! I oscillate between the pathos of the adagio from the Sonata (*Intermezzo* 21), the grace of the homage to Brahms (who never had so much charm), the excellent musicality of number 24, the energy and beautiful rhythmic line of number 18, the moving Lullaby, the delightful pianism of numbers 1–3, the mystery of number 5. Only Prokofiev has so much variety and that musicality, so spontaneous, combined with scholarly discipline. Thank you for sending me this music. I will try to work on some of these pieces for my own personal pleasure. I truly feel myself to be ‘Tansmanian’!⁴³ (Jankélévitch in Tansman, 2005, p. 433).

These few sentences reveal not only the author’s assessment of Tansman’s music but also, in a very informal, almost spontaneous manner, his musical preferences, described earlier in Bernard Sève’s quotations: he likes best that which was written for the piano, that was not German, and that he could play himself (we can also note here the philosopher’s very high level of technical skill and ability to read music *a vista* – Tansman’s piano music is difficult to play). He values the music for its poetry, musicality, energy, rhythm, expressiveness. And, most importantly, he loves what he plays, i.e., the choice of repertoire that he writes about is at least partially determined by his current preferences and ability as a pianist. On the other hand, he tended not to write about things to which he was indifferent, or presented it in opposition to what he regarded highly, as in the references to the music of Brahms and Schoenberg in the letter quoted above.

In 1961 Tansman read the book *La Musique et l’ineffable*, fundamental to Jankélévitch’s philosophy of music, and he wrote about it to its author on 18 April:

This is a true miracle. Only you can talk about the mystery of music so profoundly and... affectionately, and analyse so poetically that which is analysable. It is truly fascinating how the music and your personality, recognisable on every page, combine together. I am happy and proud to be mentioned among the quoted musicians. Thank you!⁴⁴ (Tansman, 2005, p. 437).

He immortalised musically his affection and respect for Jankélévitch in the dedication of one of his compositions. Piano miniature (no. 8), the work in

⁴³ ‘Ce que vous faites, même dans les contrepoints les plus tortueux, a toujours un visage, une ferme signification mélodique, bref c’est toujours de la musique de musicien. Quand vous les schoenbergiez, vous êtes mieux que Schoenberg: la poésie, le mystère, la rêveuse flexibilité du récitatif du 4^e Interlude n’ont pas leur équivalent chez lui. Je ne saurais vous dire ce que j’ai le plus aimé: ce que j’aime le plus est toujours ce que je suis en train de jouer! J’hésite entre le pathétique adagio de la Sonate (*Intermezzo* 21), la grâce de l’hommage à Brahms (qui n’a jamais eu tant de grâce), l’exquise musicalité du n° 24, l’énergie et la belle carrure rythmique du n° 18, la poignante Berceuse, le délicieux pianisme de n° 1 à 3, le mystère du n° 5. Je ne vois que Prokofiev qui ait tant de variété et cette musicalité si spontanée et alliée à tant de science. Merci de m’avoir envoyé ces musiques. Je vais essayer d’en travailler quelques unes, pour ma délectation personnelle. Je me sens vraiment “tansmanien”!’.

⁴⁴ ‘C’est une vraie merveille. Personne que vous ne sait parler du mystère musical avec autant de profondeur et... de tendresse, et analyser avec tant de poésie ce qui en est analysable. C’est vraiment envoûtant, comme la musique même, et d’une personnalité où on vous reconnaît à chaque page. Je suis heureux et fier de figurer parmi les musiciens cites. Merci.’

question, comes from the collection with the self-explanatory title *Album d'amis*, where each composition is dedicated to a different person, one of the composer's friends. In order to make this dedication more subtle the work's title is *Hommage à Liszt* (Tansman's only direct reference to the music of the Hungarian composer). The homage paid to Liszt, so beloved by Jankélévitch, is dedicated to the latter and seems particularly revealing; in a sense it is symbolic, especially since it was written in 1982, when both were coming to the end of their days. Stylistically the composition refers to the late Liszt, the Liszt about whom Jankélévitch wrote in his first article on music, the one who laid the foundations of contemporary music. When thanking the composer for the dedication, the philosopher captured the essence of the work and at the same time made reference to the categories important in his philosophy. Writing about the purely Tansmanian element (*purement tansmanien*), he explained it in a letter dated 25 March 1982 (see Fig. 3): 'this is something opposite to almost-nothing, it is more I-don't-know-what, it is the charm and elasticity of your form, and then it is the love of the piano, its sweetness, its harshness, it is all to choose from!'⁴⁵ (Jankélévitch in Tansman, 2005, p. 435; see also Fig. 4).

Hommage à Liszt
à Lulu et Vladimir Jankélévitch Alexandre Tansman

Andante cantabile ♩ = 60

Fig. 3. A. Tansman, *Hommage à Liszt*, bars 1–4 (own arrangement)

These quite personal statements to a friend seem to confirm Bernard Sève's thesis that 'to stress almost-nothing and I-don't-know-what in music is a reminder that beyond the subject of study is the subject of love, and that this subject of love is not only a subject but also an encounter and a listening'⁴⁶ (Sève, 2010, p. 100).

⁴⁵ 'c'est quelque chose qui est le contraire d'un presque-rien, qui est plutôt un je-ne-sais-quoi, c'est la charme et la flexibilité de ta forme, et c'est ensuite l'amour du piano, de ses douceurs, de ses rudesses, le tout est de persuader!'

⁴⁶ 'mettre l'accent sur le presque-rien et le je-ne-sais-quoi dans la musique, c'est rappeler que, derrière l'objet d'étude, il y a l'objet d'amour, et que cet objet d'amour n'est justement pas un objet, mais une rencontre et une écoute'.

25 mars 1982

Bien cher Sacha, Vous-même fier comme Astaban j'aurai
 reçu cet hommage musical de votre Sacha. Les difficultés alle-
 mands sont graduées en fonction du talent de l'interprète. Deux
 merci, votre hommage à nous est immense et abordable par celui d'Indicé
 ou de Thopique. Tant pis pour les virtuoses. J'ai pu être
 proprement débiflu le matin et du premier coup! Mais il
 y a quelque chose qui est commun à tous et qui est précisément
 tansmanien: le quelque chose, qui est le contraire d'un ques-
 tion, ni est flétri un je-ne-sais-quoi et le charme et la
 flexibilité de l'épave, et c'est ensuite l'amour du piano, de ses
 douceurs de sa rudesses, le son est à persuader. Et encore
 rien ne t'en détruira jamais; et la savoureuse complexité
 de l'orchestre ne te fera jamais oublier. Merci pour
 me part et aussi pour celle de nous autres, pour ce
 inéprouvable flux de musique, qui est ta vie elle-même et
 ton essence créatrice.

Je t'embrasse
 Vladimir

Fig 4. V. Jankélévitch to A. Tansman; letter dated 25 March 1982. Document from Les Amis d'Alexandre Tansman collection kindly provided by Mireille Tansman


Reading the deliberations of the French philosopher one can conclude that this is musicology that is sensitive, taking the side of humanity, committed to a work and the understanding of it, a musicology that was close to Maciej Jabłoński's heart. Just as were the curiosity, the openness and the need for freedom, even if it meant going 'against the current', against everything and everyone, in order to remain oneself.

It appears that the time has come for Jankélévitch's oeuvre to experience a renaissance. In January 2019 an exhibition devoted to him was opened at the Bibliothèque nationale de France: *Vladimir Jankélévitch, figures du philosophe* (15.01. – 07.04.2019). It included his manuscripts, mementoes, and an overview of the figure of a professor of the Sorbonne and a member of the Resistance Movement, but above all, his philosophical thinking and its lasting contribution that stands the test of time. Jankélévitch's students also try to preserve his legacy, hence the conferences and increasingly numerous publications. France seems to be reappraising this thinker, and devoting more attention to him. It would be a good thing to realise this so far unfinished project aimed at familiarising Polish readers with the thinking of this outstanding scholar. This would not only be beneficial for the humanities in Poland, but it would also bring us into the ranks of international avant-garde.

Translated by Zofia Weaver

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ELIZA KRUPIŃSKA

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1132-1817>

Intercollegiate Institute for Church Music, The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow

When music loses its freedom: diagnosis by Th. W. Adorno

ABSTRACT: In his analysis of the late capitalist reality *Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens* Adorno claims, that music became fetishized and lost its freedom; it became a commodity, which value is no longer be established by listener, audiences, tradition and preference but the market. The freedom of music has ended, according to Adorno, with the freedom of reproduction, which provided a stable link between production and consumption and through this has guaranteed the link between music and its listeners.

In the context of other approaches to freedom in music, which present the toxic relationship between music and the political or social ideology, Adorno's approach seem original and implies many questions for the relationship between music and society – or to be more precise – the their anastomosis. Author's goal is to discuss Adorno's diagnosis.

KEYWORDS: Adorno, freedom, fetishism, France, aesthetics

When does music lose its freedom? When can one talk of the absence of freedom in music? Usually the following scenario comes to mind: music that is breathing the life of its society one day becomes so closely linked to it that this union starts to bear the marks of a toxic relationship. One recalls the experience of socialist realism in music and its legacy: artistic output shaped under the influence of an ideology. Thus it would seem that an extreme intervention of social life into the life of art takes away the freedom of the latter. However, there is a stance that expresses a completely opposite view: that music loses its freedom when it has no bond with society and its life; that the problem of the loss of freedom lies precisely at the other extreme, perversely providing a mirror-like reflection of the opposite attitude. This is the view expressed by Theodor W. Adorno, author of the famous *Philosophy of new music* (1948). However, it is not his *Philosophy...* that will be discussed here, but Adorno's early works from the 1930s, which are of special significance for understanding the whole of his philosophical and musical views. I have in mind here such examples as his articles from *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung: On the social situation of music* (1932) and *On the fetish-character in music and the regression of listening* (1938). The first of them was published still in Frankfurt prior to his emigration, while the

second one comes from the period when Adorno was already collaborating with Max Horkheimer at Columbia University in New York.

The deliberations of the 'early' Adorno concern his diagnosis of the situation of music in the late-capitalist reality. Research activities of the Frankfurt school to which Adorno belonged, and which resulted in the creation of critical theory, involved an analysis of the economic and political situation in Germany mainly during the period of the great economic crisis of 1929–1933. Among the phenomena contributing to the creation and development of critical theory, Antoni Malinowski includes the move from free market to monopolistic capitalism, the rise of fascism and the consequences of the scientific-technical revolution (Malinowski, 1979, p. 78). From the philosophical point of view, of key importance was the situation of the individual in the face of social changes taking place. In his *Materialismus und Moral* Horkheimer described it as follows: '[...] never before did human poverty stand in such glaring contrast with the possibility of being alleviated, never had all the forces been more cruelly bound than in this generation, where children go hungry and the hands of their fathers produce bombs' (Malinowski, 1979, pp. 82–83). Adorno's views on music were strongly inspired by the ideas of Karl Marx, as evidenced above all by the use of the concepts of alienation and musical fetishism, and direct references to the author of *Das Kapital*.¹ It should be noted that the publication of the first issue of *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, with the article *On the social situation in music*, coincided in time with the publication by the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow of Marx's *Economic-philosophic manuscripts* from 1844 – an important, if not the most important, milestone on the path of reinterpreting Marxism by the Frankfurt school.

In order to understand what Adorno means by music losing its freedom we first have to refer to the diagnosis he makes when considering the condition of music in the capitalist world. The negative influence of capitalism on art expresses itself primarily in the concept of alienation. It should be borne in mind that the concept of alienation discussed by Marx in his Parisian *Manuscripts* was of a social-economic nature. Alienation described the situation in which man, under the influence of market forces, becomes imprisoned by products (things) to the point that even his relationships with other people become reified. The alienation of aesthetic phenomena may be understood as a consequence of the influence of general alienating processes on aesthetic phenomena (Pazura, 1967, p. 72). The essence of the problem of the alienation of music or art in general consists in the fact that it becomes an alienated commodity, and the traditional bond between the creator and the recipient of art is lost. Adorno's attention is drawn to music taking on the character of a commodity, which, following Marx, he describes as 'fetishism in music'. This can be reduced to a simple statement: music is a commodity and its value is determined only by market forces.²

¹ In his article *On the fetish-character in music and the regression of listening* Adorno quotes directly a fragment of *Das Kapital* explaining the phenomenon of commodity form and the case of musical fetishism.

² The kind of music involved is irrelevant. Describing Adorno's views, Malinowski writes: 'As far as the social aspect of contemporary music is concerned, according to Adorno one should distin-

The essence of fetishism in music is best conveyed by Adorno's claim in his essay *On the fetish-character in music and the regression of listening*: '[...] The consumer is really worshipping the money that he himself has paid for the ticket to the Toscanini concert. He has literally "made" the success he reifies and accepts as an objective criterion, without recognizing himself in it. But he has not "made" it by liking the concert but rather by buying the ticket' (Adorno, 1938, p. 38). Relying on Marx's *Das Kapital* Adorno explains in great detail the essence of musical fetish, and the case of the 'ticket for Toscanini' provides an ideal illustration of the problem. Let us consider for a moment the economic explanation of the latter.

Every commodity has its use value and exchange value, but the area of cultural goods – here Adorno has music in mind – is special, since it is excluded from the forces which govern exchange and is not of use in the material sense. However, in the capitalist market cultural products are forced to have a use value, or at least to appear to have it. It is enough to say that cultural goods retain the appearance of usefulness by substituting that usefulness with exchange value – after all, a 'ticket for Toscanini' has exchange value. Further on, Adorno says that the exchange value 'deceptively takes over the function of use-value' and it is this very *qui pro quo* which constitutes the specific fetish-character of music (Adorno, 1938, p. 39). Moreover, consumers' appetite for exchange value strengthens the appearance of direct access to a commodity (even if its character is abstract, as in the case of music), but on the other hand the abstract nature of exchange value which consists in absence of reference to a specific object undermines this pretence.

Alienation and musical fetishism have their consequences. If you are looking for an answer to the question 'When does music lose its freedom?', the answer is to hand. The model of musical communication forged by capitalism assumes the involvement of production and consumption, mediated by musical reproduction understood as interpretation/performance. 'The history of musical reproduction in the last century is a history of the final destruction of reproduced freedom' (Malinowski, 1979, pp. 158–159), says Adorno, and nostalgically contrasts capitalist reproduction with reproduction in pre-capitalist world. What then is the difference between the two, and what is involved in this loss of freedom by music?

Pre-capitalist reproduction was regulated by the tastes, preferences and traditions of specific social groups. Until the eighteenth century, observes Adorno (Malinowski, 1979, p. 158), production, reproduction and improvisation flowed smoothly from one to the other. Music was a living element of social life. Its freedom was the freedom of a society which shaped it according to its needs. Capitalist reality, together with the alienation and fetishism of music, introduced a new kind of music reproduction; reproduction totally dependent on the requirements

guish, on the one hand, the kind that adapts to the demands of the market and, on the other, the kind that is independent of them. The division into 'light' and "serious" music adopted within the bourgeois musical culture only seemingly corresponds to the criteria described earlier, since much of this so-called "serious" music adapts itself to the demands of the market similarly to "light" music'. The division into light and serious music itself was regarded by Adorno as a device masking the process of the alienation of the latter (Malinowski, 1979, p. 156).

and rules of the market place. When Adorno talks about the ‘destruction of reproduced freedom’, he means that reproduction has been shackled by the process of commercialisation, which *a priori* excludes what philosophy describes as a ‘balance between individualistic society and individualism of production’ (Adorno, 1932, p. 413). To sum up, music excluded from society, sentenced to banishment, turned into a product, irrevocably lost its freedom.

Finally, the question remains whether Adorno’s thesis that capitalism destroyed musical freedom as a result of reifying music and its reproduction finds its confirmation in history. Reaching back to seventeenth-century France, music at the court of Louis 14th was a part of the political project of centralising the state and achieving absolute power. It is worth mentioning here two institutions which had exclusive and ruthless control in the area of all musical activity. The Académie Royale de Musique (1669), created on the initiative of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, had a monopoly on all operatic spectacles throughout the state, and it collaborated with the so-called ‘little academy’, i.e., Académie des Inscriptions, six years its junior. The latter, as well as having control over relics which confirmed ‘in an appropriate manner’ the glory of the Sun King, also had among its duties the supervision of librettos of royal opera spectacles (Michaux, 2007, p. 80). One should also mention that Jean-Baptiste Lully’s *tragédie lyrique* was part of the brilliant idea of using culture and art to build up the prestige of the monarchy, as well as its centralisation and internal control; this idea, conceived by Richelieu, achieved its fulfilment in Mazarin’s strategy. Alongside the royal court, music came to play an increasingly important part in the private circles of aristocracy and nobility (*noblesse d’épée* and *noblesse de robe*³), which strove to equal the standard of the court. The quality of music production and reproduction – to use Adorno’s terminology – is thus a function of the tastes and preferences of the monarch and the surrounding elites.

The eighteenth century was a period which saw the development of the institution of public concerts. The beginning of François-André Philidor’s *Le Concert Spirituel* dates to 1725. Public concerts offered, for payment, access to music both to the elites and to anonymous listeners. Moreover, this new kind of concert was diametrically different from the court concerts, where music fulfilled a utilitarian function, mainly as occasional ‘ornamentation’. According to witness evidence, *Le Concert Spirituel* was particularly favourable towards encouraging lively exchanges of opinions about music, and flattering musical preferences regardless of the preferences of the court (Brenet, 1900, p. 344). Again, musical reproduction was shaped in the light of the opinion and approval of society.

It is difficult to tell where precisely Adorno draws the line between the world of traditional reproduction and the world of reproduction under the rule of the victorious bourgeoisie. Is it the year of the French Revolution (the victory of bourgeois property over the feudal one), or perhaps as late as 1848, the year which saw the publication of the *Communist Manifesto* by Marx and Engels? Whatever the particular moment in history that Adorno had in mind when writing about

³ The phrase *noblesse d’épée* (Nobles of the Sword) refers to knightly nobility, while *noblesse de robe* (Nobles of the Gown) refers to burghers who were ennobled as a reward for special service to the state.

the victory of the bourgeoisie, one thing is certain: Paris after the revolution became an arena for competing for and fighting over the listener. Everyone was to have access to music, and on equal footing. Approximately until the middle of the nineteenth century, Paris was divided between two main stages, and the potential audience had the choice of: Le Concert du cirque du Palais Royal (mainly operatic music) and La Société des concerts du Conservatoire (mainly symphonic music). In 1861 Jules Padeloup organized the *Concerts populaires* series at exceptionally low prices, from 75 centimes to 5 francs. As a comparison, ticket prices for a concert organized by the Conservatory Concert Society varied then from 2 to 12 francs (Bernard, 1971, p. 158). To give an idea of the value of money at that time one might mention that a bottle of wine that workers might buy would then have cost around 60 centimes. It is calculated that during the years 1861–1870 each concert organized by Padeloup was attended by some 4000 people from different social strata – workers, artisans, traders, clerks (Ledent, 2009, p. 8), or as many as four full halls of the National Philharmonic in Warsaw.⁴ Other concert enterprises followed the model created by Padeloup, such as that organized by Eduard Colonne (from 1873) and Charles Lamoureux (1881), which led to the creation of a proper concert market and competition for listeners.

This brief analysis of concert life in France largely confirms Adorno's diagnosis of reducing music reproduction to the role of commodity fetish and thus enslaving music itself. Is Adorno's diagnosis applicable today? We should remember that Adorno formulated his views at a time of significant changes in the area of culture, the strongest marker of which was the expansion of mass culture, or what he and Horkheimer described later in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* as 'cultural industry'. Undoubtedly the social life of today and the way music functions in it is different from the time when Adorno wrote about alienation and music fetishism. It appears that postmodernist pluralism is meeting the musical and aesthetic preferences of the listener by guaranteeing unlimited choice of music in a variety of genres and performances. Music is within easy reach, everywhere and at all times. Like a product. It's simple. But isn't it too simple?

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⁴ One suspects that the widely ranging organization of Concerts populaires had ideological aims. David Ledent, drawing attention to the fact that Padeloup belonged to the Saint-Simon movement, writes: 'Il s'agissait surtout d'impressionner un public de masse pour le convertir idéologiquement au saint-simonisme [What was particularly important was to impress mass audiences, to convert them ideologically to Saint-Simonianism]' (Ledent, 2009, p. 9).

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Małgorzata A. Szyszkowska

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1783-256X>
Fryderyk Chopin University of Music

Notes on improvisation and freedom. On transgressing self in musical performance

ABSTRACT: The author addresses the relation between music performance and freedom, assuming that art, and especially music, is either (a) linked to, (b) expressive of or (c) symbolizes freedom. Starting from these widespread claims that music is somehow connected with freedom, the author proposes to analyse specifically the freedom allowed in improvised music performances. She suggests that in general we may talk about three ways in which freedom is allowed in music performances: (1) in crossing over the rules of the correct interpretation/performance – ignoring the right note, challenging the right sound, the right way of performing (e.g.: ‘taking liberties’ in melodic, rhythmic or tonal aspects of music in classical as well as other music performances), (2) in establishing new rules and changing the performance practices during performance seen as a participatory occasion (e.g.: being ‘out of tune’ and ‘out of time’ according to Charles Keil, creating a communal occasion based on dialogue) – as in jazz, folk or blues improvisations, and (3) in creating music in performance that seems to be created ‘out of nothing’, coming from private, individual, inner inspiration – as in ‘free’ improvisation. The author focuses on yet another type of freedom allowed in a musical performance, one which happens also during classical performances. These are the moments during performance when musicians seem to forget about themselves. They become the music they perform and in this they transgress their self. Their subjective needs and individual concerns are forgotten. During performance artists follow the piece of music they perform but amidst the following and conforming to performative rules, a process of self-discovery and artistic growing appears. The artist is allowing herself to discover herself – as an artist, as a performer – and finally also to transgress all that is keeping her attached to regular ways, to comfortable behavior, the subjectivity, the self.

KEYWORDS: freedom, music performance, improvised music, self-transgression, creation

Introduction

*In one sphere of human condition to be is to be free. It is the
sphere of our meeting with music, art, literature...*
(Steiner, 1997, pp. 126, 135)

These notes address the relation between music performance and freedom, or what I take to be freedom under such circumstances. In this text I assume that art and especially music, is either (a) linked to, (b) expressive of or (c) symbolizes freedom. This belief has been pronounced enough times in literature and philosophy and it appears in art forms as well. In film, music videos and

theatre art is often portrayed as the very source of freedom. As George Steiner puts it: 'a poem, an image, a musical work is a phenomenon of freedom' (Steiner, 1997, p. 124). Schiller has said that 'art is a daughter of freedom' (Schiller, 1972, p. 44) and elsewhere that 'road to freedom leads through beauty' (Schiller, 1972, p. 45). Perhaps it was James Baldwin in his short story *Sunny's Blues* that put it most eloquently, suggesting that music (blues) is the only thing that may bring freedom to man (Baldwin, 2009, p. 47). Music expresses the most intimate and yet shared aspects of human experience and in this it restores freedom to man. A man is free when he tells his story, shares his pains and hopes with the community, he is free when he creates.

I seemed to hear with what burning he had made it his, with what burning we had yet to make it ours, how we could cease lamenting. Freedom lurked around us and I understood, at last, that he could help us to be free if we would listen, that he would never be free until we did (Baldwin, 2009, p. 47).

These notes are about ways in which one may talk about freedom in music. What it means to be free, and how free may one be in music? Finally in these notes I would like to shed some light on a particular belief, namely that during musical performances experienced performers transgress their selves. They transcend themselves and during these experiences they are no longer this and that performer, a musician. They are one with the music, they lose themselves completely in the process of creating and re-creating music through physical, emotional and intellectual efforts.¹

I.

Let me start with the assumption that in art freedom is primary. It is the very condition of art, as art has been seen as adding to nature, as creating something that was not present before. As Steiner hints in his writings (Steiner, 1997), freedom in art comes mainly from three sources. It is either existential freedom, creative freedom, and the performative and interpretative freedom. The existential freedom in artworks comes with the fact that their existence is purely tentative. They wouldn't have appeared at all if it weren't for the artist's creative process. They may or may not be. On the other hand composers and creators are completely free in that they may not create art as well as in what they create. They are free to do what they want, how to compose their music, what instruments or forms to use. Despite stylistic or historical constraints, they are autonomous in their creative process: every step of the way making new choices. Moreover their freedom lies in the very consciousness of choice. Artists may be pressured in many different ways and see their creation as subjugated to various demands, yet in the very process of creation they are most of the time completely

¹However my efforts to shed light on how creation happens in and through playing and listening to music is genuine. I need to admit that there is much about musical practice and freedom that I leave out of these comments, particularly the complex relationship between musicians and that between the musician and the musical score/composer.

autonomous. It is certainly different with performers. They seem to be bound by many more laws and expectations – indeed they seem to be following a rigid set of patterns of behavior, through which they are attempting to re-create something, which Ingarden calls a social image of the musical work – based on prior performances and recordings (creations) of the given work (Ingarden, 1986).

There are, however, situations, which give much more freedom in performative sphere. It is on the one hand improvisation and on the other a moment in performative experience, which relies on transgressing self – as I would like to call it. It appears that great performers are not bound by most of the constraints that limit and regulate the music-making of others. They are free to change the music they play or to add to it. This performative freedom will concern me the most in what follows.

II.

Hegel wrote that the concept of freedom is most misleading and unclear (Hegel, 1991, p. 140). Freedom appears in philosophy as one of the values or qualities of life, linked primarily to reason or will. In modern philosophy freedom is dependent on choice, the ability to make decisions or the ability to act without hindrance. It has been defined in reference to potentiality and necessity (Haefner, 2006), but most of all in reference to the ability to act without constraint. To be free meant to act without limitations or constraints (Hobbes, 1651, p. XXI). The paradox of freedom, then, is connected to interpreting this dynamics (necessity and potentiality) as suggesting that the more limitations and constraints there are, the less freedom there will be. Consequently, complete freedom would mean acting without any constraints. Yet such an ideal is clearly impossible to realize. There will always be constraints, either imposed from within or from without. Moreover, would freedom ever be realized, if acting freely was the social paradigm? The important difference seems to lie between the Greek concept of freedom as acting according to reason, *enkrateia* (Reale, 2002, p. 255), and a later understanding of freedom as connected to will (Haefner, 2006, p. 202). In this last understanding being free would mean full realization of one's will. And therefore freedom, as it is most widely interpreted, seems to be an ideal that is unattainable even if most desirable. A value everyone longs for. With the exception of Sartre's existential idea of freedom as potentiality of choice, freedom has been seen as the impossible condition of always realizing one's will and desires.

In reference to art freedom has been seen as the ability to create a new reality or as changing of the existing things into something new. Arthur C. Danto talks about art as a transfiguration of some kind – transfiguration of the commonplace (Danto, 1974). Yet, even if freedom in art would be defined as implementing change or making a choice, would artists see themselves as free? Perhaps freedom should be viewed as an ability to transgress barriers and defy limitations, instead. People who choose to ignore the imposed or assumed limitations seem indeed free. As they consider actions which seem best or most desirable

despite the corresponding difficulty or constraints, they execute their freedom. Shouldn't we say, then, that the more constraints or limitations there are, the greater is the freedom? Yet, the logic behind this is treacherous, as with all the limitations and constraints, what would freedom mean if not a constant battle?

III.

Artists were almost always portrayed as free in their creative efforts. Just as art has been seen as the phenomenon of freedom (Steiner, 1997, p. 124). Of the three aspects of freedom, mentioned earlier, I would like to focus on the third – the performative freedom. In the context of stage performance freedom may be seen as the ratio between a free creative impulse and the imposed order or structure. The performers or creators of music follow their creative impulses but they are also constrained by the stylistic and formal requirements. This may be more or less strongly felt but it seems that in music, as much as in other arts, artists have to comply with very many constraints. Performers are in an even more difficult situation. They need to comply with the stylistic, formal and material expectations from the public. In performances of classical music these expectations seem very clear and unforgiving. The listeners know exactly what they want to hear and they expect precision, elevation and expressive passionate execution but at the same time they expect the work of art they know and love without any changes. The more 'free' performers are sometimes rejected because of their 'unfaithful' attitude. Those and others various constraints in performance make it particularly difficult to see this sphere as free. Yet, even in classical music performances there are many aspects of freedom. The difficulty lies in assessing the amount of freedom. Perhaps, it would be better to see freedom as the relation between idea (or form) and convention (or norm). Art defies habit, want and convention. Artists impose their own order and create forms that are in conflict with the already existing ones. 'Order is not imposed from without' – says Dewey – 'but it is made out of the relations of harmonious interactions that energies bear to one another' (Dewey, 1980, p. 14). The change is the imperative, at least in the beginning. Every work of art seems to invent a new language, which its audience must learn to speak to be able to appreciate it (Gadamer, 2001, p. 64). The artists – one might say – invent art all over again with each work. Still, when one thinks about the ways in which musical performance is regulated – not necessarily with laws, but certainly with various established rules, – the performative freedom seems rather scarce. Everywhere but in improvisation, it seems.

IV.

Improvisation is probably the most liberating thing that I do
Gabriela Montero (2018)

Improvisation, either as a mode of creation in music or as a special type of musical performance, seems to be based on freedom. Some philosophers suggest that improvisation would provide a better focal point for a musical paradigm than composition – dominating in most theories of musical aesthetics (Scruton, 1997, p. 439). However, in most common music concert practice of today improvisation is rarely present. The practice of artistic classical music not only theoretically refers to but in fact relies on exact re-production in performance of the once created musical work. In contrast to that, improvised music, often chaotic or random, prides itself on changing the music, finding the music in something that wasn't [seen as] music at all. In improvisation there seem not to be a pre-established musical work, to which a performance must be headed. In contrast to that, improvisation deconstructs the work, using its elements as building blocks. It may be fluid, ragged and sometimes unfinished. It is also spontaneous, relaxed and created in response to environment. For some people improvisation is the most natural way of music making. They usually add to existing music, replace one note with the other (or several more), sing in response to some action or feeling. In some musical styles (traditional, blue grass, blues, jazz and many others that come to mind) music is always moving and never stays the same. A songwriter and performer Darrell Scott wrote a song *Long time gone*, which has been performed by other country singers as well. The song appeared on the record *Real time* (2000).² There are several recordings of that song from different occasions available for listening on youtube and every one of those versions sung by Darrell Scott (and Tim O'Brian) is significantly different.³ But these are small and partial improvisations. There are however ways of making music which are more substantially based on improvisation. Perhaps, one might think of two major sources or two types of improvisation. For the most part improvisation is either (1) done in response to environment, created in dialogue with other musicians (e.g. during jam sessions) or the audience itself, or (2) it may be created as self-reliant musical structure composed 'out of nothing' (musicians like Keith Jarrett or Bobby McFerrin could provide an example here).⁴ These two ways of improvising overlap and may happen in different quantities to different musicians. The difference may seem rather simple, as one kind is based on inner while the other on outside inspiration. Yet it shows the difference in creating music, in assuming one's role as creator. The creator, who relies on

² Darrell Scott, Tim O'Brian, *Long time gone*, *Real time*, Howdy Skies Records (2000).

³ See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8lzuOvPfoY> (accessed on 12.02.2019) or <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ojwxlgDcEec> (accessed on 12.02.2019) and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zWB_cPVUv5o (accessed on 12.02.2019). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o-QoRa_ubK1o (accessed on 12.02.2019).

⁴ Keith Jarrett *The Köln Concert ECM/1975* or listen on <https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x80ek9> (accessed on 25.02.2019).

outer sounds and creates inspired by other sounds, makes music in participation. His idea of music making is based on sharing, participation and oftentimes on dialogue. The other kind – at least in the beginning – is based on expression, it is driven from personal experience and the music is built in relative isolation. The first kind of improvisation (let's call it shared or structured) happens most often in jazz or traditional music. Generally speaking in jazz music improvisation constitutes a base for performance or at least its indispensable part. Freedom allowed during jazz performance is significantly greater than in other genres of music as well (Levinson, 2013, p. 35). In another sense, jazz music is still more similar to what music used to be – performative and socially engaged (Scruton, 1997, p. 439). During jam sessions music runs on dialogues, relying on different voices, on crossing paths with other performers, relying in turn on standard music material or common harmonic structures. In jazz performances musicians are feeding off each other and creating music while listening to their music environment. One might expect a certain tension between the actual freedom and the pre-established patterns and musical paths, but on the whole jazz music as much as most of the folk and traditional music is based on participation, and thus is not only created as improvisation but relies on *participatory discrepancies*, active emotional sharing and engaging, identifying and clashing (Keil, 1987, p. 275). As Charles Keil explains quoting Barfield and Durkheim, participation

[...] begins by being an activity, and essentially a communal or social activity. It takes place in rites and initiation ceremonies resulting in 'collective mental states of extreme emotional intensity' (Keil, 1987, p. 276).

In music that moves, the change is not only assumed or expected, but it is crucial and primary. Music builds on participation and not on expectation. Music is felt and taken in and not just appreciated and assessed. The form or structure of music – as therefore also melody – are not the most important. The most important may be rhythm, the type of beat or something else entirely – like the humor or irony in some improvised, folk songs.

V.

Performance of music is full of contrasting aspects and clashing elements. It demands commitment and freedom at the same time; it establishes wide open communication while retaining certain amount of privacy and autonomy. Musical concert may be similar to a sports event in many ways even though it is expected to be lyrical and subtle instead (Said, 1974, p. 3). Musicians are fully aware of the audience watching – musicians often invite people to watch their performance and direct their attention to those guests but at the same time they build around them a wall, which is impenetrable to anybody else and behind which they may feel safe and sheltered from outer influences. We need to understand that the goal of music performance is not just a perfect rendition of the musical work but something else entirely. Their goal is to provide an [unforgettable] experience and communal event. If music performance is no longer

a communal participatory occasion it used to be in many societies a hundred years ago, it nevertheless provides an occasion for communal and participatory experience. The performers, as much as they are often presented as mediators bringing forth the particular music and composer's style, aim at engaging with the audience or excelling in providing a moving spectacle. No solo artist, however humble, will be invisible or unrecognizable on the concert stage. Their goal is precisely to dominate the stage and lead their performance. In jazz and rock music this happens primarily through the interpretation of the work of music, offering a different and novel reading of the music.

Perhaps acknowledging the differences between the types of music performance and between the amount of freedom allowed during a musical performance, we might talk about three specific types of freedom understood as choosing the novel rather than traditional, choosing individual rather than customary way of performing music and allowing to change path rather than following the path of others in interpreting music: (1) crossing over the rules of the correct interpretation/performance – ignoring the right note, challenging the right sound, the right way of performing (e.g.: 'taking liberties' in melodic, rhythmic or tonal aspects of music in classical as well as other musical performances); (2) establishing new rules and changing the performance practices during performance seen as participatory occasion (e.g.: being 'out of tune' and 'out of time' according to Charles Keil, creating a communal occasion based on dialogue) – as in jazz, folk or blues improvisations; (3) creating music in performance that seems to be created 'out of nothing', coming from private, individual, inner inspiration – as in 'free' improvisation. This last type of freedom, the free improvisation is perhaps the most interesting and the most unique in today's world. It is also very different from the second type of freedom, which is based on and derived from traditional tribal music, retained in jazz or blues traditions (Keil, 1987). In free improvisations such as the performances by Keith Jarrett or Vijay Iyer, there is very little contact with the audience. Musicians seem to be completely focused on themselves and their music, creating and engaged in a process that is essentially private, individual and closed off. Their relation to the environment – if any – is on and off. They seem not to be paying any attention to the audience, as they are focused on and completely absorbed in the musical creative process. Perhaps it would be more accurate to think of this as partial isolation, but certainly it is a very different type of creation, one that relies on deep absorption in one's inner world.

VI.

There is another aspect of freedom in performance, to which I would like to turn now. It is a unique and special moment in performance, through which even the most rigid and rule obeying performers gain freedom. There are those moments during performance when musicians seem to forget all about themselves. They become the music they perform and in this they transgress their selves. They lose themselves in the music, one might say. One may re-

member the way Schopenhauer talks about aesthetic experience (any aesthetic experience) as capable of making an experiencing subject forget all about himself: he 'forgets even his individuality, his will and only continues to exist as the pure subject, a clear mirror of the object [...] both have become one, because the whole consciousness is filled with and occupied with one single sensuous picture [...]' (Carritt, 1931, p. 138). Obviously, not every performance of music will result in such an experience. Yet, it seems that the best performers and the best performances often rely on such a thing. One way of explaining this is that in performative experience musicians are focused on their performative tasks to such an extent that they seem to forget who they are. Their individuality, their moods and needs become irrelevant. The performance becomes all the reality they face. This experience of forgetting yourself may also be seen as the experience of transgressing the self. Their subjective needs and individual concerns are forgotten. During performance artists follow the piece of music they perform but amidst the following and conforming to performative rules, a process of self-discovery and artistic growing appears. The artist is allowing herself to discover herself – as an artist, as a performer – and finally also to transgress all that is keeping her attached to regular ways, to comfortable behavior, the subjectivity, the self. She needs to rise above her subjective concerns. Be able to forget about herself in creating music.

The process I have in mind – transgressing self as the result of total immersion in creating and performing music – also signifies the ability to abandon the ego and allow overshadowing of self with focusing on music or the community, which speaks through it. On the one hand such a moment in performance is expected, as all the other elements of interpretation and performance are in place. The overwhelming requirements of performance often leave an artist out of breath and out of mind for a moment, relying on the bodily memory, on exercise. But on the other hand, this is something very different. The performers need to find within themselves a place of peace and concentration, a place where they are most themselves, most relaxed, most efficient in their actions. And through all of this a moment of true inspiration may be found; a moment of change; of transgression.

In *Art as Experience* John Dewey discusses the fact that well-known performers are more likely than unexperienced ones to deviate from musical score and sing 'out of tune', even though most of the audiences will never guess it is so (Dewey, 1980, p. 101), which corresponds with the type (1). They are more likely 'to take liberties' in their performances. 'Small differences in the absolute pitch of notes are of no great consequence for the musical work' – says Ingarden (Ingarden, 1986, p. 22). From a very different perspective, Charles Keil discusses the way in which all engaging music allows for crossing the line between the 'in tune' and 'in sync' and 'out of tune' and 'out of sync', where great music must be more than correct, more than 'in tune'. Where the greatness of performance, in fact, demands creating a performative experience that is based on engaging and communicating and ignoring the right notes/cords and rhythmical patterns – type (2). But the last type of freedom in performance, the type (3) relies on something else. It allows losing oneself, transgressing oneself in the moment, in the

experience – where this moment of transgression is perhaps the most important element of the performative experience. And yet, the experience remains fully subsumed into the ‘right’ music interpretation. The experience of transgressing self, therefore, is a moment, in which the performing musician forgets herself but, in the name of the music, she will again be herself in the most meaningful sense of the phrase.

One might argue that such a moment is present not only in those performances of classical music, but all other improvisational performances where the element of self, or subjective experience behind performance is crucial and yet, even in this type of music, in one of those moments, a performer may be able to lose herself, forgetting her ways and ignoring all subjective impulses to follow the music, the development path.

Conclusion

The talk of freedom sets forth a path to an ideal, a way of conduct that is impossible to follow but held in highest esteem, nonetheless. An abstract idea of freedom either as a value, an idea, a standard and finally a regulative idea, has been firmly established in the thinking of man. But in many theories there have been attempts to change the simplistic ideal of freedom and acknowledge various subtle ways in which people may appear free to themselves. One such way is found in artistic activity and the artworks it produces. Musical improvisation and music as a moving art or a process provides an abundance of examples of such freedom. The performance of music – a great performance – often requires more than playing the music and even more than playing it well or perfectly even – it requires moving an audience and changing the rules of performance along the way. During such great performances, the audience is not aware that something has changed or that the music has not been rendered perfectly accurate; on the contrary, they are certain that the music has been played so well that even the composer couldn’t have done a better job. They have an experience and that is what the music was for in the first place. Yet performers apply their freedom to changing the music, to changing the tempi or rhythm. They tamper with the assumed perfect version of the work to move the audience, to shake its consciousness. The other way of realizing freedom during music performance is even more daring. In many such ‘great’ performances, artists achieve freedom in the process of performing as they completely abandon themselves. This situation, which could be seen as transgressing self, happens to many gifted performers. I shall firmly stand by the claim that such a freedom is not only significant but truly revealing. It shows the performer to be capable of forgetting who she is and relinquishing all the wanting and willfulness in herself, in the process of creation and artistic development that happens during performance.

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ANNA TENCZYŃSKA

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4893-9426>
Institute of Polish Literature, University of Warsaw

Thinking into the humanities. ‘Two cultures’: between agon and defence

ABSTRACT: This overview takes a brief ‘bird’s eye view’ look at Maciej Jabłoński’s approach to scholarship. His research problematized, within the area of musicology, various aspects of the relationship between science and art, between the methodological paradigms of natural sciences and humanities, and, finally, between scientific and artistic humanities. The context for these deliberations, important for the history of twentieth-century humanities, is provided, on the one hand, by assertions made by such writers as Charles Percy Snow in *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (1959) and René Etiemble in *Comparaison n’est pas raison. La crise de la littérature comparée* (1958), demonstrating the complexity of the relationship between the ‘two cultures’ of the title. On the other hand, the context involves the views of Adam Zagajewski, the poet whose essay *Obrona żarliwości* [In defence of ardour] was the direct trigger for Maciej Jabłoński’s reflections.

KEYWORDS: ardour, humanities, Maciej Jabłoński, musicology, two cultures

In memory of the discussion *Thinking into musicology* at
the editorial office of *De Musica*, on 19 February 2002
and
conversations after Maciej Jabłoński’s presentation at the
De Musica seminar on 20 October 2005

This brief sketch suggests a way of exploring Maciej Jabłoński’s research stance described in, for example, the record of the discussion *Thinking into musicology* and in his book *Przeciw muzykologii niewrażliwej* [Against Insensitive Musicology], and re-examined sixty years after two events important for the modern humanities: the lecture *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, given by Charles Percy Snow in 1959 at the annual Sir Robert Rede Lecture in Cambridge (Snow, 1959), and the paper *Comparaison n’est pas raison. La crise de la littérature comparée* by René Etiemble, prepared for (but not given at) the Second Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association (AI-CLA) at Chapel Hill in 1958 (Etiemble, 1963). If this suggestion resembles an attempt to adjust the focus of telescope lenses to match the characteristics of the object of observation that does not need an instrument so powerful, then let us start by regarding this instrument merely as a large scale magnifying glass. Not as a tool enabling discovery of a new constellation, but as something which

makes it easier to direct more light at the complexity of the existing constellation of science and art, natural and humanistic sciences and, finally, scientific and artistic humanities. Most importantly, let us look at their approaches to their subject of research, examined by all these disciplines to different degrees, although in the same critical manner. A similar attempt using a microscope would require different optics, and would reveal different aspects of the issue that we are exploring.

Maciej Jabłoński, who in the first paragraph of his text *Jestem ironistką* [I am an ironist girl] gives vent to a desire, lined with titular irony but undoubtedly felt strongly, of 'having the ability to suddenly and effectively transform into being a poet'. He ends that paragraph with the significant claim that 'fortunately, literature gains advantage over biology on this occasion as well' (Jabłoński, 2009, p. 220). This is a striking example of, literally, an 'intellectual with literary provenance' (to use Snow's description, Snow, 1999, p. 80). Both this description, and the desire of the author of *Jestem ironistką*, bring us to the concept of 'the culture of a man of letters'. It was used by Richard Rorty to refer to the era preceding the split between the 'two cultures' described by Snow: the scientific (with its natural sciences paradigm) and the literary (humanistic) one. Recalling, forty years ago, the type of 'intellectual who wrote poems, novels and political treatises, as well as criticism of poems, novels and treatises written by others' (Rorty, 1979, p. 4), Rorty situates his discipline within that very culture with a 'literary provenance'. The author of *Wmyślanie się w muzykologię* [Thinking into musicology], whose texts can also be read as a record of the strivings of an intellectual with similar sensitivity and temperament in the post-Snow era, would also like to move the centre of gravity of his own discipline into such a culture.

These texts reveal a researcher who is not only aware of, but able to problematize various aspects of the constellation spoken of earlier in the area of musicology. A researcher who crosses boundaries and pays visits to the neighbouring kingdoms of the Humanities, bringing from there various treasures and inventions which he would like to try out in his own experiments; a researcher who, as he said himself, wandered, like the subject of a poem by Czesław Miłosz, 'along the fringes of heresy' (Jabłoński, 2003). To what purpose? Was it also in order to satisfy one of the fundamental tasks of the humanities, that of, as we were recently reminded by Ryszard Nycz, 'forming critical self-knowledge and effective creativity of individuals and communities' (Nycz, 2017, p. 19); was it also, as Ryszard Koziółek said at the same time, 'to translate, mediate, negotiate meanings' (Koziółek, 2017, p. 61)?

When attempting to describe Maciej Jabłoński's attitude as a researcher and his style of thinking, concepts and categories relating to 'critical thinking', 'sensitivity' and 'creativity' would undoubtedly turn out to be among the more useful. One might also say that it is the act of 'translation' and 'mediation' which as a rule guides 'wanderings along the fringes' of various disciplines, methodologies, discourses etc. The concept of mediation, however, would require a deeper examination in this context; its etymology indicates striving for a 'middle', a 'centering' of judgments, yet it seems that the main aim of the author of *Against Insensitive Musicology* was, instead, their confrontation. The question arises, was

that the ultimate aim? Moreover, one should add, referring to René Etiemble's *Comparaison n'est pas raison*, that such a 'comparison' of the tasks of the humanities with those to be found in Jabłoński's texts, 'is not yet proof' (Etiemble, 1968, p. 311). However, this still does not explain the goals he set himself, nor the ways in which he tried to achieve them. As an aside let us add that these ways were one of the reasons he came to be known as the 'unquiet soul' of Polish musicology, very much as Etiemble was declared to be the *enfant terrible* of the (French) comparative literary studies of that time, as he himself reported in his text (Etiemble, 1968, p. 312). In this context it is worth drawing attention to a significant coincidence: the author of *Comparaison n'est pas raison* revealed the durability of the positivistic scientific paradigm in French literary studies, with its dominant methodological model of the natural sciences, at the same time as Snow was demonstrating the definitive parting of the ways of the 'two cultures' (within the Anglo-Saxon discourse), more than half a century after the anti-positivistic watershed.

The title of Maciej Jabłoński's book (Jabłoński, 2015), published more than half a century after those events – like the similar titles in other branches of the humanities: Susan Sontag's *Against interpretation* (1966), Paul Karl Feyerabend's *Against method* (1975) or Steven Knapp's and Walter Benn Michaels's *Against theory* (1982) – leaves us in no doubt that at the very point of departure we encounter *agon*. *Agon* changes the complex constellation of the branches of learning with their diverse interrelationships, their theoretical and methodological languages, artistic artefacts as the objects of their research, concepts, tools and categories, into a dichotomy. In this sense the author of the book might be described as Snow's heir, no less radical in drawing the boundary between the 'culture of the natural scientists' and the 'culture of the humanists' (Snow, 1999, p. 8), but pronouncing a reverse judgment on their value.

If in discussions of this kind we hear an echo of Dilthey's maxim claiming that we explain nature, while we understand 'spirit' – the subject of the humanities' research – it is worth remembering that Wilhelm Dilthey's conception of understanding encompassed experience, something which Maciej Jabłoński felt needed to be included. A constant element of the reflections of the author of *Muzykologia jako mówienie i pisanie namiętności* [Musicology as writing and speaking passion] was the concern that this 'spirit' should not be excluded from 'opera', that 'aridity' should not triumph over 'passion' – to paraphrase Rorty's ideas in his article *On The Inspirational Value of Great Works of Literature* (Rorty, 2003, p. 327). Maciej Jabłoński referred to it in his readings, and this led him to use the vocative construction, appealing for the study (of music) not to be regarded as *more geometrico*, but to be governed instead by Pascal's *l'esprit de finesse*. We posit, to put it very briefly, that dangerous generalising which ignores the actual variety of research approaches that need and demand to be recognised, serves to polarise the basic theses.

Let us examine these issues from yet another point of view: the continuity of the humanities' dialogue, maintained by Maciej Jabłoński's reflections. This continuity is characterised by a specific logic. As the *more geometrico* research approach, with its basic linguistic construction in the form of a 'declarative'

sentence, such as stating a (scientific) fact, has, on a number of occasions in the history of learning, provoked a confrontational attitude towards the vocative construction, so this latter attitude evokes (or it would be well if it did) the need for mediation, not infrequently taking the shape of a rhetorical question that inhabits that 'middle' we spoke about before. An example of such an answer to the proposals of the author of *Against Insensitive Musicology* is Danuta Sosnowska's article, its title in the form of a rhetorical question: *Czy żarliwość i emocje to przeciwnicy rozumu?* [Are ardour and emotions opposed to reason?]. There the author demonstrates that the dichotomy, which Maciej Jabłoński expressed as a dichotomy of 'ardour and boredom, emotion and reason, discourse of art and discourse of science, irrational and rational', is neither convincing nor productive in today's thinking within the humanities and about humanities (Sosnowska, 2007, p. 189). With the idea of continuity of dialogue as the inspiration for the current discussion, let us state clearly: while dichotomy may, and often has been needed at the point of departure for critical examination of the *status quo* in a given discipline or some projected change, in the final analysis it becomes an obstacle to problematising and nuancing various aspects of such examination, which must be more complex and dynamic than this simplified, bipolar schema.

In this context, what for Maciej Jabłoński became the source of this agon, namely, its reverse – defence – is of exceptional significance. *Obrona żarliwości* [In Defence of Ardour] is a collection of essays by Adam Zagajewski published at the threshold of the twenty-first century. In particular, its title essay provided the impulse for the presentation 'O czym nie można mówić, o tym trzeba mówić z wnętrza [...]'. *Niepewna myśl muzykologa z powodu 'Obrony żarliwości' Adama Zagajewskiego* [That which is not be spoken of must be said from the heart [...]] A diffident thought by a musicologist on Adam Zagajewski's 'In Defence of Ardour' during a seminar of the De Musica Association in 2005. It reveals another side of Maciej Jabłoński's research approach, no less important but not articulated so clearly as the confrontational stance. The combination of the category of 'ardour' with that of 'diffidence' (which recurs in the title of yet another article) is worth thinking about. Here is a musicologist who reads a poet who listens to music (and not only). One might say that Maciej Jabłoński reading Adam Zagajewski interpreted literally the words of Reinhold Brinkmann, who would like to see 'musicologists going to learn from poets who speak and write a comprehensible yet rich language' (Brinkmann, 2009).

Perhaps there was no time to return from agon to that which was its source. To defence. To humanities understood, for example, as Dariusz Czaja would like to see his discipline within the humanities, as a 'hybrid of reason and imagination, discourse and art' (Czaja, 2013). Or perhaps under the aegis of a poet, this time the author of the introduction to the book by Andrzej Szczeklik *Kore. O chorych, chorobach i poszukiwaniu duszy medycyny* [Kore. On the sick, diseases and the search for the soul of medicine], who emphasises, directly referring to the lecture *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, that „every author who tries to overcome this deep division deserves attention and recognition” (Zagajewski, 2007, p. 6). Perhaps also under the aegis of the philosopher quoted by Maciej Jabłoński who suggests an attitude of 'interpretative charity'

(Davidson, 1992, p. 18). Out of the categories quoted here, which often create dichotomies, sometimes arises a triad that goes beyond them (for example, such as: 'ardour' – 'diffidence' – 'charity'), sometimes other constructions that jointly become alliances. Many contemporary thinkers in the humanities write about the importance of attitudes, the approach 'towards' in the process of their creation. For example, Ryszard Koziołek's words about attitude to literature can easily be applied to music and other arts which, 'otherwise than in science', 'do not want from us the detachment of examination, but also do not demand pure ardour' (Koziołek, 2016, p. 2). How, then are we to 'overcome the division', move on beyond dichotomy? Perhaps, paradoxically, one can learn this from the texts of Maciej Jabłoński, tracing the way the author constructs that 'other' discourse which was not talked about here.

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ELŻBIETA NOWICKA

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8166-8306>

Institute of Polish Philology, Faculty of Polish and Classical Philology, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań

Music – tone – freedom in Juliusz Słowacki’s ethical and political conceptions in the mystical period of his work

ABSTRACT: The Towianistic concept of ‘tone’ was adopted and modified by Juliusz Słowacki in the political and philosophical texts which he wrote in his final years. In those writings, ‘tone’ has an anthropological dimension and applies to an original conception of the philosophy of freedom. Around this time, Słowacki lost interest in the music of Chopin and other composers, in which he saw merely external qualities, belonging to the worldly domain. Instead, he became interested in musical intervals as matrices for thinking about the processes of spiritual life and about historical phenomena.

KEYWORDS: Juliusz Słowacki, Towianism, music, confederation

Juliusz Słowacki came from a noble family with clear ties to intelligentsia – both his father and his step-father were professors at the University of Vilnius. Growing up in such circumstances endowed the future poet with natural refinement and cultural savviness as well as with certain skills including, among others, an ability to play the piano. It is clear from the poet’s later life and his own testimony that he was a mediocre musician even though he treated learning to play the piano and sustaining the ability to do so in later life with seriousness. He was, however, an exceptional recipient of opera and concert music. In a letter to his mother dated to 3 September 1832, consisting of notes on the events transpiring in August, he wrote that during one of Polish soirees ‘we were bored to death between 10pm and 2am – at the end, though, Chopin got drunk and improvised beautifully on the piano’ (Słowacki, 1952a, p. 86).¹ Numerous accounts from that period of his participation in concerts, theatrical performances and literary soirees mention Chopin, ‘a famous grand pianist’, as the poet called at that time the great composer. In the following years the relationship of the two artists turned out to be quite fraught due to personal reasons, yet it was after the poet joined the Circle of Towiańskiites – which he shortly removed himself from to individually develop mystic concepts of man, nation and universe – that his attitude to Chopin underwent a radical change. The change did not refer to the musician himself, but to his music, which in the mid-1840s Słowacki deemed

¹ Here and elsewhere in the article quotations from Słowacki and other Polish writers appear in my own translation.

close to exaltation and ‘unnerving’. In a long letter to his mother written in February 1845 he attempted to explain his new mission and vision, which she could not grasp, used as she was to her ‘old Julek’.² With exceptional seriousness and solemnity, interspersed with traces of grudge and disappointment, he explained to his mother the true worth of texts that he could ‘recite in front of Christ’ – these included *Balladyna*, *Sen srebrny Salomei*, *Książdz Marek* and *Książę Niezłomny*. At the same time, he sentenced to a metaphorical exile works that were erstwhile his and his mother’s favourites, that is *Lambro* and *Godzina myśli*. The inability of his mother and other readers to undergo a profound spiritual transformation to be able to understand the transformation of the poet and his works, the inability which was extremely painful to him, stemmed in his view from their enslavement by Chopin’s music. He wrote about people so mired in sentiment and nostalgia for sheer beauty that ‘they lost part of their soul after Chopin’s concert’ (Słowacki, 1952a, p. 467). He argued by posing questions: ‘Did you see anyone become tomorrow better, more beautiful and merciful, become a hero, in the wake of great affect caused by Chopin’s music?’ (Słowacki, 1952a, p. 469). Music, just as literature, was expected to have some causal power, which he understood primarily as a tool of spiritual transformation, a springboard for further action. Listened to and commented on by a man with his ‘inner bones shattered by *Książę Niezłomny* [*El príncipe constante* – Calderón’s play translated by Słowacki]’, Chopin could not possibly be a source of such transformation. As Słowacki further argued, Chopin’s music caused spiritual apathy, masked by superficial emotions and exaltation. He explained to his mother: ‘you sat down to write to me, having cried your soul out, having cried in vain, that is sinfully, having cried because Chopin’s polonaises provoked all your nerves with their semitones and dissonances’ (Słowacki, 1952a, p. 467).

In the final years of his life Słowacki apparently ceased to listen to the ‘beautiful’ music of Chopin and other Romantic composers. His correspondence from that time fails to mention his playing the grand piano, attending concerts or visiting opera halls. This ‘loss of hearing’ needs to be situated in a broader context of changes in the poet’s artistic and, primarily, spiritual life. This stemmed from numerous factors, out of which external conditions are the easiest to point out, conditions common to the whole generation of Polish emigrants at the threshold of the 1840s. It was at that time that the aura of mounting resignation and apathy was broken by the appearance of Andrzej Towiański, today viewed in ambivalent terms but very influential for some time. As Alina Witkowska elaborated on the phenomenon, Towiański perfectly captured the expectations of a segment of the emigrant community that was losing their hope for return, for ‘the war of the peoples’ that would make their return possible, and, simply, for the creative evolution of their own lives. ‘Towianism was not a disease but rather a radical attempt at forging new identity, at adopting the philosophy of spiritual activism and employing it practically in life. It was an attempt at salvation’ (Witkowska, 1989, p. 161), writes Witkowska with reference to Mickiewicz, but the view seems to correspond to other emigrants as well, for example to Seweryn Goszczyński and, to some extent, to Słowacki. Towiański’s presence among the

² A diminutive form of the poet’s name Juliusz.

Polish emigrants made an uneven imprint on the biographies of various people, but there is no doubt that Słowacki's encounter with 'Master Andrzej' in the summer of 1842 generated in the poet an influx of powers of all kinds: physical, spiritual and creative. These introduced a new dimension to his poetry as a direct outcome of 'the scrapping of the old man', as he put it in a letter to his mother. He parted ways with the Circle of God's Cause [the Circle of Towiańskiites, Pol. Koło Sprawy Bożej] relatively shortly, after a mere year, but the impulse for change, for a new horizon of being, remained with him and bore fruit till the end of his life. Since there is already an extensive scholarship on the issue, suffice it to say that within a few years before his death he authored a vast poetic work, whose size arguably surpassed everything he had penned before. It was written in various forms and genres and was mostly unpublished, with the exception of three plays and a fragment of *Król Duch*, individual poems and other writings directed to emigrants. 'The new man' rejected all that was 'unnerving', including participation in the artistic, musical and theatrical world. Instead, he focused on the elevating and captivating conviction of being on the way to unravel the structure of being.

'On oceanic rocks you've put me, God, to recall the long history of my spirit, and all of a sudden I felt immortal in the past, Son of God, creator of visibility and one of those who give You their unsolicited love on the garlands of golden suns and stars' (Słowacki, 1952b, p. 9). The opening sentence of *Genezis z Duchą* – a prayer, a poem in prose and a cosmological treatise all at once – signals an important kind of imagery permeating works from the poet's late period, imagery based on the sense of sight (light) and a feeling of warmth. As it will be shown later, the phenomenon of light and warmth structuring the foundation for the creation and evolution of the world in the images construed and repeated by the poet co-existed in Słowacki's conceptions with sound, voice and tone. 'Tone' was at the same time one of the basic concepts with which the Towiańskiites created their activist conception of man. Towiański himself defined tone in the following way:

All that exists in this magnitude has its life, has its own movement, and its movement has its own tone, its note, its particle in general harmony, and the whole magnitude, the whole great way of God can be rendered in music with proper tones. For this reason, only rising souls aspire to music, for this is aspiration to general harmony; those who carry the aspiration, carry the tone, which, if it resounds in them, is part of this general harmony, this collection of tones that resound forever and ever in God's great orchestra, composed of uncountable globes and uncountable groups of creatures inhabiting them (quoted in Siwicka, 1990, p. 50).

Towiański's concept alluded to a well-known metaphor of the world as an instrument in God's hands and it recalled the idea of a man as an instrument, an idea crucial for the anthropology of European Romanticism and present in Słowacki's earlier texts, for instance in the plays *Horsztyński* and *Lilla Weneda*. Dorota Siwicka, an author of a book on Mickiewicz's participation in the Circle of God's Cause, speaks of 'the Towiańskiite tone' as an element of imagination and the driving force behind the re-musicalization of the world (Siwicka, 1990, p. 98). Derived from musical terminology, the term signified in fact an anthropomorphic vision and construed the idea of a man of 'one tone', an ideal extremely

difficult to achieve, virtually impossible, for its most complete embodiment was Christ. Accepting and reworking Towiański's ideas, Mickiewicz saw 'tone' as a 'specific psychophysical state', in the words of one expert on theatre and performance, whereby the stimulation of the spirit affected the whole psychophysical state of a man as well as exerted some influence on the outside world (Kosiński, 2018). In *Przemówienie do Braci* [Speech to Brothers] on 27 September 1847, Mickiewicz argued:

Tone is everything. Tone is given and revealed to us; but as there is no general song without tact, as music requires tact, so does tone. And tact is a capturing or feeling where to accelerate or when to stop. It is most difficult to grasp tact, this gift given, which cannot be had without completely forgetting oneself (Mickiewicz, 2001, p. 296).

It is thus clear that tone is inextricably connected with movement, with life itself; only a man in possession of his tone is alive in a spiritual and social sense. Mickiewicz demanded this of all brothers in the Circle, especially of Seweryn Goszczyński, to whom he directed his *Przemówienie* [Speech] on 19 December 1843: 'Your calling is great, your responsibility in case of failure is great. You represent Russian Cossacks in the Circle. You are called mainly to tie Cossackia with Poland... You can only achieve it with a Cossack tone. You have this tone in you, God granted you this' (Mickiewicz, 2001, p. 89).

It is necessary to recall the definition of tone in Towianist writings to understand a 'musicality' of Towianist conceptions, in which a musical term served to define anthropology, understood holistically as a union of soul and body, of spirit and matter. Słowacki's original contribution, developed already after he left the Circle, lay in applying this term with reference to the whole universe.

It is well known that with a passing of time Towiański demanded that his followers have one tone, common to all, and he warned about a false one that damages the whole composition, just like one instrument which is out of tune in the orchestra. This notwithstanding, some Towiańskiites argued for the sake of the right to differ. Painter Józef Marszewski wrote to Seweryn Goszczyński in 1846:

Each of us has his own note and a proper instrument with which to play it. Thus, we may not be ordered to play one instrument. You, brother, let's say, are playing your clarinet, somebody else is playing the violin, while the French horn is my instrument and I can only accompany you. How could I play the clarinet when the notes in front of me are for the French horn? (Goszczyński, 1984, p. 289).

As Goszczyński noted down, Marszewski added, emulating Mickiewicz's style, that they should follow 'the pitchfork of Our Lord' in this respect.

The uniformity and homogeneity of the Towianist 'tone' was contested even earlier by Słowacki, who wrote in a letter to Krasieński on 17 January 1843: 'Each of us was differently moved by the master's word and each extracts his sound from a different string, which contributes to the harmony within the humble circle of brothers' (Słowacki, 1952c, p. 187). The poet's abandonment of the Circle after a mere year of participation in its work can be treated as a sign that his 'string' and the 'sound' it emitted already served some other tone and some other harmony.

The reading of the poet's mystic writings (sometimes called genesic writings, but I will disregard terminological differences and scholarly stances on the issue here) will make it possible to pinpoint a few features and to sketch the frame within which the poet situates his 'mystic musicology'. It has to be conceded, though, that the multi-generic material (including letters, speeches, dialogues, manifestos, poems, plays, the majority of them in fragments and numerous versions), enormous in scope and editorially elusive, resists interpretation and makes it difficult to reach definitive conclusions. Aware of the fact that Słowacki's Towianist and, later, genesic 'musicology' is a virtually unexplored issue, I will focus on a few aspects only.

An extensive fragment of what the publisher titled *List do J. N. Rembowskiiego* [Letter to J. N. Rembowski], Słowacki's co-brother in the Circle, positions musical tone among cosmological, theological and anthropological ruminations. The poet begins by saying: 'It's all about showing the spirits the true spiritual world, and proving the world through the visibility of form in all its details...' (Słowacki, 1952b, p. 186). For this reason, the author elaborates on a five-stage process of spiritual work and the transformation of the world. He notes, however, that the fifth activity of the spirit, meant to achieve light and warmth, failed, 'and all that has voice on the earth is sad... The sadness stems from loss of creativity in the fifth work – written everywhere on earth' (Słowacki, 1952b, p. 192). The global sadness is not nostalgia, melancholia or some other form of psychic discomfort, familiar to the poet from earlier, 'unnerving' times; it is rather a sense of imperfection, a desire for transformation expressed by the whole creation – man immersed in history, the fauna, the flora, minerals, all the elements. Słowacki makes use of a musical analogy to explain this state to the recipient of the letter, an analogy that requires a longer quotation:

Look, even our voice, having found musical particles of its tones, is written thus...
 C C-sharp D D-sharp E – F F-sharp G G-sharp A A-sharp H...
 Between the fifth and sixth tone... there is a break mysterious even to masters of harmony...
 which ends the first five tones – and begins the following seven tones with a silence... It is only
 earthly spirit that considers the sixth tone as complete... to heavenly spirits it is a dissonance – it
 is the whole reason for global sadness, for the first five tones follow the order of heavenly crea-
 tion – deriving one from another... after the pause... there is a sequence of seven tones – but
 once broken, it is in opposition to the first tones due to the break... To make peace between these
 first tones with the second group, this is what music is about, hence the chords. We can say that
 the final tones are earthly... and they correspond to the seven colours of the rainbow... as the col-
 ours that emerge after the dispersion of light belong already to the globe. Light is a pure form of
 sanctity... and we haven't seen it in its genuine form... (except on Christ's transformed face). And
 we rise in rainbow-like illuminations – and in broken instruments of pure spiritual music – to
 understand God's light (Słowacki, 1952b, p. 193).

The poet presents in this way the principle of perfecting the world and humanity crucial for his thinking, whereby pauses ('languor') of the spirit find a response in overcoming the state through radical, even brutal, transformations. He explained the process most fully in *Genezis z Duchą* [Genesis from the Spirit], in which he articulated his belief that the 'oppression' of languorous forms is necessary so that new, improved life could be begotten of them; such a paradigm of development encompassed practically everything, from inanimate nature to the

history of humanity and individual nations. It needs to be emphasized, therefore, that obstacle, lack of consonance, and dissonance are necessary elements of the spirit's movement, or, to put it differently, of the evolution in the development of forms, while a radical destructive act serves to release the potential of life. Let us consider in this context the distance between E and F tones, which I read as a metaphor of an obstacle on the way to growth, an obstacle hindering the progress of heavenly actions. I am not familiar with theories of music that Słowacki might have been referring to while speaking of a particular – negative – qualification of the distance between E and F. I believe instead that this idea might have been generated simply by a memory of the keyboard, with two white keys next to each other, without anything between them. Even if this proposition may seem simplistic to some, I would like to justify it with a reference to an image of a – visually – similar connection that turns out to be an obstacle or even a trap, present in Słowacki's other late texts. For example, in the play *Samuel Zborowski* it is a footbridge that turns out to be Satan and caves in under Atessa, postponing her existence by three thousand years:

[Lucifer]
 Ah, a log thrown
 As a bridge!
 [Prince]
 What?
 [Lucifer]
 It broke... A couple of golden shadows
 Fell into the precipice... The old man won't catch up,
 For they spread wings to the heavens
 And flew away as a couple of swans...
 Apollo's son... with Amphitrite's daughter... (Słowacki, 1952d, pp. 231–232).

E and F are not 'false' tones, as could be argued on the basis of Towiański's philosophy. The distance between them is rather an obstacle, a pause, an undesirable standstill, which disrupts the order of heavenly progress and leaves subsequent actions ('tones') as prey to the imperfect earthly order. For this reason, the latter group can only partake of the rainbow. The image may come as a surprise in light of its biblical understanding as a sign of the covenant, but here its qualification is different, for it constitutes dispersion of light instead of its desired homogenous light-ness. The world, however, has its own 'tact', hidden from those who do not understand, a system of acceleration and deacceleration, which ultimately do not damage but create.

Explaining to its recipients the foundations of the poet's system of thought, *Letter to Rembowski* also exemplifies three-stage hermeneutics, based on Origen's conceptions deployed with reference to the Bible, in which he distinguished three stages of cognition: sensory (literal understanding), psychic (allegorical reading) and spiritual (mystic). According to Ryszard Przybylski, the poet adapts this system for his own purposes, which are 'grasping the religious sense of each cultural sign' (Przybylski, 1985, p. 83). Hence, the distance between E and F is – first – two white keys; then, it is a connection that hides a trap of obstacle; and, finally, it is a space necessary for the emergence of the impulse to overcome the obstacle to be able to reach the final aim of light and warmth.

A small and cryptic untitled text – appearing in the collection as *Apologia* – that resembles an account of a dream presents the voices of a crowd accusing the dreamer, his sister and ‘the interpreter of the word’ of destroying faith and spreading poison. The experience of the siblings hidden in a granite cave is of an auditory character only. Not seeing anything, they hear aroused voices of the crowd and the calm voice of the interpreter of the word, who says: ‘I swear to Jesus Christ, my Lord, creator of all that is visible, that I have never conceived of anything against his spirit in my conscience’ (Słowacki, 1952b, p. 244). But before the siblings hidden in a cave can hear these words, the interpreter of the word ‘raised his voice after a few moments; it was clearly audible to us – yet of a changed tone: lower by a whole octave and older by half a century – its calmness of tone subduing all the shouts’ (Słowacki, 1952b, p. 243). The quoted fragment confirms the fact that Słowacki apparently remembered a conviction expressed within the Circle that ‘tone’ is a way of governing the world immersed in history.

Thinking through analogies, so common in Słowacki's later texts and so effective in poetic and artistic terms, may be difficult to comprehend in a sense that it refers to the poetics of comparison, close to classicist aesthetics, which sanctioned in this way a sense of certain ontological safety, of separateness of beings compared. Regardless of their visual character, the analogies that the poet introduces either directly or through suggestions evince a deep conviction of the unity of being, in which everything is interconnected. It is only in this way that one can see an analogy between ‘tone’ and a form of communal life that the poet was greatly attached to and which he tried to bring to life and constitute anew in the emigrant context. The form in question is confederation. As he claimed in his speech published as a brochure *Głos Brata Juliusza Słowackiego do zgromadzonych i w klub zawiązać się chcących Polaków, przedstawiający potrzebę przyjęcia nowej formy konfederacyjnej* [The statement of Brother Juliusz Słowacki to the gathered Poles wishing to form a club, arguing for the necessity of adopting a new form of confederation] (19 March 1848), ‘there is a form created by our great and cautious Forebears to protect values, which served our Nation repeatedly in the fight with external enemy or internal intriguer or foreigner. The form whose inner nature is movement and constant action’ (Słowacki, 1952b, p. 337).

Before a confederation can be forged, before freedom can find its embodiment in it, what is necessary is a *veto*, a breach in the existing legal and moral order. As a false footbridge in *Samuel Zborowski*, as disturbance of the progression of tones between E and F, for confederation, denial or absence of unanimous sequence of forms of historical being, structured into a repeatable order, opens up a new opportunity. An obstacle becomes an opportunity, while the uncovered principle of the structure of being enabled the poet to engage in original historiosophy, for which the Towianist ‘tone’ was a significant, albeit not the only, impulse.

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KRZYSZTOF LIPKA

The Fryderyk Chopin University of Music, Faculty of Dance

*Maciej Jabłoński's critique of
Mieczysław Tomaszewski's
Interpretacja integralna dzieła
muzycznego [An Integral
Interpretation of a Musical Work]*

Review article on Maciej Jabłoński's *Bonum ex integra causa... Dialog z koncepcją interpretacji integralnej Mieczysława Tomaszewskiego*

Maciej Jabłoński's criticism of the views of Mieczysław Tomaszewski appeared in a sixty-page text titled *Bonum ex integra causa... Dialog z koncepcją interpretacji integralnej Mieczysława Tomaszewskiego* [A dialogue with Mieczysław Tomaszewski's conception of integral interpretation] published in the volume *Przeciw muzykologii niewrażliwej* [Against Insensitive Musicology] (Jabłoński, 2014, pp. 271–332). Mieczysław Tomaszewski presented the conception given in the title of this text in the volume *Interpretacja integralna dzieła muzycznego. Rekonesans* [Integral interpretation of a musical work. A reconnaissance] (Tomaszewski, 2000, pp. 49–69) in the form of a twenty-page treatise titled *W stronę interpretacji integralnej dzieła muzycznego* [Towards an integral interpretation of a musical work]. In the same volume Tomaszewski included a total of nine essays. When writing his critical appraisal, Jabłoński took into account not only the text from which the volume took its title, but also referred to Tomaszewski's views expounded in other articles in the same volume, mainly to *Muzykologia wobec współczesności* [Musicology and Contemporaneity] (Tomaszewski, 2000, pp. 9–17) as well as papers published in other collections, titled *W stronę muzykologii humanistycznej* [Towards a Humanistic Musicology] (Tomaszewski, 2000) and *Nad analizą i interpretacją dzieła muzycznego. Myśli i doświadczenia* [On Analysis and Interpretation of a Musical Work. Thoughts and Experiences] (Tomaszewski, 1982, pp. 192–200).

I am certain that during this conference much will be said about Maciej Jabłoński's style of doing musicology, but I am not sure whether his writing style will also come into consideration. So, to start with, I would like to present in a few words my views on the subject. One should draw attention to the fact that Jabłoński's style of writing provided an excellent illustration of his beliefs as to how modern musicology should function. In accordance with this stance, Jabłoński's language is fully that of literature, with long, extended sentences, plaited in a manner as meandering as it is intricate. It is a language brimming with inspiration, even carelessness, free yet highly precise, vivid yet with thoughts formulated with clarity. Numerous digressions, asides, excursions (at times seemingly quite unnecessary) colour his writing and make it uniquely attractive. I use the word 'unique' quite intentionally, since in my opinion no other Polish musicologist before him wrote in a style so truly perfect, a style of undoubted aesthetic and artistic value. Even with its excessive turbulence, with the great number of errors, lapses, and even grammatical mistakes or disastrous punctuation, Jabłoński's writing soars to great intellectual heights. This is particularly significant in view of his attitude, so frequently critical that one might describe his legacy as critical musicology. When I read Maciej Jabłoński's texts, I often regret the fact that such undoubted profundity, erudition and brilliance very often concerns itself with texts which in no way deserve criticism of such quality; for many of them this is an honour.

The essay described by Jabłoński as *Dialog z koncepcją interpretacji integralnej* [A dialogue with the concept of integral interpretation] is, like most of his texts, uneven. I even have the impression that it was written in at least two stages; moreover, at least two digressions, the one concerning Ingarden's conception and the brilliant excursus into the significance of the word 'między' [between], as well as the two poetic quotations he used, are superfluous in this discussion; however, no less fascinating in spite of that. One can also recall here something for which Maciej Jabłoński was well known, and which found its expression in his deliberations: he liked to show off, which he did with inimitable, and almost touching grace and self-irony.

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At the beginning of the article which lies at the core of my reflections, Maciej Jabłoński conducts a general critique of Mieczysław Tomaszewski's conception, formulating six objections or, as he puts it 'general theses concerning my [M. J.] interpretation of Tomaszewski's view of the situation in musicology' which he regards as fundamental. When doing this, he uses phrases that are typically his, as original as they are eccentric (in the best sense), describing the totality of Tomaszewski's views as a 'mysterious-solar model'. Here we have an excellent example of Jabłoński's style: the description is original, eccentric and itself mysterious; it gives expression to irony, so frequent with Jabłoński, and the sense of humour which never left him. Further on we learn that the author understands this phrase to refer to certain 'calming procedures, [...] where the

dominant mood and methodology are those of what is positive, constructive, cohesive, [...] healing'. In other words, that which we might describe as the optimism of a familiar prescription (i.e., we know what we have been prescribed, but we do not know whether it will help).

The six consecutive general objections thus concern:

(1) the 'mysterious-solar model';

(2) the vision of the future of musicology, viewed by Tomaszewski as 'interpretation supported by the authority of history and estimable historiography', whereas in reality we live in a 'culture of exhaustion', which means that the "direction of hope" indicated by Tomaszewski, i.e., a return to humanistic-artistic research [...] is hardly realistic'. Moving on, Jabłoński thinks that

(3) Tomaszewski attributes too limited a role to the 'critical moment' and shows excessive 'critical-methodological restraint' at a time of dynamic changes. The author of the critique next notes in Tomaszewski's writing

(4) the use of 'one-sided and traditional tools', which 'today are not capable of ordering the whole range of the subjects of musicology'. According to Jabłoński

(5) Tomaszewski places too much stress on hieraticity: "unity" as the centre, "integrality", "moments", "aspects"; he uses phrases with optimistic-pompous connotations, such as 'adding splendour', when it would be more appropriate to take a dispersed view typical of today's post-modernistic stance. Finally, Jabłoński accuses his adversary of a

(6) too narrow understanding of musicology as a subject (Jabłoński, 2014, pp. 277–280); he claims that Tomaszewski is in general 'a supporter of prescriptive interpretation of our discipline' (Jabłoński, 2014, p. 277).

These are undoubtedly serious accusations, concerning the ideological stance of a scholar and researcher; in my view, undoubtedly justified. In brief, and highly simplified, they may be summarised in three points: an attitude that used to be described, in a somewhat different context, as propaganda of success; excessive optimism in assessment and prognosis; and unquestionable lack of realism in theoretical thinking. Further charges detailed in Jabłoński's text may also be reduced to these three points, in particular the frequent charge of lack of realism in assessments and proposals. Instead of being integral, Jabłoński describes Tomaszewski's conception as 'floodlighting', since it does not so much take a holistic approach as simply tries to direct a spotlight at all the consecutive phases of the aesthetic situation, to use Maria Gołaszewska's term (Gołaszewska, 1984).

The first part of Jabłoński's article consists mainly of discussions and digressions, naturally linked to his main premises; it is only in the second part of his critique that the author moves on to specific charges against Tomaszewski's conception of integral interpretation (Jabłoński, 2014, p. 295f). It is then that, keeping closely to the article about integral interpretation, he begins to formulate a number of further, more detailed objections. These are no less important for being detailed. Jabłoński, while critically questioning the various formulations of the theory, reflects on music as a text, a language, a sign, an intentional object, deprecating the inconsistencies between Tomaszewski's and Ingarden's

conceptions (which to me are immaterial)¹; he points to the narrow, nineteenth-century historiosophical horizon, the absence of declaration about the manner in which values exist, not agreeing fully with Tomaszewski's view of values; he discusses some inconsistencies, suggests others in passing, makes a start but then breaks off.

Jabłoński naturally takes this opportunity to 'have a go' at musicology as well since, as he correctly says, 'questions as to the origins of music, its ontological status, the interrelationships between music and language, the laws of perception or links between nature and culture, between that which is fundamental and primary (determining) and that which is differentiated and secondary (determined), are today examined from various points of view with increasing frequency.' However, according to Jabłoński, all in all they are examined not very often and from insufficiently differentiated points of view, and he holds it against Tomaszewski that the latter ignores them totally. Yet 'that which is inexpressible [...] the mystery of art, its metaphysical grounding, the fundamental concepts [...] continue to be important, inspiring, and at times even essential to us.'

Jabłoński extracts from Tomaszewski's text those issues the handling of which seemed to him to be especially inappropriate, but of course he travels along them guided by matters which were of greatest interest to himself. On the issue of the essence of 'integral interpretation', Jabłoński does not make a general statement, instead breaking it up into individual segments. However, taking the charges as a whole it is clear that he disagrees with the very core of 'integral interpretation', expressed most strongly by Tomaszewski in the subchapter *Zasada ontologicznej pełni* [The principle of ontological completeness]. It clearly stands out among Tomaszewski's other chapters since, while the other fragments relate to issues that are profoundly obvious, that part of the text postulates something inherently impossible. Disregarding the fact that the sense of this paragraph, according to Jabłoński, does not at all ensue from the problematics of Ingarden's well-known text on music, Tomaszewski postulates here a kind of interpretation of a musical composition that, were it truly possible, at least in some limited sense, it would undoubtedly become integral.

In response, Maciej Jabłoński quotes a number (six to be exact) of possible ways of understanding the term 'integrality' (Jabłoński, 2014, pp. 319–320), arguing that what Tomaszewski is concerned with is something fundamentally different. I will not quote here these individual explanations; what is important is that all of them together, obviously point to integrality understood, with some nuances, as completeness, a totality. However, Tomaszewski's understanding of integrality is purely mechanical; the author of 'integral interpretation' would like to add up and synthesise all possible interpretations together, in order to create one total, complete one. Apart from the fact that most individual interpretations usually contradict each other to some extent, if such a synthetic interpretation were possible, all hermeneutics, with its never-ending interpreting, would be unnecessary fiction. Tomaszewski, however, has come up with a prescription

¹ In my view, intention is an act of a living being, and an object is not intentional, intentional is only an act by a conscious entity.

for his integration, which should be carried out in four stages. Jabłoński's comment on this is brief: 'I am also intrigued by the division of the process, [which] provides a somewhat limited model, one that knocks out from the picture some quite significant aspects' (Jabłoński, 2014, pp. 310–311). What is even worse, Tomaszewski seems to be unaware that in each of these proposed four stages the interpretation is a totally different process, requiring a totally different definition.

Mieczysław Tomaszewski wants to encompass the whole process of a work's dissemination, or as he says 'its realisation in the space of culture', within four phases: creation, performance, reception, and collective experience of a musical work, i.e., to unite four processes extremely distant from each other into one unity which it is impossible to imagine. Some time ago Maria Gołaszewska provided an excellent solution to this problem (Gołaszewska, 1984) by introducing the concept of 'aesthetic situation', precisely in order to unite all these phases. This can only be done at such an extraordinarily general level as a situation, since in fact it is a long chain of a composition's functioning within society that can only be joined into some extended aesthetic whole purely arbitrarily; there is no other way of hammering the separate segments together to make them one (Jabłoński, 2014, pp. 316–317).

Jabłoński regards this ordering of the phases of the functioning of a musical composition as limited in four ways; he also regards as particularly untrue the idea that all four aesthetic elements are present only in some of Tomaszewski's phases and not – as would seem obvious – in all four of them.

In truth, I am fully in agreement that it is impossible, in spite of Tomaszewski's mistaken claim, for some integral interpretation of a musical composition to encompass together its creative aspect, performance, reception and its life in a community, and then to add up these consecutive actions and also draw from them some common interpretative conclusions. When we examine more closely the four individual components of what is a complex process, the falseness of this vision becomes striking.

1) The 'creative conception' of a composer's work arises as a result of a complex psychological process (emotional-intuitive-volitional-intellectual), of which the author is aware only in the most general outline; behind the creation of every composition there are innumerable components: its author's innate predispositions, upbringing, societal, cultural and national influences, education, as well as the influence of all works from all possible arts and epochs; creation also involves memory, imagination, inspiration, inventiveness, talent, the unconscious, the passions etc., in other words everything that exists, dreams or acts within the psyche of an artist. One may analyse a completed score, but everything beyond what results from the notation can only be guessed at; even the author's declarations are usually not reliable or coherent. Thus even at the point of considering the creative process itself, the possibility of its integral interpretation is an illusion.

2) In the phase of 'artistic realisation' (performance) we are dealing with a plurality raised to an unknown power. Every composition is performed on many occasions by thousands of performers, in a great variety of places and at different times; sometimes it is recorded and published, sometimes it is not. No

artist ever interprets the same work in an identical way every time. There is thus no such thing as the 'phase of realisation'; once a work has become public it is in a state of permanent interpretation not capable of being traced. In order to carry out integral interpretation of a work's artistic realisation one would have to interpret all its performances in existence without exception; moreover, the artist who performs the work is in the same unclear inner artistic and psychological situation as its composer. The idea of integral interpretation of the realisation of any individual composition is thus a pipe dream.

3) Identical problems arise in investigating 'aesthetic perception'. When one musician plays a composition, it is received by millions of listeners, and everything further on is multiplied beyond imagining. Moreover, even when listening to the same recording, the perception of it will be different on each occasion for each listener. There is also no method of investigating even selected examples of perception understood in this way. Thus even this stage of the social functioning of a work cannot be analysed, and its integral interpretation is a pipe dream.

4) Finally, the phase of 'cultural reception' is simply a duplication of the perceptual situation. 'Intersubjectivity and objectivisation', which is how Tomaszewski describes the last of the four segments, is only an illusion produced by statistical optics. Every reception by every experient is totally different and as changeable as perception, and as unclear, and here the pipe dream is duplicated again (Jabłoński, 2014, pp. 310–314).

Thus, if we want to follow Tomaszewski in dividing the aesthetic situation into the four stages described above, then none of these stages individually and in itself provides the possibility of conducting an integral interpretation. Let alone of combining them into a unified whole.

And here I repeat the fundamental argument (not clearly formulated by Jabłoński): the composer's interpretation is something totally different from the performer's interpretation, while the interpretations of perception and reception also have to be different; these four diverse interpretations have only one point of contact: the same work, the identity of which, by the way, is not quite clear (even for Ingarden).

However, even more puzzling is yet another aspect of Tomaszewski's conception. The author adopted the principle of integral interpretation in the 'cultural space,' therefore he must have conceived somehow of a common denominator for all the four phases associated with the social functioning of a work. Thus, even if we ignore the unimaginable task of encompassing the multiplicity and diversity of aspects to be interpreted in each segment without exception of this supposedly holistic process – and in principle it is theoretically possible, e.g. we select statements by a composer, an outstanding performer and a perfect recipient (even though there is no integration here), in order to work out some average of the subjects' attitudes – one nevertheless needs some common platform for all the individual manifestations of a work of art to coexist. The somewhat nebulous term 'cultural space' does not solve the problem, since it is purely conventional and does not make it possible for all these interpretations to come together within it in a productive way. One would need to find some existential point where

the creative, performative and receptive processes might come together if only symbolically, and be synthetised into that hypothetical integral interpretation. There could only be one such point: the place of some ideal Platonic existence above or beyond the world, among eternal ideas, where one might gather effects of integral analyses and interpretations to one's heart content until the end of the history of the universe. However, I do not think that Mieczysław Tomaszewski would be satisfied with such a solution.

Additionally (as if the foregoing was not enough), I regard as the key argument against 'integral interpretation' (and not only that) Maciej Jabłoński's statement: 'notabene, I am of the opinion that no 'state' of knowledge – in particular knowledge about art – at a given "historical moment", and taking into account the parameters which organize such knowledge – is [or can be! – K. L.] satisfactory, while the need to look for new solutions and formulation of new points of view is forced on the interpreters by the works/objects themselves, since it is also in their nature to subvert our knowledge about them' (Jabłoński, 2014, p. 305). In principle, this is demonstrated by the history of every branch of science, all knowledge, including philosophy, and in the light of this regularity no 'integral interpretation' is possible.

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Both articles discussed here, Tomaszewski's and Jabłoński's, encompass a large number of significant problems in our branch of learning, which cannot be fully summarised in one paper, especially since solutions to the fundamental issues continue to be doubtful. I must therefore limit myself to that which has already been said, but I would like to summarise my somewhat different opinion in a few points, since I think that without a constructive conclusion my contribution would have no purpose.

Firstly, I hold it against Tomaszewski that his conception is fully based on utopian premises which, unfortunately, the author takes seriously. I understand (and pursue myself) some utopian deliberations, even in a similar spirit (personally I am no stranger to the 'soteriological tone', to use M. J.'s term), but I do it principally in an essayistic style, interpreting philosophy of art as precisely a kind of art, and not a science. Moreover, I have a tendency to apply reductive measures to any doctrinaire claims, precisely in the name of the humanities. On the other hand, Tomaszewski presents his wholly irrational utopia with all the majesty of a theoretical science of the highest order this seems to me not only unreasonable, but simply unacceptable.

Jabłoński's analysis demonstrates that Tomaszewski did not fully think through his own theory, and it would be hard to disagree with this. However, it is worth noting that many of Tomaszewski's ideas (even though banal) testify to what is known as noble intentions, such as concern for the crisis of values and the desire to save them. Neither is Jabłoński driven by pure objectivism: he questions Tomaszewski's conception in all possible ways: on its ontology, ethics, aesthetics, and above all the axiology of a work of music; however, he is perfectly

aware that not only he, Jabłoński, cannot provide the answers to these issues, but probably nobody in the whole world has provided such unequivocal answers to date, as he admits himself (Jabłoński, 2014, pp. 303–395).

Secondly, in my view, a comment is required on Jabłoński's suggestion that today one needs to abandon exalted-sounding concepts such as a work of art, completeness, unity, spiritual message, together with their attributes relating to loftiness, spirituality etc. True, I also feel that Tomaszewski's attitude on that point is too harsh and too old-fashioned, too solemn and subservient, and at the same time too dry, lacking lyricism. However, I cannot fully agree with Jabłoński that this kind of musicological language should be done away with altogether. There exist, and what is more, are still universally relevant, masterpieces by Bach, Beethoven, Brahms, Mahler, Debussy and many others, and no scholarship can cease to pay them their deserved homage, even if merely verbal. Over time, the spirit of many generations has adhered to these masterpieces and I have the impression that the spirit of our times also does not regard them as undeserving of homage. We should not do away with terms that are rightly elevated only because the period which came after the works generally regarded as masterpieces were produced is lacking in such masterpieces. If they are lacking not because of shortage of talent but because there has been a change in the way of thinking, in a situation when the creative means are being exhausted, then the old achievements should be valued even more highly and retain their lofty status; that status comes not from excessive pathos or emphasis, but simply from historiosophical truth.

It is also not impossible that the stances of Tomaszewski and Jabłoński could, to a large extent, be reconciled within Nicolai Hartmann's doctrine of three spiritual strata of being. There it would turn out that works of art (as discussed by Tomaszewski) belong to the stratum of objectified spirit, while the actions, performances and interpretations belong in the domain of activities of the individual spirit, obviously supported by the objectified spirit. The question remains whether both sides would be satisfied with such a solution.

Thirdly, the above leads to an obvious suggestion. If today we divide art as a whole into classical and modern; classical in the sense of the traditional paradigm, including, let us say, Stravinsky and Hindemith, and even Lutosławski and Penderecki, but alongside it we have avant-garde, performative, multi-medial, post-internet works etc., then we should simply have an analogous division of aesthetics into two separate areas: that which will use traditional language to talk about works of art and their spiritual message, and that which must find its own new language, new tools of analysis and new evaluation criteria. The situation will then be clear. Personally I would propose that a set of new aesthetic categories should be created, which instead of beauty, loftiness etc. will postulate such attributes as inventiveness, performativity or the element of surprise. It will then become obvious which language should be used in relation to traditional art, and which applies to new art. Then the whole conflict, not only between people and even metalanguages, but also between attitudes, will be resolved all by itself.

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